At long last, the Supreme Court has decided Sierra Club v. Morton, 2 ELR 20192 (Apr. 19, 1972). Heralded as the decision that would adopt, clarify, and perhaps expand the liberal view of the Second Circuit on the standing of environmental groups to bring public interest lawsuits, Sierra Club v. Morton instead rejects the Second Circuit view in an opinion that avoids major constitutional issued and requires, somewhat imprecisely, that environmental groups allege individualized harm to themselves or their members in order to maintain actions.

Congress intended for the National Environmental Policy Act to have a major impact on the manner in which the federal government formulates national policy affecting the environment. To achieve this result, NEPA declares a separate national environmental policy and sets out the obligations of federal agencies toward full implementation of that policy. No part of the NEPA process is more important to sound federal policymaking than the requirement of §102(2)(C)(iii) and §102(2)(D) that agencies fully consider alternative courses of action before setting federal policy. NRDC v.

This month, ELR is publishing three sets of materials of interest to ELR users concerned with federal transportation programs.

Sections of the Federal Power Commission's procedural compliance guidelines for the implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act have recently been struck down by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 2 ELR 20017 (2d Cir. Jan. 17, 1972).

The recent case of Illinois v. Milwaukee, 2 ELR 20201 (U.S. 1972), clears the way for the federal district courts to apply federal common-law principles in the resolution of interstate environmental controversies. This new development, which was first discussed in ELR comments on Texas v. Pankey, 1 ELR 20089 (10th Cir. 1971), and Ohio v. Wyandotte, 1 ELR 20124 (U.S. 1971), carves out an important exception to the Erie doctrine and definitely enlarges the role the federal courts can play in environmental protection.

Three recent state court cases have further enlarged the public's right of use and access to the nation's ocean shoreline. These three decisions join a steadily developing body of state case and statutory law that over the past decade has afforded increasing protection to public rights, not only in recreational beaches, but in wetlands that nourish and protect shellfish, fish, and wildlife as well.

Standing lingers as a problem for environmental groups, whose lawyers, even after Sierra Club v. Morton, 2 ELR 20192 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972), must continue to brief and argue the point. The trend of the cases, however, definitely continues toward liberalized standing, as ELR suggested in our earlier comment on the Mineral King decision (2 ELR 10034).

The state of Oregon has adopted stringent standards on emissions into air and water and permissible noise levels within areas established under the 1964 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1131 et seq., ELR 41412. The standards will be found at ELR 49001. The establishment of the standards itself raises interesting questions of exclusive federal jurisdiction and federal preemption. See the Opinion of the Oregon Attorney General, ELR Dig. [250]. It is the effect of the standards, however, that this Comment discusses.

Michigan has recently enacted a statute for the protection of state wildernesses, wildlands, and natural areas. The Wilderness and Natural Areas Act of 1972 (ELR 43003), House Bill No. 4881, was signed by the governor on August 3, 1972. The Act defines a wilderness area as a tract of undeveloped state land or water that is either 3,000 acres or more in size or is an island of any size which: