There seems to be agreement across a wide spectrum of those involved in Superfund cleanups that such cleanups should take into consideration the kinds of activities that are expected to take place at the site after the remedial work is completed. While cleaning every site to levels suitable for all conceivable uses may be a laudable goal, doing so can impose costs that are out of proportion to the added amount of protection obtained.

Editors' Summary: Under CERCLA, a liable party cannot transfer its liability, yet it can contractually arrange for a third party to ultimately bear the financial burden of that liability. The applicability of these contractual allocations of environmental liability generally hinges on judicial interpretation of representations, warranties, indemnities, and releases. This Article surveys the case law on contractual allocation of CERCLA liability. Addressing legal issues unique to particular types of contractual provisions, the Article recommends ways to use and draft such provisions.

Editors' Summary: Despite adding the §113(f) "contribution" provision to CERCLA in 1986, Congress did not indicate whether the section was meant to supplement private parties' efforts to recover response costs form other potentially responsib parties's efforts to recover response costs form other potentially responsible parties under CERCLA §107 or was meant to preclude such cost recovery actions. More and more courts that address this issue are requiring plaintiffs to file §113(f) actions.

Editors' Summary: Institutional controls are a mechanism for providing a certain degree of safety in the absence of technology that could clean contaminated sites thoroughly. Institutional controls come in a variety of forms, each of which can be designed to meet specific site needs. Flexible but long-lasting mechanisms such as institutional controls can be used to ensure that land uses continue to be compatible with the level of cleanup at a site.

Editor's Summary: In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its most recent pronouncement on the executive foreign affairs preemption doctrine in American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi. In this Article, Kimberly Breedon argues that lower courts are prone to overbroad applications of Garamendi because the Court assumed the presence of three elements when it developed the standard for executive foreign affairs preemption of state law: (1) formal source law; (2) nexus to a foreign entity; and (3) indication of intent by the executive to preempt the state law under challenge.

Editors' Summary: The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on three takings cases in its 2004 term: Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; Kelo v. City of New London; and San Remo Hotel, Ltd. Partnership v. City & County of San Francisco. In Lingle, the Court struck down the "substantially advance" test set forth in Agins v. City of Tiburon. Kelo, which gained attention from the media and public, upheld the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes. And San Remo involved a relatively straightforward procedural issue.