This Article explains that the conventional view of agency behavior—following the specific direction of the U.S. Congress or the president and using notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication processes—does not capture how public agencies and private entities develop innovative regulatory strategies and earn regulatory authority as a result. In particular, this Article explains how governmental agencies like the U.S.

In Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal Energy Leasing, Prof. Jayni Foley Hein assesses inefficiencies in the federal fossil fuel leasing program that lead to the over-extraction of fossil fuels at great societal cost. In recognition of the U.S. Department of the Interior’s (DOI's) role in stewarding federal lands for the long-term benefit of the American people, Hein proposes that DOI should adopt a policy of seeking to maximize social welfare or “net public benefits” in its leasing decisions.

The externality costs of fossil fuel production—including pollution costs—are not accounted for under the U.S. Department of the Interior’s (Interior) coal, oil, and natural gas leasing programs. This results in fossil fuel production on public lands imposing significant social costs. Interior’s leasing programs have never been tailored to meet any past or present climate change goals, despite their significant contribution to domestic greenhouse gas emissions.