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Are Citizen Suits CERCLA §113(h)'s Unintended Victims?

Editors' Summary: CERCLA §113(h), with some exceptions, prohibits legal challenges to response actions until the cleanup at a Superfund site is completed. While the section's sponsors hoped to prevent potentially responsible parties (PRPs) from using such challenges to delay their financial responsibilities, several federal courts have held that §113(h) also bars citizen suits brought to enforce the FWPCA, RCRA, and other environmental laws at Superfund sites.

CERCLA Cleanup at Federal Facilities: The Misunderstood Relationship Between Sections 104, 113(h), and 120

Editors' Summary: In 1986, in an effort to expedite cleanups at Superfund sites, Congress enacted SARA, which among other things added §113(h) to CERCLA. Section §113(h) bars "preenforcement" challenges to response actions under §104 and cleanup orders issued under §106. SARA also amended CERCLA by adding §120, which provides for cleanup at federal facilities. Although §113(h) does not explicitly apply to §120 cleanups, the question has arisen whether it nevertheless does apply to them.

Application of EPA's Municipal Settlement Policy in the Wake of the AlliedSignal Decision

Editors' Summary: The Municipal Settlement Policy, an EPA guidance that addresses CERCLA settlements with municipalities that owned co-disposal landfills or were generators or transporters of waste disposed of at such sites, has been the subject of considerable opposition from industry groups. Although a federal district court rejected a facial challenge to the policy based on EPA's statements that it did not intend to apply it inflexibly, in the first decision examining the policy "as applied" a district court recently rejected the proposed settlement.

Superfund Reauthorization: A More Modest Proposal

Editors' Summary: For over three years, Congress has been trying to reauthorize and revise CERCLA. Reauthorization bills introduced in the 103d, 104th, and 105th Congresses have proposed extensive changes intended to "fix" a program that many people consider to be "broken." In this Article, an Assistant Attorney General for Natural Resources in the New Mexico Office of the Attorney General suggests that the Superfund program is not as flawed as its critics charge. He argues that the statute only needs some fine-tuning.

A Shorter, Simpler Approach to Superfund Reauthorization

Since its creation in 1980, the Superfund program has overcome a number of obstacles. It survived embarrassing political scandals in its first few years. It endured a failure to reauthorize the underlying statute in 1985, a lapse that led to widespread disruptions at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and set the program back significantly. It has persevered in the face of attacks from many sides.

Superfund in the 106th Congress

By the beginning of the 106th Congress, comprehensive legislative reform of the Superfund statute had consumed six fruitless years of effort. Adopting a new approach, the Administration decided to seek narrow, targeted legislation. In testimony that would be repeated several times in 1999, the U.S.

The <i>Burlington</i> Court's Flawed Arithmetic

On May 4, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States. The decision is of major significance with respect to two areas of Superfund jurisprudence--"arranger" liability, and divisibility or apportionment of harm. This Article is concerned only with the latter issue and, moreover, only with one specific element of that issue.

 

Restatement for Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA After <i>Burlington Northern</i>

This past May, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time addressed two issues that the U.S. Congress left open in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). These issues are: (1) the scope of "generator" or "arranger" liability under the language of CERCLA §107(a)(3); and (2) the circumstances under which a liable party under §1073 may be held jointly and severally liable. Rejecting the position of the U.S.