Editors' Summary

I. Introduction and Overview

Editors' Summary: Since the Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos v. United States, courts, practitioners, and scholars have continued to discuss Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's significant nexus test. Under this test, to protect a wetland one must establish that there is a significant nexus between the wetland and a traditional navigable water. In this Article, authors William W. Sapp, Rebekah Robinson, and M. Allison Burdette suggest that the nearer a traditional navigable water is to the wetland, the better the chance of establishing that there is a significant nexus between the two.

Above my desk at work, I keep a button that reads "Save the Ugly Animals Too." It is a reminder that more than just the charismatic megafauna, such as wolves and bald eagles and grizzly bears and whales, are worth conserving. From the standpoint of protecting the web of life, including the ecosystems that benefit us all by providing services such as water purification, flood control, nurseries for our fish and shellfish, and opportunities for outdoor recreation, it is often as important to conserve the lesser known species, the cogs and wheels that drive those ecosystems.

In a recent essay, Katrina Wyman suggests four substantial reforms aimed at improving implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and furthering species recovery: (1) decoupling listing decisions from permanent species protection;3 (2) requiring the Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) to implement cost-effective species protection measures;5 (3) prioritizing funding for biological hotspots;6 and (4) establishing additional protected areas.

Katrina Wyman has penned a bold, provocative, and innovative critique of the capability of the Endangered Species Act (ESA or Act) to meet the challenges of an increasingly human-dominated world. Bold because the ESA, perhaps more than any other environmental law, has impassioned champions who disfavor dissent. It is no easy task to critique a law with the truly noble mission to preserve life other than our own, particularly when the law's basic premise is that the mission's success is critically dependent on abundant and altruistic actions by us.

Despite the recent furor over the environmental damage threatened by the Republican-dominated 104th Congress, the so-called salvage logging bill—a rider on a budget-rescissions bill—so far is one of the few changes to environmental protection programs actually signed into law. One should not assume, however, that the logging rider's ability to survive a presidential veto means that it is an innocuous compromise.

The last 18 months have produced particularly interesting juridical and administrative pronouncements in the areas of Clean Water Act (CWA or Act) jurisdiction, permits, standards, citizen suits, and other enforcement. On the jurisdictional front, we learned that "deep ripping" constitutes an "addition" of a pollutant by a "point source." We also learned that 25-year-old cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.

Since the enactment of the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act) 28 years ago, the federal courts have been called upon to sort out the respective roles of the federal and state governments in connection with numerous aspects of the statute's implementation and enforcement. Congress has superimposed an additional layer of complexity on the CWA experiment in creative federalism—the citizen suit provision.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. may prove to be the most important environmental decision since Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Laidlaw's primary significance lies in its discussion of the injury component of the U.S. Supreme Court's now familiar three-part standing test.