In the past few years, owners of contaminated land, seeking to supplement possible causes of action under the Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and under state common law and state statutes, increasingly have looked to §7002(a)(1)(B) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to shift responsibility for remediation costs to former owners or operators.
Editors' Summary: Although the Clean Air Act is the primary tool used for controlling air toxics, the dramatic increase in toxic tort cases brought under common-law theories such as nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability for ultrahazardous activities has raised concern in the industrial community that compliance with regulatory requirements may not protect industry from large-scale toxic tort liability. This Article analyzes the implications of common-law liability on the selection of air quality controls.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA) represent federal regulatory regimes for protecting the environment. Although each statute initially places administrative responsibility in the hands of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), each encourages states, to varying degrees, to take primary responsibility for implementing the statutory regime.
In Environmental Federalism Part 1: The History of Overfiling Under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA Prior to Harmon, Smithfield, and CLEAN, the history of judicial and administrative decisions relating to overfiling under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA) was analyzed. The history showed that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with limited exceptions, generally was understood to have overfiling authority under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA. The limited exceptions focused on two situations.
In the span of just a few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has brought the venerable constitutional concept of federalism back to life with a vengeance. In the 1999 Term alone, the Rehnquist Court struck down three federal laws for violating basic principles of federalism and narrowly construed a fourth to avoid any conflict with those precepts.
Editors' Summary: This past summer, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 28 ELR 21119 (1998). The Court held that an environmental group's challenge to a U.S. Forest Service land and resource management plan for the Wayne National Forest in Ohio was not ripe for review. This Article examines how this decision affects the rules for judicial review of national forest plans.
One of the more daunting tasks facing environmental practitioners over the past decade or two has been the recovery of cleanup costs and related relief at sites contaminated with petroleum substances. Parties seeking relief face significant hurdles under the federal environmental statutes. The key federal environmental cost-recovery statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) often provides little help because of its petroleum exclusion.
Conventional wisdom says that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is an impediment to the reuse of brownfields. Examination of a decade of experience, however, reveals that properties "captured by the net" of RCRA jurisdiction have gone on to new, productive, and economically viable reuse. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is also a great potential for many more RCRA properties to do so.
In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly upheld orders issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to §§113(a)(5) and 167 of the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act), prohibiting construction of a new power generator unit at a mine in Northwest Alaska.
For the last several years, federal circuit courts have debated the exact jurisdictional scope of §404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Secretary of the U.S. Army (the Army), acting through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), to issue permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." The circuit courts have based their debates on the assumption, well-supported by earlier CWA decisions, that Congress intended the term "navigable waters" within the CWA to extend to the limits of the U.S. Commerce Clause.