The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899¹ is one of the oldest federal statutes providing for control of water pollution and obstructions in navigable waters.

Ever since national programs to control pollution were first considered, policy makers and scholars have argued about whether the force of law, through regulation, or the force of the market, through economic incentives, would be the more effective and efficient approach.¹ The arguments for regulation are that it is a more direct and certain means of attaining environmental quality goals because it works through clear, measurable standards which specify exactly how much each polluter may emit, and that it demonstrates clearly the national moral commitment to eradic

In 1977, after seven years of intense debate, Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),¹ one of the most far-reaching federal land-use laws. The Act was intended to alleviate widespread environmental abuses caused by surface coal mining operations by imposing stringent uniform federal standards on mining operations. Enforcement of the standards rests with participating states through federally approved state programs, or with the federal government in lieu of states that do not want to assume that responsibility.

Given that the business of producing and transporting oil is "an enterprise which will eventually cause pollution,"¹ and that 60 percent of the oil produced in the world is transported on or across water,² it may not be surprising that an estimated 10,000 spills of oil and hazardous substances annually pollute the navigable waters of the United States.³ The recently aroused interest in off-shore oil production is certain to increase the incidence of oil spills.

Pesticides are used worldwide to control destructive plants and animals and are partially responsible for greater crop production, a decreased incidence of debilitating diseases such as malaria, and generally improved standards of living. Over 1.4 billion pounds of pesticides are produced annually, with approximately 1,400 active ingredients formulated into some 40,000 end-use products.¹ Development of these products and the necessary support data often requires many years of effort and an investment of millions of dollars.

The application of cost-benefit analysis to environmental health and safety regulation, although criticized for obstructing the achievement of legislated health and environmental goals,¹ has been hailed as the cure for the adverse economic impacts resulting from such regulation. Industry complaints that environmental regulation costs too much has led to congressional and administrative efforts to make regulations more "efficient" by requiring costs of controls to be justified by greater benefits.

The drive for "regulatory reform" is now in its ascendency as a dominant influence on federal regulatory policy.

Over the last two years, the federal common law of nuisance has been described in these pages as a "potent legal tool"¹ the significance of which, due to its "revolutionary growth,"² could foreseeably rival the citizen suit provisions in the major federal environmental statutes.³ These observations were not hyperbole.

The cornerstone of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 is the requirement that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set geographically uniform national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). Congress' goal of assuring healthy air quality across the nation is embodied in its commitment to achieve attainment of the NAAQS by prescribed dates.

The federal consistency provisions embodied in §§307(c) and 307(d) of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),¹ have, for almost a decade, been a lurking presence in the federal coastal zone management program. These provisions were designed to ensure that actions for which the federal government has responsibility conform to state coastal zone management objectives. Although the interaction in the consistency process among federal agencies such as the Department of the Interior, the U.S.