Editors' Summary: In this second of a three-part series, the authors examine the knowledge element in environmental crimes. They point out that while mens rea—or "guilty knowledge"—is a required element of most criminal offenses, a distinguishing feature of environmental crimes is that they require minimal proof of knowledge to sustain a conviction.

Editors' Summary: In this last of a three-part series, the authors provide a "how-to" guide for responding to an environmental criminal investigation and discuss the ramifications of an environmental criminal conviction. They first describe several basic procedures that the target of a governmental investigation should follow, emphasizing that the first and best line of defense is to have in place an effective environmental self-auditing program to identify pollution threats and to correct minor problems before they become serious.

Editors' Summary: After three years of work, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has essentially completed its voluntary environmental management systems standard—ISO 14001. This Article reviews the standard's development, summarizes its goals and key elements, and discusses potential approaches to conforming to the standard. Next, the Article analyzes potential domestic applications of the standard in the context of current federal efforts to encourage private compliance-assurance programs.

In 1994, a California case called Titan Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.¹ seemed to signal the closing of the door on insureds' hopes for insurance coverage for environmental cleanups under the Personal Injury section of their commercial general liability policies. However, a recent California Court of Appeal case, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,² may mean that the door remains ajar.

This past year has been one of upheaval and trauma for environmentalists. The issues have been big, fought out at the highest levels of government and in headlines and TV sound bites. The stakes are high, higher than at any time in the quarter century since the movement's birth.

Project XL is built on the simple premise that in many cases companies know their business a whole lot better than the government does; that they understand how best to reduce their own pollution; that we will all benefit if private enterprise brings its energy, its innovation, its creativity to the task of reducing pollution ….

President Clinton¹

If it isn't illegal, it isn't XL.

Motto of EPA staff²

Over the past few years, regulated industry's criticism of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) approach to enforcing environmental requirements has increased. Perhaps emboldened by shifts in Congress' composition, the Agency's industrial critics have argued that EPA's arm's-length approach to enforcement, with an emphasis on sanctioning violators and deterring other parties from committing violations, is now anachronistic and unneeded.

In June 1992, delegates from nearly every nation in the world, including 107 heads of state or government, participated in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), or Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro. Their most important work was Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan of action for sustainable development.¹ The United States, led by President George Bush, endorsed Agenda 21. Agenda 21 was premised on the simple and appealing idea that the real work of the conference would occur afterwards, in a variety of contexts, all over the world.

In an effort to address the well-documented and serious problem of environmental justice in the United States, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order (EO) No. 12898¹ on February 11, 1994. The EO represented the culmination of a century of rapid changes in society's attitudes toward the placement of hazardous facilities in poor, disadvantaged, and minority communities, as well as the denial of services to these communities. This survey examines the impact of the EO on federal agencies.²

Prior to the New Deal, the American judiciary was highly suspicious of regulatory legislation, which was viewed as upsetting the common law's support for private property interests and freedom of contract. Laissez-faire policies reigned. Regulatory statutes were vulnerable to invalidation under a variety of constitutional theories, including substantive due process, federalism and, for a brief period of time, delegating legislative authority to the executive branch, a constitutional offense under separation-of-powers principles.