Christopher Stone is absolutely right in pointing out that formulations of the precautionary principle are widely varying, often incredibly vague, and all too frequently not "particularly helpful." Despite this (or perhaps, in fact, because of the perceived palatability of vague formulations), the principle has become widespread in domestic and international law and policy. Organizations from the United Nations (U.N.) to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the World Trade Organization, as well as nations such as Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United States, and many others are known to have endorsed one form or the other of the principle. Certainly it would seem, then, that one worry that cannot be plaguing proponents of the precautionary principle is that it is not getting enough recognition.

Proponents of the precautionary principle should, however, be quite worried about the flaws in the literature that Stone has pointed out. First, there ought to be concern about the sheer multitude and disarray of distinct theoretical formulations of the precautionary principle. Proponents of the principle ought to be concerned that the principle's uptake into law and policy is not going to result in effective action to prevent possible harm. An overabundance of variety in theoretical formulations of the principle will (and has) without a doubt translate(d) into an overabundance of formulations of the principle in law and policies. This disarray will most certainly translate into disarray in, for instance, what is thought to be the proper application of the precautionary principle. Such a disunified precautionary front is certainly less likely to be successful in supporting rigorous and appropriate precautionary action. Second, there ought to be concern about the vagueness of the formulations of the precautionary principle that lawmakers and policymakers are adopting. Such vague formulations have been adopted, I imagine, primarily for two reasons: (1) the vast disarray of theoretical versions of the precautionary principle; and (2) the fact that the formulations are often sufficiently vague so as to allow interpretations of them that do not demand much at all.