Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs

August 2008
Citation:
38
ELR 10539
Issue
8
Author
Jonathan Remy Nash

Editor's Summary: Prof. Jonathan Nash suggests that it may be possible to construct a viable development rights trading regime that would protect ecosystems and endangered species by relying on lessons from other trading programs, such as air emissions credits. Virginia Albrecht finds the analogy to air emissions credits weak because it fails to take into account the private-property rights inherent in land, the many competing demands on land use, and the fungibility of air. Michael Bean believes there are some lessons to be learned by considering development rights trading schemes, but that ultimately they are unlikely to succeed given current limitations to our knowledge about species and habitat.

Jonathan Remy Nash is Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law, and until July 2008 was Robert C. Cudd Professor of Environmental Law at Tulane Law School. He was a Visiting Scholar at Columbia Law School for fall 2005, Visiting Associate Professor at Hofstra Law School for fall 2006, and Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago Law School for the 2007-2008 academic year. A version of this Article was originally published at 32 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (2007), and is reprinted with permission.
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