Ohio v. Wyandotte, 1 ELR 20124, decided by the Supreme Court on March 23, 1971, puts to rest expectations that the Court might actively employ its original jurisdiction to hear environmental lawsuits brought by a state against citizens of another state. The decision sets out a reasonable policy toward the present-day allocation of judicial business in a complicated national system of courts, but it raises important questions about (1) how far the Court will go in upholding the constitutionality of the expanded state court in personam jurisdiction necessary as an alternative to the Court's original jurisdiction, and (2) the soundness of the Court's dictum that similar cases when brought in lower federal courts would require the application of state law under the Erie doctrine.

In Ohio v. Wyandotte, the state of Ohio moved for leave to file a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to enjoin three chemical manufacturers from dumping toxic mercury into streams whose courses ultimately reach Lake Erie, polluting its waters, fish, and vegetation and causing an alleged public nuisance.The Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, because the public nuisance theory advanced by Ohio was premised on local law that Ohio's state courts are competent to consider, because various national and international governmental units are investigating the pollution involved, and because resolution of the case by the Supreme Court would require novel and complex factual determinations that are outside the Court's general competence and, further, do not raise the important questions of federal law that is the Court's primary responsibility. Jurisdiction was denied even though jurisdiction in similar nuisance actions was granted four times between 1901 and 1931,¹ and even though the Court admits that "it may have initially been contemplated that this Court would always exercise its original jurisdiction when called upon to do so." 1 ELR 20125. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote for the majority, with Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent.