The Price-Anderson Act (the Act)¹ is the legal backbone for the development of civilian nuclear power in the United States, and for the conduct of nuclear weapons complex environmental cleanup. Initially enacted in 1957, and amended since, the Act was intended to limit the accident liability of nongovernmental entities that produce nuclear power and/or work with nuclear materials and provide compensation for injury and damages caused by accidents.²

The Act is scheduled to expire on August 1, 2002, in the absence of congressional reauthorization.³ On the surface, this year's debate over reauthorization might seem another set piece debate between proponents and opponents of nuclear power. Proponents of the Act point out that the Act is essential to the continued operation of the nuclear power plants which provide 20% of the nation's electric power supply and that the total amounts paid out under the Act since the 1950s has been relatively small.⁴ Opponents argue that the Act is a subsidy that puts the public's thumbs on scale in favor of nuclear power (as opposed to alternatives such as renewable resources) and that, after decades of operation, the industry should be able to sink or swim on its own.

Lost in this debate is the reality that, whether one is, or is not, a proponent of the Act's renewal, developments since the last (1988) reauthorization raise basic questions that beg public and congressional review prior to any reauthorization.