The federal government's commitment to environmental protection has weakened considerably since 1970-1971. Perhaps nothing better symbolizes this shift than Secretary of Transportation William Coleman's recent decision to permit the Concorde supersonic transport (SST) to land in the United States.¹ This authorization contrasts with Congress' 1971 vote to cancel federal funding of a United States SST.

In both energy and environmental terms, the Concorde SST exemplifies the costs which often accompany technological achievements. With technology, man can accomplish feats once thought beyond his powers, but the price to be paid is often severe. Developments in aviation technology have made it possible to fly faster than the speed of sound, but only at the expense of severe supersonic air drag. As a result, to achieve a modicum of fuel efficiency, as SST must be designed with a slim fuselage, slender engines and a short, thin, low-lift wing. Compared with less sleek subsonic jets, these design constraints mean reduced passenger capacity and noisy operation: the low-lift SST wing demands extra engine thrust on landing and takeoff, and the slim engine design and high engine exhaust velocity needed for efficient supersonic operation preclude use of noise-suppressing techniques now available for subsonic jet engines.²