Improving State Environmental Enforcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountability and Other Strategies

August 2003
Citation:
33
ELR 10559
Issue
8
Author
Clifford Rechtschaffen and David L. Markell

Modern federal environmental law has a built-in dynamic of tension that since its inception has led to challenging relations between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states. On the one hand, the U.S. Congress enacted numerous environmental statutes in the early 1970s because of widespread dissatisfaction with state efforts to protect the environment. Congress made EPA ultimately accountable for achieving the mandates of federal law. On the other hand, Congress contemplated that states would actually implement and enforce the requirements of these statutes, subject to federal oversight. To a large extent, its vision has been realized; states now administer over 75% of the major federal delegable environmental programs,1 and conduct the great majority of environmental enforcement in this country. But as Prof. David Hodas notes, "heavy reliance on state enforcement is a double-edged sword. When we 'deputize' the states to implement national environmental laws, we shift the government's discretionary enforcement power to state and local officials, who may not be interested in, or able to carry out, federal goals."2

The tension characterizing the federal/state enforcement relationship has, if anything, intensified in recent years, particularly during the 1990s. Many state programs have grown and become more professional over the past two or three decades. With this maturation, state agencies are increasingly feeling their oats. They have become dissatisfied with a role that they perceive as EPA "dependents" or "subordinates," and increasingly insist on changing the terms of this relationship to one of "partners." With the emergence in the 1990s of the Environmental Council of States (ECOS), the influential lobbying group representing the environmental commissioners of 51 of the 55 states and territories, in particular, state environmental agencies enjoy a new level of influence in Washington, D.C. State calls for devolving more environmental authority have met with sympathetic receptions in both Congress and the executive branch.

Clifford Rechtschaffen is a professor at Golden Gate University School of Law. He is also co-director of Golden Gate's Environmental Law and Justice Clinic. David L. Markell is the Steven M. Goldstein Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law. This Article is derived from CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP (Envtl. L. Inst. 2003). The book may be ordered or additional information obtained by visiting http://www.elistore.org. Portions of this Article first appeared in David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000), and are reprinted with permission.

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