Harmonizing Methods of Scientific Inference With the Precautionary Principle: Opportunities and Constraints

February 2004
Citation:
34
ELR 10131
Issue
2
Author
David E. Adelman

Virtually anyone with an interest in environmental policy is familiar with the allegations that traditional methods of statistical inference are biased against preventative environmental standards. They surely also know of the Precautionary Principle as the broad theory often cited by environmentalists to support this critique and to argue that regulated industries should bear the burden of proving that their products and activities are safe. This collision between scientific method and environmental principle has had great salience in environmental law and policy for many years. However, the debate loses much of its force and momentum because it is premised on a relatively superficial understanding of the underlying statistical methods. This Article seeks to move beyond the heuristics of the current discourse.

The author is an Associate Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona. B.A., Reed College, 1988; Ph.D., Stanford University, 1993; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1996. The arguments discussed in this Article are drawn from a larger piece: David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 101 (2003). This project benefitted from the financial support of the Golden Family Foundation.
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