Environmental Regulatory Objective: Auditing and Compliance or Crime and Punishment

May 1991
Citation:
21
ELR 10239
Issue
5
Author
Thomas L. Adams Jr. and William N. Farran III

The passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 19901 and its attendant Statement of the Senate Managers once again raises the issue of the proper role and treatment of environmental self-audit programs in the field of environmental enforcement. The Statement encourages environmental audits and provides that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the United States Department of Justice (Justice), in their discretion, should refrain from using self-audit information to prove knowledge in a Clean Air Act §113(c) criminal enforcement case where reporting obligations were met and where there was timely corrective action.2 Despite this legislative encouragement, prosecutors may exercise their discretion differently; thus, appropriate legal protection is needed to support and encourage auditing programs. EPA should supply this legal protection by fashioning an overall regulatory scheme that provides a safe harbor to companies that participate in a self-audit and voluntary corrective action program.

The environmental regulatory community is at a critical juncture in the philosophy of environmental enforcement. A decision must be made whether to influence behavior primarily through the force of the recently improved arsenal of criminal penalty provisions or by also creating a legal structure under which self-policing programs can achieve improved compliance effectively.

Mr. Farran is environmental counsel for Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., the U.S. operations subsidiary of Rhone-Poulenc S.A., a specialty chemical, pharmaceutical, basic chemical, and agricultural chemical manufacturer. Mr. Farran previously served as senior counsel to UGI Corporation in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, and as an associate in the government regulation section of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mr. Adams is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Dechert, Price & Rhoads. He was previously Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Michael T. Fantini, who made a substantial contribution in the drafting and editing of this Dialogue.

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Environmental Regulatory Objective: Auditing and Compliance or Crime and Punishment

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