Formally or informally, scholars widely assume that political and bureaucratic self-interest largely determines the character of public policy in the United States. Previous research has indicated how the political self-interest of voters, interest groups, Congress, and the President might shape the goals and broad patterns of resource allocation in U.S. environmental policy.¹ This Dialogue complements that previous research. It explores the relationship between congressional self-interest, bureaucratic self-interest, and the implementation of U.S. environmental policy by federal agencies.

The Dialogue begins by explaining how the delegation of policymaking power to environmental agencies might advance the political self-interest of congressional members. It then examines the implications for environmental policy of the traditional, "subgovernment" or "iron triangle" theory of bureaucratic self-interest.² It considers the environmental policy implications of theories that depictbureaucrats as "budget maximizers."³ The Dialogue concludes that Congress has been handing the agencies unrealistic statutory mandates, that environmental agencies have become intensely politicized, and that continuing fragmentation of environmental policy is likely.