Providing compensation for individuals or communities who may be impacted by climate change presents four fundamental questions: (1) who, if anyone, should receive compensation; (2) how much each recipient should receive; (3) who should pay; and (4) how much each payer should be required to pay. Prof. Daniel Farber presents a well thought-out foray into this thorny issue, setting forth the pros and cons of various compensation regimes utilized in other contexts and suggesting how they may be adapted to the question of climate change compensation. In the end, however, Professor Farber's discussion demonstrates that the questions of who should receive compensation for climate-related damages and who should be required to pay have no suitable analogs. These questions are not appropriate for resolution by our court system, and climate change is unlikely to be an issue where the elected branches of our government determine that coerced redistribution of wealth represents the best policy choice.

Climate change is markedly different from all other past circumstances where one party has been required to compensate another party for injury. Tort law, which is often the forum of first resort for resolving issues of compensation, is ill-suited to resolving disputes concerning climate-related compensation. Traditionally, in order to show that a defendant is liable to a plaintiff for damages, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed him a duty, the defendant breached that duty, and the breached duty immediately caused the plaintiff's compensable harm. Each of these questions--duty, breach, and causation--presents seemingly insurmountable hurdles to a party seeking to use the tort system as an avenue for receiving compensation.