Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s
I. Introduction
Ten years ago, we analyzed how environmental policy, primarily as formulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), had fared in federal courts during the first two decades of the Environmental Era.1 Our primary interest then was to determine how emerging environmental values were being accommodated by federal courts when those courts reviewed administrative actions by EPA and other agencies charged with new environmental responsibilities. This Article updates, extends, and refines our earlier work using a different methodology and with related, but also different, objectives.
In this Article we analyze how EPA and the federal courts interact under two broad aspects of judicial review. First, we study EPA's and the courts' interpretations of the Agency's statutory authority, with special emphasis on how the Agency has fared under the Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (Chevron)2 doctrine. Second, we study how well EPA's rulemaking satisfies the requirements of "reasoned decisionmaking" as set forth in [31 ELR 10372] Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park),3 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm)4 and other decisions. The Article thus focuses on how EPA has fared under judicial review, rather than on how environmental values have been treated by the federal courts. In subsequent work, we plan to use these same data to return to this latter question, which was the subject of our earlier work, an effort that will include examining the ways in which political preferences of the judges affect their decisions.5