CZMA Consistency and OCS Leasing: Supreme Court to Review California v. Watt

Frances L. McChesney and Michael Chernau

Editors' Summary: In recent years, a number of coastal states have resisted the Department of the Interior's stepped-up efforts to issue oil and gas leases in the outer continental shelf (OCS) because of the potential adverse environmental and other impacts on their coastal zones. Legal challenges based on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Endangered Species Act, and NEPA have been largely unsuccessful, but the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) has proved a more effective weapon. The Ninth Circuit and several federal district courts have ruled that OCS lease sales "directly affect" the coastal zone and therefore are subject to the consistency requirement in § 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. The Interior Department has, in response, recently completed consistency determinations for several OCS lease sales. But the question is far from resolved as the Supreme Court has agreed to review the Ninth Circuit's decision in the 1983-84 Term. The Court's ruling could go far in settling the controversy over the balance between federal and state control over the development of OCS resources.

[13 ELR 10266]

Since 1978, when Congress amended the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)¹ in order to expedite development of oil and gas resources in the outer continental shelf (OCS), the Department of the Interior has stepped up its leasing efforts.² However, despite the statutory pressure to develop new domestic sources of oil, not all is going smoothly for the Interior Department. Many coastal states have resisted Interior's actions, primarily because of concern over the environmental, social, and economic impacts of OCS oil and gas development, particularly the negative impacts on fisheries resources, wildlife, and the tourism business. Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, and other states have sued the federal government claiming violations of not only the OCSLA, but the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).³

The states generally have been largely unsuccessful with their OCSLA, NEPA, and ESA claims,⁴ but the CZMA has so far lived up to the prediction that its federal consistency provisions provide a "powerful tool for states" in protecting their coastal resources from the effects of federal energy development.⁵ Section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA⁶ imposes on the federal government the duty to determine if its activities "directly affecting" the coastal zone are consistent with approved state coastal zone management programs. The Department of the Interior would construe the provision narrowly to prevent states from interfering with attainment of the goals of the OCSLA; the states would construe it broadly because they view § 307 as their only opportunity to have a meaningful voice in deciding where and when leasing should occur off their coasts. The State of California jumped the first CZMA hurdle last year when it convinced the Ninth Circuit, in California v. Watt,⁷ that pre-leasing activities, i.e., the lease sale itself, "directly affect" the coastal zone and therefore require a consistency determination.⁸ The [13 ELR 10267] Commonwealth of Massachusetts leapt the next CZMA hurdle with the district court enjoined a lease sale in Georges Bank off the coast of Massachusetts in Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt,⁹ ruling that the Interior Department's stated reasons for its finding of consistency were inadequate.

So far, most of the CZMA rulings have favored the states, but the controversy is far from resolved. The Supreme Court agreed last term to review the Ninth Circuit's California v. Watt decision.¹⁰ Although the case will focus on the narrow issue of whether the lease sale stage is subject to the consistency provision, the Court could also resolve some apparent inconsistencies within the CZMA, as well as conflicts between the CZMA and the OCSLA. Although both statutes incorporate to some degree oil and gas leasing, the CZMA emphasizes the protection of the coastal zone¹¹ while the OCSLA promotes energy development. As such, the decision could be the key to balancing the responsibilities of the federal and state governments in the development of offshore energy resources.

CZMA and OCSLA

Congress enacted the CZMA in 1972 when it realized that rapid growth was threatening the vital productive coastal areas of the country. Congress determined that the most effective management of coastal resources would be achieved if states were given a major role in developing and administering management programs.¹² The Act sought to assure the states that their management programs would not be disregarded by federal agencies whose activities would affect the coastal zone. For example, the stepped-up OCS development policies of the early 1970s led to the 1976 amendments that assured greater state involvement in the planning stages of oil and gas development.¹³

The Act accomplishes its goal primarilyby encouraging the states to develop voluntary coastal zone management programs. However, the federal government has significant authority over the policies incorporated into the state plans. Under the Act, the Secretary of Commerce may not give the required approval to the state's proposed plan "unless the view of Federal agencies principally affected by such programs have been adequately considered."¹⁴ The plan must also provide "for adequate consideration of the national interest."¹⁵ Once a state has an approved program, it becomes eligible for federal funds¹⁶ and acquires the benefit of the "consistency provisions." Sections 307(c) and 307(d) of the CZMA establish classes of federal activities that must be consistent with state programs. These include federal activities that directly affect the coastal zone,¹⁷ development projects,¹⁸ federal licenses and permits,¹⁹ OCS exploration, development, and production plans,²⁰ and federal assistance to states and local governments.²¹

The controversy in California v. Watt focused primarily on § 307(c)(1), which states that federal agencies shall conduct or support activities "directly affecting" the coastal zone "in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs." Regulations promulgated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to implement the CZMA direct federal agencies to provide state coastal management agencies with a consistency determination for all federal activities directly affecting the coastal zone.²² If the federal agency decides that a consistency determination is not required it must notify the state agency and set forth its reasons for a negative determination.

While § 307(c)(1) arguably applies to the lease sale stage, in the 1976 amendments to the Act Congress added § 307(c)(3)(B) to the CZMA for the express purpose of integrating development activities on the OCS into the CZMA statutory scheme.²³ Section 307(c)(3)(B) requires oil and gas lesses submitting plans to the Department of the Interior for "the exploration or development of, or production from," any area leased under the OCSLA, to certify that the plan complies with and will be carried out in a manner consistent with the state's coastal zone management plan.

The OCSLA, originally enacted in 1953, was amended in 1978 to reform the mechanics of the OCS oil and gas leasing process. The 1978 amendments established a strong national policy to develop the resources of the OCS. The Act divides an oil and gas development program into three major stages: the lease sale and pre-exploration activities,²⁴ exploration activities,²⁵ and production activities.²⁶ The OCSLA provides for participation by state and local governments in all stages of the leasing process. Section 19 states that the governor of [13 ELR 10268] any affected state may submit recommendations to the Secretary "regarding the size, timing or location of a proposed lease sale."²⁷ The Secretary must accept the recommendations if they provide for a "reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State."²⁸ Section 25 prohibits the Secretary from authorizing any activity under development or production plans "affecting any land use or water use in the coastal zone" unless the state with an approved plan concurs with the consistency certification required under § 307(c)(3)(B).²⁹

Consistency Applied to OCS Leasing

During the past year many of the coastal states have challeged OCS lease sales off their coasts based on claims under § 307 of the CZMA, and at least four disputes have resulted in court decisions.³⁰ The Ninth Circuit established the rule that the lease sale stage directly affects the coastal zone and therefore requires a consistency determination. In Kean v. Watt, the New Jersey district court agreed that a consistency determination is required, for physical impacts not economic impacts, and also went one step further and ruled that the consistency determination must consider all stages of the leasing process — the sale as well as exploration and development. And the district court in Massachusetts, in Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, the first ruling on the adequacy of a specific consistency determination, disagreed with the New Jersey court that only direct physical impacts may be considered, ruling that social and economic effects are included within the scope of the Act. Without specifically finding Interior's consistency determination inadequate, it found the reasons insufficient and preliminarily enjoined the sale. But while the district courts have raced beyond the ruling in California v. Watt, the basic question of whether OCS lease sales directly affect the coastal zone has been elevated to the Supreme Court.

The question now before the Supreme Court is whether the lease sale stage of OCS oil and gas development would have "direct effects" on the coastal zone within the meaning of § 307(c)(1) and therefore require a federal consistency determination. The Ninth Circuit, after reviewing the statute's language and purposes, the legislative history, and the administrative interpretations, ruled that the lease in question, Lease Sale No. 53, does directly affect California's coastal zone. While the Ninth Circuit based its ruling substantially on its view of § 307(c)(1), the Supreme Court has been asked to go further and consider the importance of § 307(c)(3)(B) and the CZMA's relationship to the entire oil and gas leasing process under the OCSLA.

California v. Watt — The Ninth Circuit

The California v. Watt litigation arose out of the Department of the Interior's decision to offer OCS tracts off central California for leasing under the OCSLA. Lease Sale No. 53 included a number of productive fishing areas and important habitat for marine species, including some species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA. After the publication of the environmental impact statement for the proposed sale, the California Coastal Commission, believing that Lease Sale No. 53 "directly affected" the California coastal zone within the meaning of § 307(c)(1), requested the Secretary to complete a consistency determination. The Interior Department, however, determined that the preleasing activities — the lease sale and the award of the lease — would not directly affect the California coast and decided, therefore, that no consistency determination was necessary. When the Secretary proceeded with the sale, California filed suit to enjoin the sale of 29 tracts in the northern portion of the Santa Maria Basin, claiming that the Department had violated § 307(c)(1) by failing to make a consistency determination.The district court entered summary judgment for California, finding that leasing directly affects the coastal zone because it "sets in motion the entire chain of events which culminates in oil and gas development."³¹ The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision reasoning that California's expansive interpretation of the threshold standard of "directly affecting" served the purposes of the CZMA better than did the federal government's.³²

* Statutory Interpretation. The CZMA provides no guidance on the meaning of the term "directly affecting." The Department of the Interior had proposed what the Ninth Circuit labeled a narrow definition, arguing that the lease sale itself has no direct effects on the coastal zone since a sale authorizes no activities that could have physical impacts on the California coast or its resources. The exploration and production phases that follow the lease sale may have direct effects, but those phases are subject to federal approval and to state concurrence with the lessees' consistency determination under § 307(c)(3)(B). The state argued that the exploration and production phases were too late for a meaningful consistency determination. It proposed a much broader definition: "directly affecting" encompasses effects of the lease that reasonably flow from the sale, and that have a "functional interrelationship from an economic, geographic, or social standpoint" with lands and waters in the coastal zone.³³ The Ninth Circuit sided with California. The lease sale stage, it stated, has direct effects on the coastal zone because it is at that point that decisions are made that shape the activities that will have direct effects, such as whether oil will be transported by pipeline or ship, what will be the routes and volumes of vessel traffic, and where onshore facilities will be sited. The sale also is critical because it is the only time that cumulative effects of the entire lease can be considered. Furthermore, the court ruled that the CZMA was created to promote state primarcy over its coastal resources through cooperation with the [13 ELR 10269] federal government. To effectuate these purposes, the state needs to be involved at the early stages of federal activities that will affect their coastal zones.

* Legislative History. As with the statute itself, the ambiguous legislative history provides little help in determining what Congress meant by "directly affecting." The history is complex, but the center of the debate is whether the 1976 and 1980 amendments were meant to expand or restrict the federal government's obligations to ensure that its actions are consistent with state coastal zone management plans.

The federal government claimed that when the CZMA was originally drafted in 1972, the primary focus was whether federal property located "in" the coastal zone should be subject to state coastal zone management programs.³⁴ The bills from each House of Congress imposed requirements only on federal activities "in" the coastal zone. In the conference committee, "in" was replaced with "directly affecting,"³⁵ but there was no explicit legislative history to explain the intent of this change. The federal government argued before the Ninth Circuit that the "directly affecting" threshold of the legislation was plainly designed to narrow its consistency obligations for activities inside as well as outside the state's coastal zone.³⁶ The government argued that to interpret Congress' actions any other way, as the lower courts have done, results in an unwarranted expansion of states' substantive control over energy development activities in the OCS and effectively grants the states veto power over the issuance of an OCS lease.

The court of appeals, however, found persuasive post-enactment committee statements that specifically addressed the uncertainty that had arisen concerning interpretation of the threshold test of "directly affecting."³⁷ The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries issued a report in 1980 favoring a broad definition, stating that the provision should apply when a federal agency initiates a series of events relevant to coastal management, regardless of whether the effects are economic, geographic, or social.³⁸ The court accorded the report substantial weight because its interpretation would ensure early consultation between the federal and state governments and would prevent wasteful commitment of public resources to activities that might later be found inconsistent with a state's management program.

* Administrative Interpretation. Turning to another source of statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit considered the agency interpretation of the provision and found it confusing at best. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), within the Department of Commerce, is responsible for promulgating regulations under the CZMA.³⁹ As of 1980, NOAA took the position in its regulations that the final notices of OCS lease sales are subject to federal consistency requirements. But in 1981, NOAA proposed new regulations that in effect exempted routine OCS lease sales from the consistency requirement. The new definition stated that an activity directly affects the coastal zone if "it produces an identifiable physical alteration in the coastal zone or initiates a chain of events reasonably certain to result in such alterations without further agency approval." The explanatory comments stated that leasing does not directly affect the coastal zone.⁴⁰ But NOAA suspended the proposed regulations when the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee adopted a resolution disapproving them.⁴¹

California argued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the recent regulations issued by NOAA represent a complete reversal of previous NOAA policy and should not be given great weight. The record shows that up until 1981, NOAA had consistently favored a broad view of "directly affecting," acknowledging that pre-lease sale activities were subject to the consistency requirements.⁴² The court of appeals concluded that "to defer to such a passing phase in the appropriate agency's interpretations would amount to obeisance to shadows and a flight from judicial responsibility."⁴³ Thus, the court gave greater deference to the older liberal application of "directly affecting," and ruled against the federal government.⁴⁴

Watt v. California — The Supreme Court

The federal government appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court, which granted review. It is likely that the Court will have to address broader issues than those considered by the appeals court. Because the Ninth Circuit found that the legislative history and administrative interpretations tended to support its broad interpretation of the "directly affecting" language of § 307(c)(1), it was unnecessary to delve further into an analysis of other parts of the CZMA or the OCSLA. However, in its brief to the Supreme Court, the federal government has not only made a strong argument that the lease, by itself, has no "direct effects" on the coastal zone, but also argues that § 307(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA requires reversal.

In the OCSLA Congress adopted a phased decision-making scheme for OCS leasing.⁴⁵ The lease sale was separated from later decisions to permit exploration, development, and production activities. Thus, key decisions would be made when more information was available on the impacts on the environment and on the availability of oil and gas. Moreover, the Secretary was given authority to modify or cancel leases at each stage of the process. [13 ELR 10270] The consistency requirements of the CZMA, so argued the federal government, are integrated into this system. Under § 307(c)(3)(B), each of the post-lease sale stages are subject to consistency determinations. Therefore, a consistency determination under § 307(c)(1) at the lease sale stage would not only be inadequate, because insufficient information exists at that stage to assess consistency with state plans, but also unnecessary, because consistency can and will be assessed at the later stages.

The argument can be compared to the D.C. Circuit's analysis in North Slope Borough v. Andrus,⁴⁶ a case involving the impact of OCS leasing on endangered whales in the Beaufort Sea of Alaska. In rejecting the claim that the Department of the Interior had violated the ESA, the court relied heavily on the OCSLA's multistage approach to development of an oil and gas project. At each stage of a project, the court explained, the Secretary must prepare separate environmental impact statements and remains subject throughout the process to the provisions of the ESA. This segmented approach of the OCSLA, insuring "graduated compliance" with ESA standards, made it clear to the D.C. Circuit that the Secretary can respond to environmental needs and retain control of the entire OCS project as it proceeds. Thus, the Secretary did not need to delay the lease sale stage of the project until more information was available about the threats to whales posed by the final production stages.

Arguably, this multistage approach also guarantees compliance with the CZMA without a consistency determination at the lease sale stage. As the Ninth Circuit ruled, the "direct effects" to be considered in the § 307(c)(1) consistency determination stem from activities in the stages that come after the lease sale, i.e., exploration and production. Thus, the lease sale, by itself, does not directly affect the coastal zone and at the later stages other consistency determinations must be made under § 307(c)(3)(B). However, these arguments do not necessarily undermine the Ninth Circuit's ruling. A consistency determination made at the lease sale stage involves considerations important to the state that it can no longer respond to at later stages, such as the cumulative impact of potential offshore oil and gas operation. Furthermore, unlike the ESA analysis, which requires scientific information on impacts on specificareas of wildlife habitat, the consistency analysis made under the CZMA is part of a planning process that must deal with alternative types of activities and ranges in the magnitudes of those activities. Finally, if § 307(c)(3)(B) determinations are to suffice for the entire OCS leasing and development process, what purpose does § 307(c)(1) serve?

Conclusion

Watt v. California presents the Supreme Court with an interesting choice. Both sides will present reasonable arguments supporting their interpretation of "directly affecting" the coastal zone. The Court will see that neither the CZMA nor the OCSLA is designed the protect federal or state interests to the exclusion of the other.The Court could side with the federal government's position that lease sales alone do not physically affect the coastal zone and its resources and that later consistency determinations fully serve the purposes of the CZMA while not untracking the energy development given high priority in the OCSLA. Such a ruling would not only erase other lease stage consistency determinations the Interior Department has completed, but would moot the appeal now pending before the First Circuit in Conservation Law Foundation. A decision upholding the Ninth Circuit would be a victory for states' rights and would sharpen the teeth of § 307(c) of the CZMA. However, if the Court upholds the Ninth Circuit, other questions remain, some that the lower courts have begun to address.

What is the scope of the lease stage consistency determination?In Kean v. Watt,⁴⁷ the district court concluded, in keeping with California v. Watt, that a consistency determination for a lease sale must also include consideration of the likely effects of the exploration, development, and production activities that may flow from leases.

What kinds of effects should be considered in the lease stage consistency determination? The court in Kean concluded that only physical effects within the coastal zone, not economic effects on an industry located within the coastal zone, need by considered. The court in Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt⁴⁸ expressly rejected that Kean analysis. In its view, the CZMA "recognizes that a wide range of uses and concerns come within the purview of the Act," including "ecological, cultural, historic and esthetic values as well as … economic development."⁴⁹

What is the Secretary of the Interior's obligation to demonstrate that the sale is consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with the state coastal zone management plan as required by § 307(c)(1)? The Ninth Circuit in California v. Watt ruled that "to the maximum extent practicable" does not mean that the state has total veto power over the lease sale. Both §§ 307(c)(1) and 307(c)(3) preclude such a result. Section 307(c)(1) grants to the Secretary of the Interior the final authority to determine if a sale is consistent. Section 307(c)(3) grants to the Secretary of Commerce the final decision as to whether exploration, development, and production activities are consistent with the CZMA, or whether the activity is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the court ruled, granting the state final veto authority would thwart the purposes of the OCSLA to assure federal control over the OCS and its resources. Similarly, in Conservation Law Foundation, the court held that the state does not have veto power over a lease sale, but nonetheless concluded that the Interior Department's finding that the Georges Bank lease sale was consistent with the Massachusetts plan was not in compliance with the CZMA.

The legal jurisdiction of the states stops at the three-mile boundary of the territorial sea. To enable the states to manage effectively the precious resources of their coastal [13 ELR 10271] zones, Congress wrote into the CZMA authority for the states to reach beyond their jurisdictional limits to influence the development of oil and gas on the OCS. In Watt v. California, the Supreme Court is being asked to decide whether the states may have a strong influence on the scope of the OCS leasing activities, or whether they must be contend to address only the development of tracts leased and selected through processes outside their control.

1. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, ELR STAT. 42451.

2. See California v. Watt, 13 ELR 20723 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1983) (upholding the Department of the Interior's five-year OCS leasing plan).

3. See, e.g., California v. Watt, 13 ELR 20723 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1983) (OCSLA's five-year leasing plan); Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 13 ELR 20445 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 1983) (Lease Sale No. 52); California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 11 ELR 20870 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd 683 F.2d 1253, 12 ELR 21084 (9th Cir. 1982) (Lease Sale No. 53); California v. Watt, 12 ELR 21045 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (Lease Sale No. 68); Kean v. Watt, 13 ELR 20618 (D.N.J. 1982) (Lease Resale No. 2); Virginia v. Watt, Civ. No. 83-284 (E.D. Va., filed Apr. 15, 1983); Maryland v. Watt, Civ. No. 83-1180 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 16, 1983); New York v. Watt, CV 83-1523 (E.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 19, 1983).

4. See, e.g., California v. Watt, 13 ELR 20723 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1983) (rejecting challenges to OCSLA five year leasing plan); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 10 ELR 20832 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting ESA and NEPA challenges to OCS leasing in Beaufort Sea); Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 10 ELR 20067 (1st Cir. 1979) (rejecting ESA and NEPA challenges to OCS leasing in Georges Bank).

5. See cases at supra note 3. See also Greenberg, Federal Consistency Under the Coastal Zone Management Act: An Emerging Focus of Environmental Controversey in the 1980s, 11 ELR 50001 (1981).

6. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464, 1456(c)(1), ELR STAT. 41701, 41704:1.

7. 683 F.2d 1253, 12 ELR 21084 (9th Cir. 1982).

8. But see Kean v. Watt, 13 ELR 20618 (D.N.J. 1982) (limiting consistency requirements to physical impacts and excluding economic impacts).

9. 560 F. Supp. 561, 13 ELR 20445 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 1983).

10. Watt v. California, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2083 (U.S. May 16, 1983) (No. 82-1326).

11. "Although sensitive to balancing competing interest, [CZMA is] first and foremost a statute directed to and solicitous of environmental concerns." American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 886, 919, 8 ELR 20853, 20867 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 1306, 10 ELR 20083 (9th Cir. 1979).

12. H. REP. NO. 269, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981).

13. Id.

14. CZMA § 307(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(b), ELR STAT. 41704:1.

15. CZMA § 306(c)(8), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(8), ELR STAT. 41704.

16. Grants for implementing state programs are authorized under § 306. These grants, along with the coastal energy impact program (CEIP), have been a major source of funding for most state programs. CEIP loans and grants are designed to assist states and localities plan for and mitigate the effects of coastal energy development. These funds are only available to states participating in the coastal zone management program.

17. CZMA § 307(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1), ELR STAT. 41704:1.

18. CZMA § 307(c)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(2), ELR STAT. 41704:1.

19. CZMA § 307(c)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A), ELR STAT. 41704:1.

20. CZMA § 307(c)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B), ELR STAT. 41704:1.

21. CZMA § 307(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(d), ELR STAT. 41704:2.

22. 15 C.F.R. pt. 930.

23. CZMA § 307(c)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B), ELR STAT. 41704:1.

24. 43 U.S.C. § 1344, ELR STAT. 42463.

25. 43 U.S.C. § 1345, ELR STAT. 42464.

26. 43 U.S.C. § 1351, ELR STAT. 42467.

27. 43 U.S.C. § 1345, ELR STAT. 42464.

28. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c), ELR STAT. 42464.

29. 43 U.S.C. § 1345, ELR STAT. 42467.

30. See supra note 3. The suits filed by Virginia and Maryland were dismissed voluntarily pursuant to agreements with the government that tracts of interest to the states would not be bid upon. New York's case is currently being negotiated as tracts of interest to the state were bid upon.

31. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 11 ELR 20870 (C.D. Cal. 1981).

32. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 12 ELR 21084 (9th Cir. 1982).

33. H.R. REP. NO. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4376, 4382.

34. H. REP. NO. 1049, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).

35. CONF. REP. NO. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 15 (1972).

36. Brief for Appellants at 23, California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 12 ELR 21084 (9th Cir. 1982).

37. California v. Watt, 12 ELR at 21084.

38. H. REP. NO. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980).

39. 15 C.F.R. § 923.2(b) (1981).

40. 46 Fed. Reg. 35253 (1981).

41. H.R. Con. Res. 166, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H5450 (daily ed. July 30, 1981).

42. See 44 Fed. Reg. 37142, 37146-47 (1979) (comments to 15 C.F.R. § 930.33(c)).

43. California v. Watt, 12 ELR at 21088.

44. The court rejected claims that the Department of the Interior violated the National Environmental Policy Act and § 19 of the OCSLA, but it granted standing to environmental groups under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act to bring CZMA claims. 12 ELR at 21090-92. In addition, the court ruled that the state does not have authority to veto oil and gas leases since the federal government has the final authority to determine if the lease sale is consistent.See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.

45. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.

46. 486 F. Supp. 332, 10 ELR 20115 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 642 F.2d 589, 10 ELR 20832 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Comment, Circuit Courts Give Go-Ahead to OCS Lease Sales Despite Uncertain Effects on Endangered Whales, 10 ELR 10210 (1980).

47. Kean v. Watt, 13 ELR 20618.

48. 560 F. Supp. 561, 13 ELR 20445.

49. Id. at 575. (emphasis added by court).

50. CZMA § 307(c)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B), ELR STAT. 41704:1.