Minnesota Federation of Ski Touring Clubs v. Knebel

No. 4-76 Civ. 169 (D. Minn. January 18, 1977)

The court upholds the Secretary of Agriculture's decision to ban the use of snowmobiles in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA), the second largest unit in the National Wilderness Preservation System, and the Forest Service Chief's discretionary authority to permit or prohibit snowmobiling in the BWCA. Plaintiffs had moved for summary judgment, contending that the use of snowmobiles was prohibited as a matter of law rather than subject to administrative discretion. Plaintiffs in intervention sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ban on the grounds that since the Wilderness Act permitted continued snowmobiling in the BWCA, the Secretary's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence. The decision banning snowmobiles was the culmination of a time-consuming administrative process involving public hearings, ample time for comment, and a lengthy record. Questioning plaintiffs' standing but finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue, the court denies their motion for summary judgment and dismisses the complaint. Although the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136, ELR 41412, prohibits snowmobiles in designated wilderness areas, a special BWCA provision created by Congress because of existing uses at the time the Act was passed establishes an exception by providing that the Secretary shall manage the BWCA in his discretion so as to maintain its primitive character. This special status of the BWCA in the wilderness system is consistent with the Eighth Circuit's decision in MPIRG v. Butz, 6 ELR 20736 (1976). The intervening plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is denied because there is neither a probability of success on the merits nor a showing of irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue. Intervenors' argument as to their understanding of the BWCA statutory exception is neither persuasive nor supported by legislative history. Furthermore, there is adequate evidentiary support in the record for the Secretary's decision.

Counsel for Plaintiffs
Charles K. Dayton, James A Payne
Dayton, Herman & Graham
Midland Bank Bldg., Minneapolis MN 55401
(612) 339-7633

Counsel for Defendants
Robert G. Renner, U.S. Attorney; Francis X. Hermann, Ass't U.S. Attorney
596 U.S. Courthouse, 110 S. 4th St., Minneapolis MN 55401
(612) 781-7430

Counsel for Plaintiffs Intervenors, Coalition of Minnesota Snowmobile Organizations International Snowmobile Industry Association
Robert A. Schwartzbauer, Mark A. Jarboe, William Jobe
Dorsey, Windhorst, Hannaford, Whiney & Halladay
2300 First Nat'l Bank Bldg. Minneapolis MN 55402
(612) 340-2600

[7 ELR 20532]

Alsop, J.:

This action results from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture of September 8, 1976, banning the use of snowmobiles in the Boundary Water Canoe Area (BWCA).

Plaintiffs are skiing associations whose members use the BWCA as a ski-touring area.¹ They do not disagree with the result of the Secretary's decision banning snowmobile use in the BWCA, but rather challenge the Secretary's statement that the Chief of the Forest Service (Chief) has the discretion to permit or prohibit snowmobiling in the BWCA, contending that the use of snowmobiles is prohibited there as a matter of law. Plaintiffs move for a summary judgment declaring that the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq., under which the BWCA is established and managed, and Executive Order 11644 prohibit the use of snowmobiles in the BWCA as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs in intervention are associations whose members either manufacture snowmobiles or encourage snowmobiling.² They do not disagree with the Secretary's statement regarding the Chief's discretion to either ban or permit snowmobiles in the BWCA, but rather contend the ban is unsupported by substantial evidence in the administrative record and is arbitrary and capricious. They also contend that, as a matter of law, the Wilderness Act requires the Secretary to permit the continued use of snowmobiling in the BWCA. Accordingly, they now move for a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Secretary's decision dated September 8, 1976 to the extent it bans snowmobile use on the 21 existing BWCA snowmobile trails.

The Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest Service contend that not only do they have the discretionary authority to prohibit the use of snowmobiles in the BWCA under the special BWCA provision of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5), but that this discretion has been properly exercised throughout these administrative proceedings.

The issues in this case are whether the Secretary of Agriculture has the discretion to ban the use of snowmobiles in the BWCA and if so, whether he properly exercised that discretion in his decision of September 8, 1976, banning snowmobiles from that area.

I. The BWCA

The BWCA, the second largest unit in the National Wilderness Preservation System, is administered by the Forest Service, an agency of the Department of Agriculture.It contains 1.03 million acres of land and water in the northern one-third of the Superior National Forest and occupies parts of Cook, Lake, and St. Louis Counties in northern Minnesota. Approximately 175,000 acres, or 18 percent, of the area is covered by water. Until November 1, 1976, it was the only wilderness area under the Forest Service administration that permitted public snowmobile use.

The management policies of the Forest Service in administering the BWCA have been the subject of recent litigation. See, MPIRG v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 [3 ELR 20457] (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1314 [4 ELR 20700] (8th Cir. 1974), remanded, 401 F. Supp. 1276 [6 ELR 20133] (1975), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1292 [6 ELR 20736] (1976), stay denied, __ U.S. __ (Nov. 8, 1976).

The Superior National Forest is administered by a supervisor with headquarters in Duluth, Minnesota. It is one of 16 national forests comprising the Eastern Region (Region 9) of the Forest Service with the office of the Regional Forester located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The head of the Forest Service is the Chief with offices in Wasington, D.C.

The administration of the BWCA is governed primarily by the Wilderness Act of 1964, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136; the Secretary of Agriculture's regulations governing all Wilderness Areas, 36 C.F.R. 293.1-293.15; the special regulation governing the BWCA, 36 C.F.R. 293.16; and directives and policies issued by the respective administrative levels of the Forest Service, 36 C.F.R. 200.4.

II. The Administrative History

The Secretary's decision of September 8, 1976 represents the culmination of a lengthy administrative process, an understanding of which is necessary to rule on the matters now before the court.

On September 16, 1974, the Forest Service, with the approval of the Regional Forester, developed the BWCA Land Use Management Plan (plan) currently in effect. The plan provided that existing public use of motor-driven ice and snowcraft on the designated trails in the BWCA would be terminated after April 15, 1980. Plan at 33-35. Following approval of the plan, various organizations filed requests for administrative review of this policy.

On April 30, 1975, the Chief issued his initial decision concurring with the decision of the Regional Forester to terminate snowmobile use in the BWCA as provided in the Management Plan. However, rather than allowing snowmobiling to continue in the area until 1980, the Chief directed that such use end after the 1974-75 winter season. The Chief based this initial decision on the general policy of the Wilderness Act which prohibits such use:

As there are no specific provisions for continuing snowmobile use, and the Wilderness Act in general prohibits such use, I consider their restriction a necessary one to avoid conflicts with the primitive character of the area.

Chief's Decision of April 30, 1975 at 16.

On November 1, 1975, the Chief issued his decision on reconsideration after evaluating extensive materials submitted by both sides to the controversy. The Chief concluded that his earlier decision was a proper exercise of administrative discretion "taken to protect and enhance the values of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area." He incorporated by reference the rationale of his April 30th decision and thus reaffirmed his original decision that snowmobile use should be terminated. However, he stayed the ban for one season until November 1, 1976, to permit interested parties to exhaust their administrative remedies by requesting further review by the Secretary of Agriculture.

On February 12, 1976, the Secretary concluded that "the public interest is best served by providing an additional opportunity [7 ELR 20533] for the expression of local, regional and national interests." Consequently, a public hearing was ordered. In addition, the Secretary ruled that the Chief had discretionary authority to regulate snowmobile use in the BWCA under the special BWCA provision of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5).

On April 22 and 23, 1976, extensive public hearings were held in Duluth.

On July 1, 1976, the Chief of the Forest Service issued an extensive "Responsive Statement" in which he outlined in detail the history of this administrative proceeding. He also set forth, in greater detail, his reasons for imposing the snowmobile ban, all of which are based upon evidence in the record. The Chief's principal reasons were the following:

1. The increase in popularity of the snowmobile and the advanced design and dependability of the machine had not been foreseen at the time the Wilderness Act was passed and the Secretary's regulations and Chief's guidelines were promulgated. The boom in primitive recreation activities such as ski touring had not yet occurred; modern equipment has now extended the ski touring range and made winter camping more practical.

2. Therefore, while the relatively few number of snowmobiles that first traveled the BWCA may not have seriously affected the primitive character of the area, the same is no longer true.

3. Executive Order 11644 of 1972, specifically precludes the designation of trails for the use of off-road vehicles in designated wilderness areas and the Wilderness Act specifically designates "canoe" areas as wilderness areas. Banning snowmobiles in the BWCA is consistent with Executive Order 11644, and the procedural aspects of setting the effective date of eliminating snowmobile use are within the discretion of the Secretary.

4. Quetico Provincial Park, which adjoins the BWCA on the north, has banned snowmobile use throughout the park. It is the Forest Service policy to coordinate its management practices in the BWCA with those of Quetico so that the two are "reasonably similar."

Chief's Decision of July 1, 1976 at 7-9. Based upon all these factors, the Chief found that "the primitive character of the BWCA, particularly in the vicinity of lakes, streams, and portages where snowmobiles must operate, is certain to decline if snowmobile use increases." Id. at 7.

On September 8, 1976, the Secretary issued his final decision which upheld the decision of the Chief on the basis of the same factors. In addition, the Secretary recognized, on the basis of the record, the great disparity between public lands available for motorized use and those available for non-motorized winter recreation.

The record reflects that ample opportunity exists for recreational use of motorized ice and snow craft, both on the Superior National Forest outside the BWCA and on state and private lands. Conversely, areas closed to mechanized use, which can provide for growing winter wilderness use, are extremely limited.

Secretary's Decision of September 8, 1976 at 12.

Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary's conclusion that the Chief is vested with discretion to either ban or permit snowmobiles in the BWCA is contrary to the provisions of both the Act and Executive Order 11644. Plaintiffs in intervention contend that the Secretary's decision to ban snowmobile use in the BWCA is arbitrary and capricious and that the Act requires the Secretary to permit the continued use of snowmobiling in the BWCA.

III. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Summary Judgment

The court has serious reservations about whether plaintiffs have adequate standing to challenge the Secretary's statement concerning his discretionary authority to manage the BWCA. Plaintiffs agree with the Secretary's decision to ban snowmobiles in the area and only challenge the asserted discretion to permit snowmobiling there. It is difficult to see how plaintiffs have been injured by the Secretary's action. They assert that they have sustained an injury because as a result of the Secretary's position, they will be required to defend the snowmobile ban in the future.

The court finds it unnecessary to resolve the issue of plaintiffs' standing to challenge the Secretary's action, because, before the court can resolve the issue raised by plaintiffs in intervention of whether the Secretary has abused his discretion, it is necessary to determine whether the Secretary does indeed have that discretion. Therefore, the court will respond to the issues and arguments presented by plaintiffs before addressing the motion for a preliminary injunction.

A. Summary Judgment

To obtain a summary judgment, plaintiffs must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

1. Wilderness Act

Plaintiffs argue that § 4(c) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) the "prohibited use provision," prohibits snowmobiling in the BWCA. This provision states:

Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area.

Snowmobiles are a "mechanical transport" as defined by regulations promulgated by the Forest Service pursuant to the Act. 36 C.F.R. § 293.6(a). Thus the prohibited use provision clearly prohibits snowmobile use in wilderness areas, "[e]xcept as specifically provided for in this chapter. . . ."

The Secretary contends that the special BWCA provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5), is such a specific exception. This provision states:

Other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, the management of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, . . . shall be in accordance with regulations established by the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the general purpose of maintaining, without unnecessary restrictions on other uses, including that of timber, the primitive character of the area, particularly in the vicinity of lakes, streams, and portages: Provided, that nothing in this chapter shall preclude the continuance within the area of any established use of motorboats.

Thus the special BWCA provision provides that the Secretary shall manage the BWCA in his discretion so as to maintain its primitive character, "[o]ther provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding."

The issue presented is whether the special BWCA provision is a "specific" exception to the prohibited use clause so as to permit the Secretary to decide whether snowmobiling in the BWCA is compatible with the area's primitive character. Plaintiffs contend that the only uses specifically exempted by the special BWCA provision are timber and motorboats and thus the "other use" clause of the special BWCA provision can only mean that the Secretary has limited discretion to allow those uses not specifically prohibited by the prohibited use clause. Examples of these, plaintiffs argue, include horseback riding, hunting, falconry, sailing, or hang gliding.

This construction, however, severely restricts the discretion of the Chief and the Secretary in managing the BWCA and renders meaningless the "other use" clause of the special BWCA provision. Moreover, the legislative history of the Act will not support plaintiff's suggested restriction.

When the Wilderness Act was first introduced in Congress it did not contain the special BWCA provision. A form of that provision first appeared in the bill after Dr. Richard E. McCardle, [7 ELR 20534] Chief of the Forest Service, appeared before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on June 19, 1957. At that hearing, Dr. McCardle stated that the Forest Service desired to manage the BWCA as wilderness, but because old logging roads existed in parts of the area, it could not be included within the Act's strict definition of wilderness.³ The Forest Service therefore proposed a special provision to ensure that the BWCA would be included within the wilderness system, notwithstanding the other provisions of the Act.

Thus when Congress decided to include the BWCA within the wilderness system, it recognized that due to some of its existing uses, the BWCA did not meet the literal requirements of a wilderness area. Therefore, "[o]ther provisions of [the Act] to the contrary notwithstanding," Congress vested the management of the BWCA in the Secretary of Agriculture with the directions to exercise his discretion so that the "primitive character of the area, particularly in the vicinity of lakes, streams and portages," is maintained. With respect to the BWCA, therefore, the prohibitions included in § 1133(d)(5) supersede the provisions of § 1133(c).

This construction of the special BWCA provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5), is consonant with the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals construction of it in MPIRG v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 [6 ELR 20736] (8th Cir. 1976). There the court observed:

Three things are apparent from the face of this statute. First, the language "[o]ther provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding," indicates that the BWCA is to be accorded special treatment under the Wilderness Act. Second, the duty of managing the BWCA is delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture. Third, the BWCA is to be managed with a view to maintaining its primitive character without unnecessary restrictions on other uses, including timber.

Id. at 1297.

The decision of this court with respect to snowmobiling recognizes the special niche the BWCA is accorded under the Wilderness Act and the duty of the Secretary in managing it.

2. Executive Order 11644

Plaintiffs also argue that Executive Order 11644, 3 C.F.R. 332 ("Use of Off-Road Vehicles on the Public Lands"), dictates that trails or areas for snowmobile use may not be located in the BWCA. This Executive Order regulates the use of off-road vehicles on public lands and requires certain agency heads, including the Secretary of Agriculture, to promulgate regulations governing the designation of permissible trails and areas for off-road vehicles for public lands under their control. Section 3(4) of the Order states:

Areas and trails [for off-road vehicles including snowmobiles] shall not be located in officially designated Wilderness Areas or Primitive Areas. . . .

3 C.F.R. 334. Plaintiffs argue that the BWCA is an "officially designated Wilderness Area" within the meaning of § 3(4) and thus the Order prohibits snowmobiling in the BWCA.

The Secretary in his September 8, 1976 decision found that while termination of snowmobile use is consistent with the general intent of Executive Order 11644, the Wilderness Act and regulations issued thereunder predate the Executive Order and are controlling.

In the opinion of the court, it was not the intent of the Executive Order to overrule the special exception to the Wilderness Act established by the special BWCA provision. As recognized in MPIRG v. Butz, supra, the BWCA has never been managed as a pure wilderness area, but rather is afforded a special niche in the wilderness system. The Wilderness Act did not change the BWCA management policy of multiple uses, nor was Executive Order 11644 intended to change this management policy. It is far more reasonable to assume that the President was aware of the "special treatment" afforded the BWCA under the Wilderness Act when he entered this Executive Order and that he did not intend to upset the statutory framework of the Act. Thus the special BWCA provision of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5), operates to exempt the BWCA from the prohibited uses listed in 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), and also removes the BWCA from the operation of Executive Order 11644. Therefore, although the Secretary's ban on snowmobiling is in accord with the intent of the Executive Order, the Order itself does not operate to ban snowmobiling in the BWCA as a matter of law.

3. Entry of Judgment

The court has decided that, as a matter of law, the Secretary was correct in concluding the special BWCA provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5), vests the Chief with the discretion to prohibit snowmobiling in the BWCA if it is necessary to maintain the primitive character of the area. The Secretary, however, has not moved for summary judgment. Although Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., specifically states that a summary judgment motion may be made by any party, it does not provide for a situation in which the non-moving party, rather than the movant, is entitled to summary judgment but no cross-motion has been made. The weight of authority is that summary judgment may be rendered in favor of the opposing party even though he has made no formal cross-motion under Rule 56. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2720. Accordingly, summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action against the defendants will be entered in favor of the Secretary and Chief.

B.Plaintiffs' in Intervention Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

In order to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Secretary's September 8th decision, plaintiffs in intervention as the moving parties have the burden of showing substantial probability of success at trial and irreparable injury to themselves absent such issuance. Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1973).

1. Substantial Probability of Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs in intervention argue that the decision to ban snowmobiling in the BWCA is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record and is arbitrary and capricious, and that the special BWCA provision of the Act requires the Secretary to permit the continued use of snowmobiles in the area.

Because the agency action under review in this case is an informal one, as opposed to notice and comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 or formal adjudication under 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-556, the Administrative Procedure Act dictates that the court's review of the agency action is limited to determining whether the choice made by the Secretary was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or entered under a misapprehension as to the effect of the law.

Preliminarily, the court observes that the administrative proceedings that preceded the Secretary's September 8th decision were extensive and that apparently plaintiffs in intervention have chosen to submit their motion for a preliminary injunction on a partial administrative record. Therefore, for the purpose of this motion, the court will review the Secretary's decision on the record now before it.

First, plaintiffs in intervention argue that the Secretary did not base his decision to ban snowmobiles in the BWCA on the evidence received in the administrative proceedings, but rather prejudged the issue as early as 1971. The court finds that there is nothing before it to support this claim.

Second, plaintiffs in intervention argue that the Secretary misunderstood the effect of the special BWCA provision which they claim compels the Secretary to continue the use of [7 ELR 20535] snowmobiling in the BWCA. This provision requires the Secretary to manage the BWCA "in accordance with the general purpose of maintaining . . . the primitive character of the area. . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs in intervention argue the word "maintain" was meant by Congress to mean "to preserve" or "keep in an existing state or condition" and embraces acts of repair or other acts to prevent a decline, lapse, or cessation from that state or condition. Thus, they argue, because snowmobiles were used in the BWCA before the effective date of the Wilderness Act, Congress intended by the use of the word "maintain" that this preexisting use of the BWCA must continue. According to this construction, Congress empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to place only those restrictions upon other uses, which were necessary for the purpose" of maintaining . . . the primitive character of the area."

As support for its construction, plaintiffs in intervention refer to the language in MPIRG v. Butz, supra, where the Court stated that "the special BWCA provision [16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5)] was intended to maintain the status quo with respect to management of the area." The status quo in the BWCA, plaintiffs in intervention argue, includes numerous noncompetitive uses, one of which is snowmobiling.

The court finds this construction unpersuasive. Plaintiffs in intervention have not referred the court to any legislative history to support their construction. Indeed, there is no indication that Congress was aware of the minimal preexisting use of snowmobiles under BWCA. The court is unwilling to hold that the Act requires the Secretary to permit the continued use of snowmobiles in the area when the literal language of the Act does not compel such a far-reaching conclusion and there is no legislative history to support such a claim.

Moreover, the plaintiffs' in intervention reliance on MPIRG v. Butz, supra, is misplaced. When the court of appeals held in MPIRG that the Wilderness Act did not prohibit commercial logging in the virgin forest areas of the BWCA, it did not intend to mandate the continued use of any activity that may have existed when the Wilderness Act became effective. In contrast with the dearth of legislative history concerning motorized recreational vehicles in the BWCA, the Court in MPIRG was faced with both repeated references in the legislative history to logging in the BWCA and the fact that logging sales in the BWCA prior to and at the passage of the Act were very active. It is clear that the Forest Service policy with respect to timber harvesting has a completely different factual and legal background from the policy governing motorized recreation. Read in context, the language quoted by plaintiffs in intervention will not support the proposition for which they cite it.

Finally, plaintiffs in intervention argue that the Secretary has not made a finding of adverse ecological impact. Concededly such a finding has not been made. In the court's opinion, however, it is not required under the provisions of the Act. The Act requires the ban be necessary to "maintain . . . the primitive character of the area" and the Secretary has decided that it is necessary to ban the use of snowmobiles in order to maintain the area's primitive character. The court has concluded that there is more than adequate evidentiary support in the record for the Secretary's decision. Thus the Secretary's decision is not arbitrary and capricious. Therefore plaintiffs' in intervention motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied because there is not a substantial probability that they will succeed on the merits.

2. Irreparable Injury

Plaintiffs' in intervention motion for a preliminary injunction will also be denied because they have not demonstrated that they will be irreparably injured if an injunction does not issue. Although the 21 trails in the BWCA have been closed to snowmobile use for this season, there are adequate alternative routes available in northern and northeastern Minnesota.There were 238 miles of snowmobile trails available in the Superior National Forest area outside the BWCA for the 1975-76 winter season. In addition, hundreds of miles of old logging roads are now available for use by snowmobiles. Thus the plaintiffs' in intervention request for a preliminary injunction will be denied.

It is unfortunate that the language of the Wilderness Act is such as to foster continual litigation regarding the appropriate use of this natural resource. Hopefully further disputes involving the appropriate use of the BWCA, at least as regards the use or nonuse of snowmobiles, will soon be finally resolved by enactment of one of the two bills on the subject previously introduced in the United States House of Representatives by Congressmen Fraser and Oberstar.

These expressions shall constitute the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Upon the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED That plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the clerk enter summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That plaintiffs' in intervention motion for a preliminary injunction be and the same hereby is, in all things denied.

1. Plaintiff Minnesota Federation of Ski Touring Clubs (Minntour) is an unincorporated association of 22 Minnesota ski-touring clubs with memberships ranging from twenty to two hundred individuals. Plaintiff United States Ski Association, Central Division (USSA) is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of Michigan with a membership of approximately 75,000 individual skiers in 11 midwestern states. Plaintiff United States Ski Association, National Organization, is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of Wisconsin with a membership in excess of 100,000 individuals throughout the United States.

2. Plaintiff-Intervenor Coalition of Minesota Snowmobile Organizations (CMSO) is a non-profit membership association, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Minnesota. CMSO's objectives include the promotion of safe and enjoyable snowmobiling opportunities in Minnesota. Plaintiff-Intervenor International Snowmobile Industry Association (ISIA) is a trade association founded in 1965, and is composed of members who manufacture snowmobiles plus associate members who are suppliers of accessories and parts.

3. Dr. McCardle testified:

We wanted very much and the wilderness people wanted very much, to have this particular area, these three roadless areas — when I say "roadless" I mean permanent roads — in Minnesota included in the wilderness area and managed as wilderness. And we want to do it, too, but since there are temporary logging roads in there which are plowed up and blocked after logging, we could not include those in the other definition. We would be precluded from having them managed as wilderness under the proposed legislation, unless you took special action. And that is why those areas are mentioned. And those roads are purely temporary. They are not permanent roads.

Hearings on S. 1176, before Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong.; 1st Sess. 100 (1957).