Coupland v. Morton

No. 75-1390 (4th Cir. July 7, 1975)

The Court of Appeals summarily affirms a district court judgment upholding Interior Department regulations which sharply restrict use of the beach in the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge by motor vehicles. The government's environmental impact statement need not have dealt with the impact of substitute means of access to the privately-owned beach areas to the south. Further, no public interest regulating beach access remained in the State of Virginia after the federal government's condemnation of the beach in question.

Counsel are listed at 5 ELR 20504.

Winter, Craven, & Butzner, J.J.

[5 ELR 20507]

Per curiam:

In the district court, plaintiffs sought unsuccessfully to enjoin implementation of regulations of the Secretary of the Interior restricting the use of motor vehicles on Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge. Before us, their attack on the regulations is twofold: First, they contend that the environmental impact statement prepared by defendant prior to restricting access to the Refuge by motor vehicle was inadequate, especially in its failure to consider the effect on the ecology of substitute means of access to lands lying south of the Refuge should access through the Refuge be restricted. Second, they argue that the State of Virginia retained title to a portion of the shoreline of the Refuge so that the Secretary had no legal right to restrict passage.

We see no merit in either contention. We think the environmental impact statement was entirely adequate. True, it did not consider the environmental impact of substitute means of access by motor vehicle, e.g., a bridge or causeway, to lands south of the Refuge should passage through the Refuge be barred. But there was no necessity for such consideration. The proposed action was limitation of passage by motor vehicle through the Refuge, not provision of transportation to the area south of it. Accordingly, the environmental impact statement was required only to be a "thorough consideration of all appropriate methods of accomplishing the aim of the action, including those without the area of the agency's expertise and regulatory control as well as those within it." EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1975).

With the district court, we agree that the government obtained title by condemnation to the entire fee to the Refuge in 1938, including the entire area between the mean low and high tides. There was left in the State of Virginia no remaining interest and, hence, no legal impediment to the Secretary's withdrawal of the right of passage exists.

AFFIRMED.