

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 August Term, 2007

4 (Argued: November 9, 2007 Decided: August 14, 2008)

5  
6 Docket No. 05-2603-cv

7 -----  
8 THE FUND FOR ANIMALS, HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES,  
9 DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ANIMAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA,  
10 DONALD FEARE, GUSTAV W. VERDERBER, JULIE BAKER, KRISTI GHOLSON,  
11 COLLETTE ADKINS GIESE, MARIAN PROBST,

12 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

13 - v -

14 DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Secretary of the Interior, H. DALE HALL, Fish  
15 and Wildlife Service Director, CHUCK CONNER, Acting Secretary of  
16 Agriculture, and CINDY SMITH, Administrator of the  
17 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,  
18

19 Defendants-Appellees.

20 -----  
21 Before: McLAUGHLIN, CABRANES, and SACK, Circuit Judges.

22 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District  
23 Court for the Southern District of New York (P. Kevin Castel,  
24 Judge) granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment and  
25 dismissing plaintiffs' claims challenging the defendants' Public  
26 Resource Depredation Order, 50 C.F.R. § 21.48, as a violation of  
27 treaty obligations and federal statutes.

28 Affirmed.

1 KIMBERLY D. OCKENE, Meyer Glitzenstein &  
2 Crystal (Howard M. Crystal, Eric R.  
3 Glitzenstein, Meyer Glitzenstein &  
4 Crystal, Washington, DC; and Leonard D.  
5 Egert, Amy Trakinski, Egert  
6 & Trakinski, New York, NY, of counsel),  
7 Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-  
8 Appellants.

9 SARAH S. NORMAND, Assistant United  
10 States Attorney (Michael J. Garcia,  
11 United States Attorney for the Southern  
12 District of New York, and Sara L.  
13 Shudofsky, Assistant United States  
14 Attorney, of counsel), New York, NY, for  
15 Defendants-Appellees.

16 SACK, Circuit Judge:

17 The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the United  
18 States District Court for the Southern District of New York (P.  
19 Kevin Castel, Judge), which, among other things, dismissed on a  
20 motion for summary judgment their claims challenging the Public  
21 Resource Depredation Order, 50 C.F.R. § 21.48 (the "Depredation  
22 Order"), on the grounds that it violates treaty obligations of  
23 the United States and federal statutes. We consider on appeal  
24 whether the defendants issued the Depredation Order in compliance  
25 with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), 16 U.S.C. § 703 et  
26 seq., the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706,  
27 the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4321  
28 et seq., and international treaties relating to the treatment of  
29 migratory birds to which the United States is a party.

30 **BACKGROUND**

31 The plaintiffs are individuals who, and organizations  
32 whose members, derive pleasure from observing water birds known

1 as double-crested cormorants ("cormorants") in their natural  
2 habitat. These birds are not protected by the Endangered Species  
3 Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., but their treatment is regulated  
4 by international treaties to which the United States is a party,  
5 and by federal statutes and regulations. The Fish and Wildlife  
6 Service ("FWS") has been delegated primary responsibility for  
7 regulating migratory birds, including cormorants. See Migratory  
8 Bird Permits; Regulations for Double-Crested Cormorant  
9 Management, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,653, 12,653 (Mar. 17, 2003).

10 The plaintiffs brought this action to challenge the  
11 Depredation Order, which, they allege, violates the relevant  
12 treaties and statutes by "authoriz[ing] state fish and wildlife  
13 agencies, Indian Tribes, and U.S. Department of Agriculture . . .  
14 employees to kill an unlimited number of federally protected  
15 double-crested cormorants in New York and twenty-four other  
16 States, without any restrictions on time of year or location of  
17 the killings, without any advance notice to the FWS, and without  
18 any showing of specific, localized harm caused by the  
19 cormorants." Compl. ¶ 1.

20 Because they are migratory birds, cormorants regularly  
21 cross national boundaries. Prior to 1916, the treatment of these  
22 birds was regulated by individual nations within their own  
23 borders, making it difficult for any individual country to  
24 protect their populations from over-hunting or other harm. In  
25 order to create a "uniform system" for migratory birds that  
26 passed through their territories, the United States in 1916

1 negotiated a treaty with the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of  
2 Canada, to coordinate protection of certain bird populations.  
3 See Convention Between the United States of America and the  
4 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland for the Protection of  
5 Migratory Birds in the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,  
6 Proclamation, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 ("U.K. Convention").  
7 Similar treaties were later entered into by the United States  
8 with Mexico in 1936, Japan in 1972, and the Soviet Union in 1976.  
9 See Convention between the United States of America and the  
10 United Mexican States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and  
11 Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 ("Mexico  
12 Convention"); Convention between the Government of the United  
13 States of America and the Government of Japan for the Protection  
14 of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their  
15 Environment, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329; Convention  
16 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet  
17 Socialist Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory  
18 Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 1976, 29  
19 U.S.T. 4647. Each of these treaties lists the birds that are  
20 protected under its terms. Only the Mexico Convention, as  
21 amended in 1972, explicitly applies to cormorants.

22 The original 1936 Mexico Convention provides, in  
23 pertinent part:

24 ARTICLE I. In order that the species may not  
25 be exterminated, the [United States and  
26 Mexico] declare that it is right and proper  
27 to protect birds denominated as migratory . .  
28 . by means of adequate methods which will  
29 permit, in so far as the respective high

1 contracting parties may see fit, the  
2 utilization of said birds rationally for  
3 purposes of sport, food, commerce and  
4 industry.

5 ARTICLE II. The [United States and Mexico]  
6 agree to establish laws, regulations and  
7 provisions to satisfy the need set forth in  
8 the preceding Article, including:

9 A) The establishment of close seasons,  
10 which will prohibit in certain periods  
11 of the year the taking of migratory  
12 birds . . . .

13 . . . .

14 C) The limitation of their hunting to  
15 four months in each year, as a maximum,  
16 under permits issued by the respective  
17 authorities in each case.

18 D) The establishment of a close season  
19 for wild ducks . . . .

20 . . . .

21 ARTICLE IV. . . . [T]he following birds shall  
22 be considered migratory:

23 Migratory game birds. . . . .

24 Migratory non-game birds. . . . .

25 Mexico Convention, arts. I, II, IV, 50 Stat. at 1312-14. The  
26 1972 amendments to the Mexico Convention added the cormorant  
27 family of birds, but did not specify whether it was a game or  
28 non-game bird. See Agreement between the Government of the  
29 United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of  
30 America Amending Article 4 of the Convention for the Protection  
31 of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Signed at Mexico City on  
32 February 7, 1936, U.S.-Mex., Mar. 10, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 260  
33 ("Mexico Convention 1972 Amendments"). It is undisputed for  
34 present purposes that the cormorant is a non-game bird.

1           The MBTA implements these treaties as federal law. It  
2 was first enacted in 1918 to reflect the mandates of the U.K.  
3 Convention, and later amended to reflect each of the subsequently  
4 negotiated treaties. The statute makes it "unlawful at any time,  
5 by any means or in any manner," inter alia, to "take" birds  
6 listed in the relevant treaties. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). To "take"  
7 a bird means "to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,  
8 or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,  
9 capture, or collect" it. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12.

10           The MBTA also delegates authority to the United States  
11 Secretary of the Interior,

12           from time to time, having due regard to the  
13 zones of temperature and to the distribution,  
14 abundance, economic value, breeding habits,  
15 and times and lines of migratory flight of  
16 such birds, to determine when, to what  
17 extent, if at all, and by what means, it is  
18 compatible with the terms of the conventions  
19 to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing,  
20 possession, sale, purchase, shipment,  
21 transportation, carriage, or export of any  
22 such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof,  
23 and to adopt suitable regulations permitting  
24 and governing the same, in accordance with  
25 such determinations, which regulations shall  
26 become effective when approved by the  
27 President.

28           16 U.S.C. § 704. This authority has been subdelegated by the  
29 Secretary to the FWS. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.1.

30           When migratory birds converge in large numbers, they  
31 may consume large quantities of local plants, fish, or other  
32 species. In doing so, they may harm commercial activity  
33 dependent on those species. For example, as the cormorant  
34 population has grown over the past several decades, the FWS has

1 received increasing numbers of complaints from fishermen and  
2 operators of aquaculture facilities, such as commercial catfish  
3 farms, asserting that cormorants are responsible for plundering  
4 the same fish that they seek to gather, cultivate, and sell.

5 When migratory birds cause, or are about to cause, such  
6 acts of "depredation,"<sup>1</sup> the FWS may, upon application, issue a  
7 permit that allows a person to take migratory birds for  
8 depredation control purposes. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.41.

9 Applications for such permits must include, inter alia, "(1) A  
10 description of the area where depredations are occurring; (2) The  
11 nature of the crops or other interests being injured; (3) The  
12 extent of such injury; and (4) The particular species of  
13 migratory birds committing the injury." Id. Permittees are  
14 subject to a variety of conditions, including limitations on the  
15 manner in which the birds in question may be killed and the  
16 proper methods of disposing of their remains. Id.

17 As an alternative to individual permits, the FWS may,  
18 "[u]pon the receipt of evidence clearly showing that migratory  
19 game birds have accumulated in such numbers in a particular area  
20 as to cause or about to cause serious damage to agricultural,  
21 horticultural, and fish cultural interests . . . issue by  
22 publication in the Federal Register a depredation order . . . ."  
23 50 C.F.R. § 21.42. Such an order must state explicitly that it  
24 is an "emergency measure designed to relieve depredations only"

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<sup>1</sup> "[A]n act of plundering, despoiling, or making inroads."  
Webster's Third International Dictionary Unabridged 606 (2002).  
The FWS regulations do not define the word.

1 and it must impose certain restrictions on the manner in which  
2 birds may be killed. Id.

3 In addition to these general provisions for addressing  
4 depredations, the FWS also provides specific rules for  
5 depredation orders that have been issued relating to specific  
6 species. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.43-46. The rules referred to above  
7 were all in effect prior to and at the time of the FWS's  
8 promulgation of the orders at issue in this case.

9 Agency Proceedings

10 In response to complaints that cormorants' fish-eating  
11 habits were becoming increasingly costly to aquaculture and other  
12 industries, the FWS in 1998 adopted an Aquaculture Depredation  
13 Order, 50 C.F.R. § 21.47, allowing the taking of cormorants  
14 without a permit when they are found committing or about to  
15 commit acts of depredation on aquaculture stocks, subject to  
16 various conditions and only within thirteen enumerated states.  
17 See id. This provision was amended when the FWS adopted the  
18 Depredation Order at issue in this appeal.

19 In response to continued complaints of cormorant-  
20 related depredations, and an increase in complaints unrelated to  
21 aquaculture, the FWS in 1999 issued a Notice of Intent to develop  
22 a "national cormorant management plan" with an accompanying  
23 Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") as required by NEPA.  
24 Migratory Bird Permits; Notice of Intent To Prepare an  
25 Environmental Impact Statement and National Management Plan for  
26 the Double-Crested Cormorant, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,826 (Nov. 8, 1999);



1 see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The FWS also formed a  
2 "Cormorant Team" consisting of staff members from various FWS  
3 offices which consulted with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's  
4 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS"). The team  
5 evaluated methods of managing the cormorant population. In  
6 December 2001, it released a Draft EIS ("DEIS") for public  
7 comment. Notice of Availability; Draft Environmental Impact  
8 Statement on Double-Crested Cormorant Management, 66 Fed. Reg.  
9 60,218 (Dec. 3, 2001). The DEIS presented "six management  
10 alternatives to address biological and socioeconomic resource  
11 conflicts associated with cormorants." Id. They included: 1) no  
12 action (continuation of existing cormorant management practices);  
13 2) only non-lethal management techniques; 3) expansion of  
14 existing cormorant management policies; 4) a new depredation  
15 order; 5) reduction of regional cormorant populations; and 6)  
16 frameworks for a cormorant hunting season. Id. From these  
17 alternatives, the team recommended the fourth, proposing in the  
18 DEIS the adoption of a new depredation order "to allow public  
19 resource managers greater flexibility in dealing with cormorant  
20 conflicts while ensuring Federal oversight via reporting and  
21 monitoring requirements." Id.

22 The proposed depredation order, as described by the  
23 DEIS, "authoriz[es] State, Tribal, and Federal land management  
24 agencies to implement a [cormorant] management program, while  
25 maintaining Federal oversight of [cormorant] populations via  
26 reporting and monitoring requirements." U.S. Fish and Wildlife

1 Service, Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Double-Crested  
2 Cormorant Management 17 (2001), available at  
3 [http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/issues/cormorant/deis/chapter2.](http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/issues/cormorant/deis/chapter2.pdf)  
4 pdf (last visited July 22, 2008). These land management agencies  
5 would be allowed to take cormorants without a permit "to protect  
6 biological resources . . . on public lands and waters," though  
7 they were to "utilize non-lethal management tools to the extent  
8 they consider[ed] appropriate." Id. at 18. The agencies would  
9 be required to keep records of all activities and report this  
10 data to the FWS annually. Id. at 19. The FWS reserved the  
11 authority "to immediately suspend or revoke any Agency's  
12 authority under [the proposed depredation order]" if the agency  
13 did not adhere to the terms specified in the order or if the FWS  
14 determined that cormorants no longer posed a threat to public  
15 resources, or if the viability of cormorant populations were  
16 threatened. Id.

17 In March 2003, the FWS published a proposed rule  
18 reflecting slight modifications of the proposed depredation order  
19 as described in the DEIS. Migratory Bird Permits; Regulations  
20 for Double-Crested Cormorant Management, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,653  
21 (proposed Mar. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21).  
22 Among other changes, the proposed rule reduced the number of  
23 states to which the proposed depredation order would apply from  
24 forty-eight to twenty-four, identified with greater specificity  
25 the agencies to which the order would apply, restricted its  
26 applicability to land and freshwater (therefore excluding

1 saltwater), and allowed more methods for taking cormorants. Id.  
2 at 12,654. It also noted that "[w]hile the [FWS] has the primary  
3 responsibility for regulating [cormorant] management, on-the-  
4 ground management activities are largely carried out by entities  
5 such as State fish and wildlife agencies, wildlife damage control  
6 agencies such as the Wildlife Services program of [APHIS] and, in  
7 some cases, by private citizens." Id.

8 The FWS published its final EIS in August 2003 and  
9 issued a final rule on October 8, 2003. See Notice of  
10 Availability; Final Environmental Impact Statement on  
11 Double-Crested Cormorant Management, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,603 (Aug.  
12 11, 2003); Migratory Bird Permits; Regulations for Double-Crested  
13 Cormorant Management ("Final Rule"), 68 Fed. Reg. 58,022 (Oct. 8,  
14 2003). The Final Rule established the Depredation Order, 50  
15 C.F.R. § 21.48, and amended the Aquaculture Depredation Order, 50  
16 C.F.R. § 21.47.

17 Before issuing the order, the FWS reviewed studies  
18 related to the growth, breeding, and travel patterns of  
19 cormorants in North America. Based on what it considered to be  
20 the available science, the agency concluded that:

21 (1) [Cormorants] are generalist predators  
22 whose diet varies considerably between  
23 seasons and locations and tends to reflect  
24 fish species composition; (2) The present  
25 composition of cormorant diet appears to have  
26 been strongly influenced by human-induced  
27 changes in the natural balance of fish  
28 stocks; (3) "Impact" can occur at different  
29 scales, such that ecological effects on fish  
30 populations are not necessarily the same as  
31 effects on recreational or commercial  
32 catches, or vice versa; (4) Cormorant impact

1 is generally most significant in artificial,  
2 highly managed situations; and (5) Because  
3 environmental and other conditions vary  
4 locally, the degree of conflicts with  
5 cormorants will vary locally.

6 Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,025. The FWS noted that in  
7 addition to the losses at aquaculture facilities resulting from  
8 cormorant depredations, cormorants could also have an adverse  
9 impact on other birds and local vegetation. Id.

10 In its final form, the Depredation Order "authorizes  
11 State fish and wildlife agencies, Federally recognized Tribes,  
12 and State Directors of the Wildlife Services program . . . to  
13 prevent depredations on the public resources of fish . . . ,  
14 wildlife, plants, and their habitats by taking without a permit  
15 double-crested cormorants found committing or about to commit,  
16 such depredations." 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(c)(1). The rule requires  
17 the initial use of non-lethal control methods, id. § 21.48(d)(1),  
18 applies only to cormorants, id. § 21.48(d)(7), and mandates  
19 specific measures intended to limit the impact of control efforts  
20 on species protected under the Endangered Species Act,  
21 id. § 21.48(d)(8). Agencies acting pursuant to the Depredation  
22 Order must, for each year in which they intend to act, provide "a  
23 one-time written notice" to the FWS indicating their intent to  
24 act under the Depredation Order, id. § 21.48(d)(9), and they must  
25 notify the FWS in writing thirty days in advance if any "single  
26 control action . . . would individually, or a succession of such  
27 actions . . . would cumulatively, kill more than 10 percent of  
28 the double-crested cormorants in a breeding colony,"

1 id. § 21.48(d)(9)(i). The FWS has the power to prohibit such  
2 activity if the FWS deems it "a threat to the long-term  
3 sustainability of double-crested cormorants or any other  
4 migratory bird species." Id. § 21.48(d)(9)(ii). Agencies are  
5 also required to submit annual reports describing their  
6 activities under the Depredation Order, including numbers of  
7 cormorants killed and nests whose eggs were oiled,  
8 id. § 21.48(d)(10)-(11), and the FWS reserves the right to  
9 suspend or revoke the authority of any person acting pursuant to  
10 the Depredation Order, id. § 21.48(d)(13). In addition to  
11 adopting the Depredation Order, the FWS expanded the Aquaculture  
12 Depredation Order to allow cormorants to be taken at their winter  
13 roost sites. Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,031.

#### 14 District Court Proceedings

15 In February 2004, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in  
16 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New  
17 York challenging, inter alia, the FWS's adoption of the  
18 Depredation Order, asserting that it was contrary to treaties to  
19 which the United States is a party, federal statutes, and FWS  
20 regulations. The parties all eventually moved for summary  
21 judgment.

22 In a Memorandum and Order filed March 29, 2005, the  
23 district court concluded that the Depredation Order is not in  
24 conflict with the MBTA because it balances the factors set forth  
25 by the MBTA and determines "'when, to what extent, if at all, and  
26 by what means' the taking of [cormorants] is permissible." Fund

1 for Animals v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408-11 (S.D.N.Y.  
2 2005) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 704(a)). To the extent that the MBTA  
3 requires a national approach to migratory bird management, the  
4 district court reasoned, the requirement is not in conflict with  
5 the Depredation Order's limited delegation of discretion to state  
6 agencies and regional branches of the FWS because the FWS "has  
7 not abdicated its authority, or granted states free reign over  
8 management of the cormorant population," particularly in light of  
9 the Depredation Order's notice requirements and limits placed on  
10 the manner in which cormorants may be taken. Id. at 410-11. The  
11 district court also concluded that the Depredation Order does not  
12 conflict with the Mexico Convention. Although the Convention  
13 requires that each nation establish "close seasons" during which  
14 takings are prohibited, the district court deferred to the FWS's  
15 view that this provision applies only to game birds, which the  
16 parties agree do not include the cormorant. Id. at 412-14.

17 The district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument  
18 that the defendants' adoption of the Depredation Order was  
19 arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to the APA, for it found  
20 that the record adequately demonstrates that: 1) the double-  
21 crested cormorant adversely affects public resources; 2) the  
22 Depredation Order is a reasonable method of effectuating the  
23 goals of the MBTA; and 3) the Depredation Order does not conflict  
24 with the FWS's internal regulations. Id. at 414-23. The court  
25 also determined that the defendants had complied with the  
26 requirements of NEPA by issuing the final EIS. Id. at 427-34.



1 (1951) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The  
2 reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence in  
3 the record, but the possibility of drawing two inconsistent  
4 conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative  
5 agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence."

6 Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523

7 (1981) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When an  
8 agency makes a decision in the face of disputed technical facts,  
9 "[a] court must be reluctant to reverse results supported  
10 by . . . a weight of considered and carefully articulated expert  
11 opinion." Fed. Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404  
12 U.S. 453, 463 (1972).

13 In evaluating agency reasoning, we must be satisfied  
14 that the agency examined the relevant data and established a  
15 "rational connection between the facts found and the choice  
16 made." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.  
17 Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citation and internal quotation  
18 marks omitted).

19 The agency's action should only be set aside  
20 [if] it 'relied on factors which Congress has  
21 not intended it to consider, entirely failed  
22 to consider an important aspect of the  
23 problem, offered an explanation for its  
24 decision that runs counter to the evidence  
25 before the agency, or is so implausible that  
26 it could not be ascribed to a difference in  
27 view or the products of expertise.'

28 Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2000)

29 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070  
30 (2001).



1           II. Whether the Depredation Order Violates the MBTA

2           The plaintiffs argue that by delegating "management  
3 authority" to the states and other agencies, the Depredation  
4 Order violates the MBTA's requirement that any killings of  
5 protected birds be specifically authorized by the FWS. We agree  
6 with the district court, however, that the discretion granted to  
7 these third parties is limited and subject to adequate oversight  
8 by the FWS, and that the Depredation Order therefore does not  
9 contravene the MBTA.

10           Delegation of statutory responsibility by federal  
11 agencies and officers to outside parties is problematic because  
12 "lines of accountability may blur, undermining an important  
13 democratic check on government decision-making," U.S. Telecom  
14 Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 543  
15 U.S. 925 (2004), and because outside parties, whether private or  
16 sovereign, might not "share the agency's national vision and  
17 perspective," id. at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted). We  
18 agree with the D.C. Circuit that, absent statutory authorization,  
19 such delegation is impermissible. Id.

20           The MBTA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior "to  
21 determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means"  
22 takings may occur, 16 U.S.C. § 704(a), and "to adopt suitable  
23 regulations permitting and governing the same," id., but the  
24 statute does not specifically provide for this authority to be  
25 delegated to third parties. Because any unauthorized delegation  
26 of this authority beyond the agency would be impermissible, our

1 inquiry focuses on whether the Depredation Order is, in fact,  
2 such a delegation.

3 An agency delegates its authority when it shifts to  
4 another party "almost the entire determination of whether a  
5 specific statutory requirement . . . has been satisfied," U.S.  
6 Telecom, 359 F.3d at 567, or where the agency abdicates its  
7 "final reviewing authority," Nat'l Park & Conservation Ass'n v.  
8 Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19 (D.D.C. 1999). Agencies may seek  
9 advice and policy recommendations from outside parties, but they  
10 may not "'rubber-stamp' decisions made by others under the guise  
11 of seeking their 'advice.'" U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 568. If  
12 all it reserves for itself is "the extreme remedy of totally  
13 terminating the [delegation agreement]," Nat'l Park, 54 F. Supp.  
14 2d at 20, an agency abdicates its "final reviewing authority,"  
15 id. at 19.

16 In the case at bar, the authority delegated by Congress  
17 to the FWS under the MBTA bears little resemblance to the far  
18 narrower band of discretion afforded to those acting under the  
19 Depredation Order. The MBTA requires the Secretary "to determine  
20 when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is  
21 compatible with the terms of the conventions" to permit takings  
22 and killings of migratory birds. By contrast, third parties  
23 acting pursuant to the Depredation Order are limited to takings  
24 of cormorants, and cormorants only, and even then, solely "to  
25 prevent depredations on the public resources of fish . . . ,  
26 wildlife, plants, and their habitats." 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(c).

1 Even if we accept the plaintiffs' warning that the term  
2 "depredation" is not explicitly defined by the FWS and could  
3 include birds engaging in the natural behavior of eating fish  
4 with no evidence of harm to a fish population overall, the  
5 Depredation Order nonetheless restricts the species, locations,  
6 and means by which takings in response to such depredations could  
7 occur, thereby restricting the discretion that may be exercised  
8 by third parties acting under the Order.

9           The Depredation Order therefore does not represent a  
10 delegation of authority but is, instead, a permissible "grant of  
11 permission [conditioned] on the decision of another entity, such  
12 as a state, local, or tribal government, . . . [with] a  
13 reasonable connection between the outside entity's decision and  
14 the federal agency's determination." U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at  
15 567. By adopting a rule that provides local agencies discretion  
16 to determine what constitutes a "depredation" within a localized  
17 context, the FWS was exercising its "broad permitting authority"  
18 while incorporating "obviously relevant local concern[s] as . . .  
19 element[s] of its decision process." Id.

20           As a practical matter, of course, by issuing the  
21 Depredation Order, the FWS has limited its ability to regulate in  
22 advance those takings that are authorized by the Order. In this  
23 regard, the Depredation Order differs from the permit and  
24 rulemaking system for handling requests for depredation permits  
25 set forth at 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.41-21.42, which prohibits  
26 depredation control efforts unless the FWS first affirmatively

1 issues a permit or order, and which requires the FWS to consider  
2 beforehand evidence of damage caused or about to be caused by  
3 migratory birds. There is, however, no statutory requirement  
4 that the FWS provide prior authorization in the form of a permit  
5 for specific takings of migratory birds. The MBTA mandates only  
6 "suitable regulations permitting and governing" takings. 16  
7 U.S.C. § 704(a). The regulations restricting the taking of  
8 migratory birds, even in the absence of an advance permitting  
9 scheme, satisfy this statutory requirement.

10 It is also worth noting that the FWS does retain some  
11 authority to regulate takings under the Depredation Order before  
12 they occur. For example, the FWS must be notified 30 days in  
13 advance of depredation control efforts that would "kill more than  
14 10 percent of the double-crested cormorants in a breeding colony"  
15 and may prevent any such efforts with simple notification. 50  
16 C.F.R. § 21.48(d)(9)(i)-(ii). It may also suspend or revoke the  
17 authority of third parties to act pursuant to the Depredation  
18 Order if they do not adhere to the Order's "purpose, terms, and  
19 conditions" or if the "long-term sustainability of double-crested  
20 cormorant populations is threatened." Id. § 21.48(d)(13).  
21 Finally, the Depredation Order requires third parties acting  
22 under it to submit annual reports detailing their activities.  
23 The reports are required to include, among other things, an  
24 assessment of the effectiveness of control efforts, a description  
25 of efforts made to minimize incidental takings, and a tally of  
26 the number of cormorants and other migratory birds killed.

1 Id. § 21.48(d)(10). In light of this oversight power and  
2 monitoring authority, the FWS is amply equipped to monitor the  
3 nationwide status of cormorant populations and to respond to  
4 long-term effects on the species.

5 We conclude that the Depredation Order does not violate  
6 the MBTA.

7 III. Whether the Depredation Order Conflicts with  
8 Treaties to Which the United States Is a Party

9 Article II(A) of the Mexico Convention -- the only  
10 treaty that refers specifically to cormorants -- requires "[t]he  
11 establishment of close seasons, which will prohibit in certain  
12 periods of the year the taking of migratory birds . . . ."  
13 Mexico Convention, art. II, 50 Stat. at 1312. The plaintiffs  
14 interpret this provision to apply to all migratory birds --  
15 whether or not they are game birds. In their view, the  
16 Depredation Order's failure to provide for a close season renders  
17 the order contrary to the treaty and therefore in violation of  
18 the MBTA. See 16 U.S.C. § 704 (providing that the MBTA is  
19 "[s]ubject to the provisions [of] and [designed] in order to  
20 carry out the purposes of the conventions"). We think that the  
21 Mexico Convention itself is ambiguous regarding the question of  
22 whether the "close seasons" requirement applies to all migratory  
23 birds. We therefore defer to the FWS's reasonable view that the  
24 Convention requires a close season only for game birds, which the  
25 parties agree do not include the cormorant.

26 "Respect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the  
27 Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international

1 treaty." El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S.  
2 155, 168 (1999); see also Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.  
3 Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not conclusive,  
4 the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government  
5 agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is  
6 entitled to great weight.").

7           We will not create ambiguity where none exists, but the  
8 text and structure of the Mexico Convention do not express a  
9 clear intent regarding the need for a close season for all  
10 migratory birds, as opposed to game birds -- a category that does  
11 not include cormorants. Article II(A) refers to "the taking of  
12 migratory birds," not the taking of "all migratory birds." That  
13 section, moreover, creates an exception for "private game farms."  
14 And Article II(C) specifies the minimum length of a close season  
15 when "their hunting" would be limited, implicitly referring back  
16 to the "migratory birds" referenced in subpart (A). These  
17 provisions addressing hunting can reasonably be read to suggest  
18 that the "migratory birds" at issue in Article II(A) include only  
19 those that are hunted, i.e., game birds.

20           The distinction drawn in Article IV between game birds  
21 and non-game birds does little to clarify the meaning of Article  
22 II(A) in this regard. The fact that the states parties to the  
23 treaty made this distinction makes it clear enough that they were  
24 aware of the differences between the two. They therefore could  
25 have specified "migratory game birds" at Article II(A) had they  
26 meant that the requirement of close seasons applied only to game

1 birds. But it is also possible that they viewed this distinction  
2 as implied by the kinds of protection described in Article II,  
3 some of which clearly apply only to game birds, and some of which  
4 do not.

5 The plaintiffs suggest that the references to hunting  
6 at subpart (C), and to game farms at subpart (A) restrict the  
7 meaning of subpart (A)'s "migratory birds" only for those  
8 specific purposes. The "close season" requirement remains  
9 applicable to all migratory birds. Even if we accept this  
10 argument, however, there is nothing in the text or structure of  
11 Article II that would foreclose the defendants' contrary  
12 interpretation. The plaintiffs' interpretation of Article II(A)  
13 is not unreasonable, but the treaty does not unambiguously  
14 require such an interpretation. The agency's view -- that  
15 Article II(A) refers only to migratory game birds -- is also a  
16 reasonable one, and we therefore are required to accept it.<sup>3</sup>

17 IV. Whether the FWS Acted Arbitrarily or Capriciously  
18 in Adopting the Depredation Order

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<sup>3</sup> The plaintiffs also argue that even if Article II(A) is ambiguous, the defendants' interpretation is not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), because the agency never expressly adopted this interpretation during the administrative process. Even if the FWS's interpretation had not been adopted prior to this litigation, however, it appears that we would still accord deference to the executive branch view concerning the meaning of the Mexico Convention. See United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 164 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001) (accepting the State Department's view concerning rights under the Vienna Convention, provided in response to questions posed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit).

1           The plaintiffs contend that the FWS acted arbitrarily  
2 and capriciously in adopting the Depredation Order. In their  
3 view, the Order "authoriz[ed] a full-scale assault on the  
4 protected birds" in the absence of evidence that cormorants were  
5 having a widespread impact. Appellants' Br. at 46. We disagree.

6           Although the Depredation Order applies to about half  
7 the states, depredation control efforts pursuant to the  
8 Depredation Order may take place only where cormorants are found  
9 "committing or about to commit" depredations and under specified  
10 conditions. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(c)(1). By so limiting control  
11 efforts, the Depredation Order provides a "rational connection  
12 between the facts found and the choice made" and is therefore  
13 neither arbitrary nor capricious. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43  
14 (internal quotation marks omitted).

15           As the plaintiffs observe, the FWS does not provide  
16 evidence that cormorants have a "widespread impact" on public  
17 resources. Appellants' Br. at 46. But it is the FWS's position  
18 that the agency was not required to make any such finding to  
19 support the Depredation Order. In its review of studies  
20 addressing the impact of cormorants on various types of public  
21 resources, the FWS noted that "negative impacts are typically  
22 very site-specific and thus [cormorant]-fish conflicts are most  
23 likely to occur on a localized scale," Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg.  
24 at 58,025; that "[w]hile large-scale impacts on regional or  
25 continental bird populations have not been documented" there was  
26 evidence that other bird species could "be negatively impacted by



1 [cormorants] at a site-specific level," id.; and that cormorants  
2 caused significant financial loss at aquaculture facilities and  
3 fish hatcheries, which are localized by their nature, id. at  
4 58,026. Studies reviewed by the FWS also concluded that  
5 cormorant predation had adverse impacts in states including  
6 Wyoming, New York, and states in the Upper Midwest, South, and  
7 Mississippi Delta region, whether in the form of cormorant diets  
8 skewed heavily towards fish, or economic losses due to cormorant  
9 predation at aquaculture or hatchery facilities. As the FWS  
10 itself acknowledged, these studies did not provide a full picture  
11 of the interaction between cormorants and local resources. The  
12 FWS recognized the "need for more information about [cormorants]  
13 and their impacts on resources across a variety of ecological  
14 settings" and agreed with critics of the Depredation Order that  
15 "better information on population status and trends is  
16 desirable." Id. at 58,023. What the FWS did establish, though,  
17 was that in a large number of states, cormorants were responsible  
18 for localized, site-specific harm to public resources, even if  
19 not on a state-wide basis.

20 The remaining question, then, is whether the  
21 Depredation Order is a reasonable response to this evidence of  
22 harm. In light of the limited discretion afforded by the  
23 Depredation Order, we conclude that it is. The express intent of  
24 the Order is "to enhance the ability of resource agencies to deal  
25 with immediate, localized [cormorant] damages." Id. And that is  
26 precisely what the Depredation Order does. It applies only to

1 the public resources of affected states, 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(b),  
2 (c)(1), and takings are permitted only of those cormorants  
3 "committing or about to commit . . . depredations," id. §  
4 21.48(c)(1). All takings must be recorded and detailed in annual  
5 reports. The FWS must be notified in advance of activity that  
6 would result in the taking of more than 10 percent of a breeding  
7 colony. The FWS may also prevent such activity if it is deemed a  
8 threat to the long-term sustainability of cormorants. These  
9 restrictions adequately limit depredation control activities  
10 under the Depredation Order to address the types of harm the FWS  
11 specifically found are caused by cormorants. Although, as  
12 discussed, there may be some uncertainty in the meaning of  
13 "depredation," the discretion provided by the Depredation Order  
14 to local agencies to determine when depredations occur is not so  
15 expansive that it would render the order arbitrary and  
16 capricious.

17 The plaintiffs also argue that instead of the  
18 Depredation Order, the FWS should have adopted a "less drastic  
19 liberalized permitting scheme" similar to some of the  
20 alternatives considered by the FWS. Appellants' Br. at 49.  
21 Perhaps such an approach would be a better response than the  
22 Depredation Order in providing local agencies with some degree of  
23 flexibility, addressing actual cormorant damage, and avoiding  
24 unnecessary takings of cormorants. However, the FWS has  
25 articulated adequate explanations for its choice not to adopt  
26 this, or another, alternative approach, preferring to grant local

1 agencies a degree of flexibility that the FWS thinks will more  
2 "adequately address resource damages caused by [cormorants]" than  
3 permit-based approaches. Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,034. It  
4 is, of course, typically the case that there are several  
5 different possible responses to a given problem, more than one of  
6 which may be rational. In this case, the Depredation Order  
7 represents one rational response to the problem of cormorant  
8 depredation based on evidence available to the FWS, and the FWS  
9 has explained its reasons for choosing one rational response over  
10 others. This is the limit of our inquiry, see Citizens to  
11 Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971),  
12 and we therefore conclude that the FWS complied with the APA in  
13 adopting the Depredation Order.

14 V. Whether the FWS Complied with NEPA in Adopting  
15 the Depredation Order

16 In order to adopt the Depredation Order, the FWS was  
17 required by NEPA to prepare an EIS that would "provide full and  
18 fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and . . .  
19 inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable  
20 alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or  
21 enhance the quality of the human environment." 40 C.F.R.  
22 § 1502.1; see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). "NEPA is a procedural  
23 statute that mandates a process rather than a particular  
24 result. . . . [It] does not command an agency to favor any  
25 particular course of action, but rather requires the agency to  
26 withhold its decision to proceed with an action until it has taken  
27 a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences." Stewart Park &

1 Reserve Coal., Inc. (SPARC) v. Slater, 352 F.3d 545, 557 (2d Cir.  
2 2003) (internal citation omitted). The court's role is to ensure  
3 that NEPA's procedural requirements have been satisfied, not to  
4 "interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive  
5 as to the choice of the action to be taken." Kleppe v. Sierra  
6 Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (internal quotation marks  
7 omitted).

8           Where there is uncertainty regarding the potential  
9 effects of an agency action, "speculation in an EIS is not  
10 precluded, [but] the agency is not obliged to engage in endless  
11 hypothesizing as to remote possibilities." County of Suffolk v.  
12 Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1379 (2d Cir. 1977). Even where  
13 this uncertainty arises from disparate state and local regulation  
14 that may affect federal action, we have not required detailed  
15 information regarding the effects of these regulations in an EIS  
16 where such "information would be of little or no utility in  
17 determining the impact of state and local exercise of regulatory  
18 powers, since each of the states and municipalities affected could  
19 change its regulations . . . between the publication of the EIS"  
20 and the time when such local regulations would affect the federal  
21 action. Id.

22           The plaintiffs point to the lack of site-specific or  
23 localized analysis in the EIS as evidence that the FWS violated  
24 NEPA's requirement to examine and permit the public to comment on  
25 the environmental impact of the proposed Depredation Order. But  
26 under the order, the FWS did not commit itself to any site-

1 specific actions, and it would have been largely speculative for  
2 the FWS to identify the specific, localized areas where control  
3 efforts under the order would take place. We therefore do not  
4 think that the FWS was obligated under NEPA to include site-  
5 specific analyses in the EIS.

6 Under the Depredation Order, local agencies have  
7 discretion to select the particular sites at which to pursue  
8 depredation control efforts, subject of course to the constraints  
9 set forth in the Depredation Order. The Depredation Order does  
10 not itself mandate that local agencies utilize their authority  
11 under the Order. And, because cormorant depredation is highly  
12 localized, and because the Depredation Order limits control  
13 efforts only to those cormorants "found committing or about to  
14 commit" depredation, the exact locations where local agencies  
15 might act pursuant to the Depredation Order could not be known  
16 with any certainty by the FWS in advance. These compounded  
17 uncertainties would render any site-specific EIS virtually  
18 impossible to prepare. Not only would it be uncertain where  
19 control efforts under the Depredation Order could take place, it  
20 would remain uncertain whether any control efforts actually would  
21 take place there. The FWS had no means of reliably identifying  
22 the relevant sites, let alone ascertaining whether any actions  
23 under the Depredation Order would be warranted at that site.  
24 Effects that are not reasonably foreseeable need not be included  
25 in an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (including as effects for EIS  
26 purposes those "which are caused by the action and are later in

1 time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably  
2 foreseeable"); Suffolk County, 562 F.2d at 1378 ("If the  
3 additional information would at best amount to speculation as to  
4 future event or events, it obviously would not be of much use as  
5 input in deciding whether to proceed."). The FWS therefore did  
6 not violate NEPA by omitting site-specific analyses in this case.

7           In the absence of any certain site-specific action,  
8 then, it was sufficient for the FWS here to prepare only a  
9 programmatic EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c) (Environmental impact  
10 statements on "broad actions" may be prepared "[g]enerically,  
11 including actions which have relevant similarities, such as common  
12 timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation, media,  
13 or subject matter."); see also Friends of Yosemite Valley v.  
14 Norton, 348 F.3d 789, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) ("NEPA requires a full  
15 evaluation of site-specific impacts only when a 'critical  
16 decision' has been made to act on site development -- i.e., when  
17 the agency proposes to make an irreversible and irretrievable  
18 commitment of the availability of resources to [a] project at a  
19 particular site. The determination of whether a 'critical  
20 decision' has been made begins with an accurate description of the  
21 [agency's] proposed action." (emphases, internal quotation marks,  
22 and citations omitted)). Any site-specific actions to which the  
23 FWS or any other agency subsequently committed would require the  
24 preparation of a site-specific EIS - even if the action were  
25 undertaken pursuant to the Depredation Order -- if the  
26 programmatic EIS is insufficient to address the environmental

1 impact of the site-specific action. See Nat'l Audubon Society v.  
2 Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 13 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Manatee County v.  
3 Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 778 (M.D. Fla. 1982)). But because the  
4 Depredation Order itself does not commit FWS to any site-specific  
5 control efforts, its adoption did not require any corresponding  
6 site-specific EIS.

7 The FWS did not violate NEPA in adopting the Depredation  
8 Order.

9 **CONCLUSION**

10 We have considered the plaintiffs' remaining arguments  
11 and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the  
12 judgment of the district court is affirmed.