Sierra Club v. Morton

No. 1182-73 (D.D.C. August 24, 1973)

The court denies defendants' motion to transfer to Montana an action seeking an injunction against the planned development of coal mining in parts of the Northern Great Plains until a comprehensive environmental impact statement is filed. The issues central to the case are not such that they require adjudication by a Montana court, nor do the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice demand transfer. The case deals primarily with NEPA, a statute with which this court has long experience, and most witnesses and recipients of interrogatories will be federal officials in Washington. The laws regarding venue were primarily intended to make the federal judicial process available to private plaintiffs on a more convenient and less costly basis, and not to allow defendants to overrule plaintiffs' choice of forum.

Counsel for Plaintiffs
Bruce J. Terris
1908 Sunderland Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Defendants
Herbert Pittle
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

[3 ELR 20785]

Parker, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This suit was brought by seven environmental groups seeking, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA" or "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., injunctive and declaratory relief. At issue is the vast coal development which is planned for parts of the Northern Great Plains¹ region of the country. Named as defendants are the heads of various federal administrative bodies who allegedly have already made, or are in the process of making, significant decisions with regard to this development.²

The thrust of plaintiffs' contentions is that since implementation, the mandates of NEPA, in particular the preparation of a § 4332 "impact statement," must be complied with by the agencies involved.³ No Statement having been prepared, plaintiffs have instituted this litigation seeking a declaration that NEPA will be violated if any of the delineated governmental action is taken without first compiling a comprehensive environmental impact statement and enjoining the defendants from taking any action in this regard unless and until the required evaluation is undertaken.

The Court has granted several applications for intervention by parties holding interests in property involved.

The government has moved this Court for an order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), transferring this cause to the United States District Court for the District of Montana. Several of the intervening defendants have either supported that motion or similarly moved on their own behalf.⁴

The Court concludes, on the basis of the moving papers and the memoranda submitted in support and opposition thereto, that the defendants have failed to meet the heavy burden levied upon a defendant who seeks to upset plaintiff's choice of forum. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).

Section 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332, mandates federal agencies, before taking any "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," to prepare, after consultation with other agencies versed in environmental matters a detailed and comprehensive "impact" statement analyzing the effects any proposed action may have on the environment, as well as the feasibility of alternative measures aimed at alleviating any such deleterious results. The provisions of § 102 leave little room for latitude, ". . . are not inherently flexible . . . and must be complied with to the fullest extent possible unless there is a clear conflict of statutory authority." Calvert Cliffs Coord. Com. v. United States A.E. Com'n., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis in original).

It is clear then that the basic issues which this Court will be [3 ELR 20786] confronted with on the merits concern the interpretation and applicability of § 102, primarily whether there are "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." This suit does not call into question the ultimate propriety of any final administrative determination. What is involved is the imposition of certain conditions precedent to any such decisions.

Any consideration of the transfer motion must be viewed in light of the rather narrow issues placed before the Court by the complaint.

Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides as follows:

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.

The government's principal contentions are: since the property and interests ultimately affected by this suit are situated far from the District of Columbia, the logical forum is in Montana where the trial judge presumably will be more familiar with the local problems and ramifications attendant to the planned projects; that the discovery and trial proceedings will involve persons situated in Northern Great Plains territory; that transfer may discourage the filing of multiple suits; and that the provisions of and rationale behind 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) support the transfer request.

The Court is not persuaded. The issues in this suit do not appear to necessarily involve a close scrutiny of the various individual property interests affected. The basic controversy centers upon Federal administrative policy which is made, or at least coordinated, in the District of Columbia. Any discovery, therefore, will undoubtedly involve the officials officed in this jurisdiction. In this regard it is not insignificant to note that the plaintiffs have asserted that they will move for summary judgment in the near future and that little or no discovery is contemplated to support their position.⁵

The case does not appear to involve intricate questions requiring the expertise of the Montana courts and it is noted that this Circuit, on both the appellate and district level has had considerable experience and involvement with so called "NEPA" cases which often have broad, if not national, impact.

In 1962 subsection (e) was added to § 1391 of the Judicial Code to provide that suits against Federal officials may be brought in the districts where (1) the defendant resides; (2) the cause of action arose; (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or; (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved. This altered the previous policy of requiring that such suits be brought in this jurisdiction and "was intended to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of litigating far from their residences, to relieve the courts in the District of Columbia of some of their case load, and to take advantage of the expertise district judges acquire in the problems peculiar to their areas." Pruess v. Udall, 359 F.2d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (emphasis added). The defendants have invoked this statute as supportive of their position that the transfer of the suit would accommodate the parties and witnesses and serve the interests of justice. Although the Court is hesitant to find that § 1391 (e) is entirely without relevancy, the policy considerations underlying its enactment do not fit defendants' purposes. Congress was primarily concerned with making the federal judicial process available to private plaintiffs on a more convenient and less costly basis. S.Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 2 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News, p. 2786 (1962).

Plaintiffs have chosen the seat of government as the forum in which to litigate issues which, on the basis of the pleadings and the memorandum submitted in connection with the present motion, appear to have potential impact upon the economy, environment, and energy situation, on a wide basis.

The Court is aware that the outcome of this suit will significantly affect the lands directly involved, but the Court is not convinced that the issues central to this case are such that they require adjudication by a Montana Court or that the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice demand transfer. The Court, therefore, will exercise its discretion and deny the government's motion.

1. The states primarily involved are Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota.

2. The defendants are: Secretary of the Department of the Interior; Director of the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of Interior; Assistant Secretary For Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior; Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of Interior; Director of the U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of Interior; Secretary of the Department of Agriculture; Secretary of the Army; and Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers.

3. These in part include the issuance of prospecting permits and mining leases, contracting for the sale of water rights, granting permits for transmission lines, etc.

4. The Court, however, has not considered these filings since it is doubtful that intervenors have standing to challenge venue. See 3B Moore, Federal Practice, P24.19.

5. The plaintiffs have already had expedited discovery for the limited purpose of determining the necessity of moving for a preliminary injunction. No such motion was filed.