United States v. Neville Chemical Co.

No. 86-5333 (9th Cir. October 12, 1989)

In a decision designated as not for publication, the court upholds the conviction of a chemical manufacturing company for knowingly disposing of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of § 3008(d)(2) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The district court properly determined that a finding of specific intent to violate the statute is not required. The district court need only find that defendant knew it disposed of hazardous waste and that there was no permit. The evidence supports the district court's conclusion that defendant knew the waste it disposed of was hazardous.

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
Janet Goldstein
U.S. Attorney's Office
312 N. Spring St., Los Angeles CA 90012
(213) 894-2434

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Nicholas Dewitt
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker
555 S. Flower St., 23rd Fl., Los Angeles CA 90071
(213) 683-6000

[20 ELR 20197]

Rea, J.: Memorandum^*

Neville Chemical Company manufactures chlorinated paraffin and generates hazardous wastes. After waiving its right to a jury, Neville was tried and convicted of knowingly disposing of these wastes without a permit in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2). We affirm.

Neville first contends that the district court failed to correctly interpret the statute. The penalty provision of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) applies to any person who

Knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste . . .

(A) without a permit . . . or

(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit . . .

Neville argues that this language requires a finding of "specific intent" to violate the statute; that is, the court must find that Neville knew it had disposed of wastes, knew they were hazardous, and knew there was no permit.

We reject Neville's argument. In United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 [19 ELR 21140] (9th Cir. 1989), we recently held that knowledge of lack of a permit is not required to violate the statute. A trial court need find only that the defendant knew the wastes were disposed of and that they were hazardous. Id. at 1038-39. The district court "required neither proof of knowledge of the law or proof of specific intent" and found that Neville knew the buried waste was hazardous. This standard is consistent with Hoflin and we affirm.

Neville next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Neville had specific intent to violate 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2). Even though specific intent is not an element of this offense, the statute does require knowledge that the waste was hazardous. Neville asserts that it lacked such knowledge and bases its assertion on the testimony of Robert Shimko. However, the evidence supports the finding that at least some employees knew that the dumped material was hazardous and the trial judge specifically stated that he did not find Shimko credible. Hence, the evidence supports the district court's finding that Neville knew the dumped waste was hazardous. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The judgment is

AFFIRMED.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.