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18 ELR 20317 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1988 | All rights reserved American Lung Association v. Kean No. 87-288 (D.N.J. November 19, 1987)The court establishes a timetable to bring New Jersey into compliance with the ozone control portion of its state implementation plan (SIP). In a previous decision, the court had held that New Jersey was liable for failing to abide by its SIP's timetable for implementation of seven specific ozone control strategies. Plaintiffs and defendants New Jersey and the Environmental Protection Agency then agreed on a proposed compliance schedule, to which industry intervenors raised several objections. The court first holds that the language of CAA § 172 indicates that the only proper consideration in setting a timetable for New Jersey's compliance after the deadline is whether it provides for SIP implementation as expeditiously as practicable. Addressing the intervenors' objections, the court holds that it need not consider all aspects of the proposed schedule, including its technical feasibility. An exhaustive factual inquiry into the effects of the proposed timetable is not required, since the only issue before the court is whether New Jersey can meet the dates proposed. The court holds that it cannot delay the implementation of Stage II vapor controls at commercial gasoline stations until after New Jersey has promulgated regulations for underground gasoline storage tanks because the court has no jurisdiction under CAA §§ 110 or 307 to review the New Jersey SIP's complex balancing of costs and benefits. The court next holds that there is a sufficient number of available contractors to make the schedule for installation of the Stage II vapor controls practicable. Although close, the schedule actually furthers the purpose of the CAA, which is to bring about expeditious compliance. Moreover, any shortage of contractors could be alleviated if the gasoline stations offered more for the contractors' services. The court also rejects intervenor's arguments that the tight schedule will create unacceptable risks of accident and explosion, because existing statutory and common law promotes safety, and the evidence suggests that Stage II installation is relatively simple. The court holds that market conditions that increase the cost of installing the vapor controls at gasoline stations do not render the schedule impracticable. Finally, the court holds that it cannot delay the implementation of vapor controls on the barge loading of gasoline. To the extent that such a delay would be for the purpose of minimizing compliance costs, the court has no jurisdiction to review the state's decision to require such controls. Although the Coast Guard plans to promulgate regulations requiring the use of similar controls, to delay implementation of such controls under the New Jersey SIP in expectation of the Coast Guard's action would violate the CAA's mandate to move as expeditiously as practicable. There is no reason that New Jersey cannot implement regulations for barges on its own. Should New Jersey's scheme violate the Commerce Clause, an appropriate challenge could be brought. The court enters an order requiring New Jersey to comply with the proposed compliance schedule. [A previous decision in this case is published at 18 ELR 20036. Decisions from related New York litigation are published at 18 ELR 20106 and 20148.] Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Defendants Counsel for Defendant-Intervenors Ackerman, J.: Opinion This is an action brought by certain non-profit associations to enforce federal prohibitions on ozone pollution in New Jersey. On September 24, 1987, I issued a decision granting plaintiffs summary judgment against the defendant State of New Jersey on the issue of New Jersey's liability under the federal Clean Air Act. F.Supp. (D.N.J. 1987). Specifically, I found that New Jersey had violated the Act by failing to follow its state implementation plan ("SIP") for ozone-pollution control, a plan which, in accordance with the Act, New Jersey itself had authored and the defendant federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had approved. In particular, I found that New Jersey had failed to keep to the timetable set out in its SIP for issuing proposed regulations and adopting and enforcing final regulations which would have implemented seven specific strategies for ozone control, including the installation of "Stage II vapor controls" at commercial gasoline stations and the use of vapor controls during the coastal barge loading of gasoline. After finding liability, I ordered the parties to submit by October 30, 1987, proposed timetables for New Jersey to follow in order to achieve expeditious compliance with its SIP objectives. Before those proposed schedules were due, new parties entered the case. In early October I was presented with a proposed order consented to by all parties, permitting the American Petroleum Institute (API) to intervene as a defendant "for the sole purpose of addressing the remedies required as a result of the court's opinion of September 24, 1987." I had earlier denied API's motion to intervene on the issue of New Jersey's liability, but had accepted an amicus brief from API on that subject. In view of the parties' consent to intervention on the remedy issue, I signed the order. In late October I received another proposed consent order, this one permitting the National Association of Convenience Stores, the Petroleum Marketers Association of America, and the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers, appearing as one party (hereinafter referred to as the "Gasoline Marketers"), to intervene as defendants "for the sole purpose of addressing the Stage II [vapor control] remedies" required by my liability decision. I had earlier denied the Gasoline Marketers' motion to intervene on the liability issue; as with the API intervention, however, I signed the order regarding intervention on the remedy issue in view of the parties' consent. In early November, New Jersey submitted its own proposed schedule for expeditious SIP compliance. Plaintiffs, defendant EPA, and the intervenor-defendants all commented in writing. The intervenor-defendants also proposed alternative schedules. Generally, plaintiffs and the EPA supported the adoption of New Jersey's proposed schedule, and the intervenor-defendants argued that longer timetables were required. On November 9, 1987, I held oral argument on the propriety of the proposed schedules, hearing from plaintiffs, New Jersey, the EPA, and the intervenor-defendants. I gave all parties four additional days to supplement their arguments with further submissions, and gave the intervenor-defendants that same time to respond to certain late papers filed by plaintiffs and the EPA in support of New Jersey's proposed schedule. I shall now decide what compliance schedule New Jersey must follow. At the outset, I note that the powers of a federal district court to remedy demonstrated wrongs is broad. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1971) (discussing the "historic equitable remedial powers" of courts); see also U.S. v. Town of North Hempstead, 610 F.2d 1025, 1027 [10 ELR 20060] (2d Cir. 1979). New Jersey's demonstrated wrong in this case is its failure to implement seven specific ozone-control strategies called for in the state's ozone-control SIP. That SIP had been written by New Jersey and reviewed, tightened, and approved by the EPA in conformance with the Clean Air Act, and in furtherance of Congress' goal, stated in the Act, that allowable standards for ozone pollution must be met "as expeditiously as practicable but not later than December 31, 1987." 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2). All parties agree that at this point there is no hope of New Jersey implementing the seven strategies and complying with its SIP by December 31, 1987. The task for this court, therefore, is to provide for SIP implementation "as expeditiously as practicable" after December 31, 1987. To that end, New Jersey has submitted the following proposed schedule for the implementation of the seven strategies:
New Jersey calls this schedule "expeditious," and while it does not consent to its imposition by order, it does represent "in good faith" that the schedule can practicably be met. Plaintiffs find this schedule acceptable, noting that for strategies 2, 3, and 4, New Jersey proposes to compress the implementation timetable from the 24 months originally set out in the SIP to 19 months, after an initial 8-month period in which to generate the first proposed rules and thereby activate the implementation timetable; for strategies 5, 6 and 7, to similarly compress the original 24-month timetable to 19 months, but to take an initial 12 months to generate the first proposed rules and thereby start the timetable; and for strategy 1, to follow the original 12-month timetable for large gasoline stations only, and to give medium-sized gas stations a full 24 months before full compliance is required, or twice as long as originally provided for in the SIP. (Small gasoline stations -- that is, stations which handle less than 10,000 gallons per month on average -- had always been exempt from the SIP requirements for Stage II vapor controls.) The EPA finds the schedule to be "reasonable and practicable." Plaintiff proposes that an order be entered imposing this schedule on New Jersey, and requiring the state to report every three months on its compliance with the ordered schedule. New Jersey does not consent to such an order, but makes no argument in opposition. If I had to consider the positions of plaintiffs, New Jersey, and the EPA only, I would enter an order imposing the proposed schedule without further discussion. After all, it is plaintiffs who seek relief here, New Jersey that must live under the threat of contempt for non-compliance with such an order, and the EPA whose duty it was to police the production by New Jersey of a federally acceptable SIP in the first place. Their satisfaction with the schedule is telling. But the intervenor-defendants have raised objections of their own, which I must address. Initially, I consider an objection made by API which implicates the adoption of any and all parts of New Jersey's proposed schedule. API claims that plaintiffs and New Jersey have failed to provide the court with an adequate factual record upon which to judge the propriety of the proposed schedule. Indeed, API suggests that before I adopt any schedule, I must consider "all relevant facts" regarding the proposed schedule, including its "technical feasibility." API apparently believes that nothing should be ordered until I have developed an exhaustive record on the issue of how the accelerated timetable New Jersey proposes will in fact play out, and what its effects will be. I disagree. The inquiry to be made at this point is simply whether New Jersey can practicably achieve the increases in implementation speed which it proposes, and whether those increases cannot practicably be augmented. I have already been presented with New Jersey's admission that it can practicably follow the schedule, with the October 30, 1987, affidavit of William J. O'Sullivan of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in support of the schedule, and with New Jersey's failure to actively oppose my adoption of the schedule; with plaintiffs' acceptance of the schedule as sufficiently expeditious; and with the EPA's characterization of the schedule as reasonable and practicable. Aside from inquiry into the specific objections articulated by the intervenor-defendants and discussed later in this opinion, no further inquiry is necessary to establish the adequacy of the proposed schedule as plaintiffs' proper remedy for New Jersey's failure to perform duties which were imposed upon New Jersey in part as a result of the EPA's approval of the New Jersey SIP. Next, I consider the particularized objections made by the intervenor-defendants to specific parts of the proposed schedule. API raises objections to those parts of the schedule which concern Stage II vapor controls and barge loading of gasoline. The Gasoline Marketers object to the provisions concerning Stage II controls only. I shall deal first with the objections to Stage II vapor controls and second with the barge-loading objections. Because there have been no objections to the timetables proposed for the other five strategies, the proposed schedule regarding those strategies shall be adopted. The intervenor-defendants raise a number of objections to the proposed timetable for Stage II vapor controls, all of which I reject. First, intervenor-defendants argue that Stage II controls should not be required until New Jersey's DEP has promulgated regulations for the underground monitoring and fortification of gasoline storage tanks. DEP was due to issue such regulations under state law by September 3 of this year. Intervenor-defendants contend that both Stage II installation and storage-tank-monitoring installation will require significant digging and construction at gas station sites, and should be coordinated to minimize costs to the affected stations. I reject this argument for the following reasons. New Jersey's SIP embodies the complex balancing of varied costs and benefits that has already been made in regard to Stage II implementation in New Jersey. The procedure by which that SIP was produced, and by which that balancing was performed, makes no provision for district court review of the balances struck therein. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410 and 7607, especially § 7607(b) and § 7607(e); see also U.S. v. Ethyl Corp., 761 F.2d 1153 [15 ELR 20589] (5th Cir. 1985). In contrast to the process which produced the SIP, my sole task today is to consider how fast New Jersey's SIP may practicably be implemented. Were I to order the implementation of some parts of the SIP at full speed and other parts at a slower speed, I would not only violate the overriding Congressional direction that ozone-pollution control proceed "as expeditiously as possible," I would also rearrange the distribution of compliance costs and benefits which was set by the original terms of the SIP. Under the Act, neither result is tolerable. Second, intervenor-defendants argue that there are not enough contractors to complete in time all the Stage II installations required by the proposed timetable, at least not without rushing the construction work and thereby creating risks of accident and explosion. Factual submissions have been received from plaintiffs and from intervenor-defendants regarding the number of available contractors and the speed at which they could practicably operate. New Jersey's proposed schedule allots to the 2,000 large gas stations in the state a bit more than 27 weeks to install their own Stage II controls, and allots to the 2,200 remaining regulated stations a bit more than 43 weeks to complete their own Stage II installations. The evidence submitted by plaintiffs, including the results of a New Jersey DEP phone survey of contractors and a November 13, 1987, letter from Janine Kelly, PrincipalEnvironmental Engineer for DEP, support plaintiffs' contentions that about 50 contractors with two crews each are now available, and that with these 50 contractors committing half their crews during good weather, and completing two installations per crew per week, about 320 installations could be completed each month. The Gasoline Marketers respond by contesting the quality of the phone survey and suggesting that fewer contractors are available than plaintiffs claim. API responds in part through affidavits which suggest that 45 to 50 contractors with two crews each "are capable of" or "may" be available for installation work, but that one crew can perform only one installation per week. Plaintiffs' numbers suggest that, at a weekly rate of 80 installations, it would take 25 weeks to install Stage II controls at the 2,000 large stations and 27 1/2 weeks to install controls at the remaining regulated stations. The only alternative numbers offered by intervenor-defendants suggest that it would take perhaps twice as long for each category of gas station. Given these competing estimates of the time required, I find that New Jersey's proposed schedule of 27 weeks for large-station installation, although tight, is practicable, and that the proposed schedule of 43 weeks for the remaining regulated stations is certainly practicable. Of course, the rough quality of the estimates, as well as the uncertainty inherent in predictions regarding future contractor supply and future contractor demand per installation, renders any measure of the time required somewhat speculative. By limiting the state and its gas stations to little more time than the most favorable estimate now available, therefore, the pressure on them to perform expeditiously is essentially maximized. This is, however, what I understand the Clean Air Act to require in these circumstances. I note in addition that, despite intervenor-defendants' speculations to the contrary, some or most part of any contractor shortage which might ultimately develop could probably be alleviated if gas stations simply offer more money for contracting services. I do not offer this observation lightly, but rather as an expansion on my earlier point regarding the coordination of construction jobs at gas station sites, that this is not the time and not the place to argue for an exemption from the costs of compliance which were originally allocated in the cost-benefit balance struck by New Jersey's SIP. As a final note on the issue of Stage II contractor availability, I reject API's conclusory speculations, stated in the recent affidavits of Mark Towey and Gerald A. Schanke, that a tight installation schedule will create unacceptable risks of accident and explosion. First of all, when designing Stage II specifications and installing Stage II controls, New Jersey, the state's gas stations, and the contractors themselves will all operate, as they always do, under the weight of established statutory and common law favoring care and safety. Second, plaintiffs have offered the comparatively more detailed August 21, 1987, supplemental affidavit of James J. Morgenster in support of their contention that Stage II installation is a relatively simple operation. For all these reasons, I reject contractor shortage as a problem rendering the proposed schedule impracticable. Finally, I reject, for reasons already repeated, the intervenor-defendants' arguments that construction-loan costs, insurance costs, and fiberglass pipe shortages are all irremediable market conditions which render the proposed schedule impracticable. It is perhaps understandable that intervenor-defendants wish to avoid the costs of speedy Stage II compliance, but the law as it stands in the Clean Air Act and the New Jersey SIP itself will not allow intervenor-defendants, at this point in at least, to hide behind those costs. Intervenor-defendant API also raises an objection to the proposed timetable for controls on the barge loading of gasoline. That timetable calls in part for the submission of proposed rules on July 22, 1988, a public hearing on those rules on September 30, 1988, the commencement of compliance with final rules in February 1989, and full compliance by February 1990. In opposition, API points out that the United States Coast Guard is planning to issue its own nation-wide regulations for the use of vapor controls in the barge loading of gasoline, with an emphasis on uniform practice in interstate and maritime commerce and an emphasis on maritime safety, and that the Coast Guard has through the Secretary of Transportation asked certain states including New Jersey to put off their regulatory efforts until after the Coast Guard has issued regulations. API contends that New Jersey should not regulate barge loading until at least 2 1/2 years after the Coast Guard implements whatever regulations it may eventually promulgate. The 2 1/2 year delay, on its own, is offered as a means for minimizing compliance costs for regulated parties, and is therefore legally indefensible for reasons cited earlier. Therefore, I reject it. The suggestion that New Jersey wait until the Coast Guard acts first is on its own more substantial, but I reject it also. The Coast Guard contemplates the receipt of an advisory committee report on the subject by February 1989 and the promulgation of final rules by February 1990. See the October 8, 1987, letter of Rear Admiral J.W. Kime to Commissioner Dewling of the New Jersey DEP. For New Jersey to wait until then to begin regulation of barge loading of gasoline would put the state 26 months behind in its proposed schedule. Such a delay would certainly violate New Jersey's federal Clean Air Act duty to move as expeditiously as practicable. Nor is there evidence that the delay would interfere with the Coast Guard's plans for research and eventual regulation, or with the Coast Guard's regulatory goals as currently espoused. Although the Coast Guard may have special expertise regarding marine safety, there is no reason to believe that New Jersey could not promulgate a safe barge-loading scheme on its own. In addition, should New Jersey's scheme when implemented constitute a Commerce Clause violation in an area not yet governed by federal regulation, parties with standing to sue and ripe claims could assert a Commence Clause argument in the appropriate court case. And if the Coast Guard eventually issues regulations which require New Jersey's regulatory scheme to give way under the Supremacy Clause, then the regulated parties will simply be obliged to make such adjustments as are necessary in their regulated activities. Of course, New Jersey should consult thoroughly with the Coast Guard on the barge-loading subject generally, and should also do what it can, without veering from the proposed barge-loading timetable, to learn from the Coast Guard's expertise in this area, and to promulgate regulations which anticipate what the Coast Guard may later require and which minimize any anticipated differences between the state-authored and federal schemes. Forall these reasons, API's objections to the barge-loading timetable are rejected. I have reviewed the specific objections raised by the intervenor-defendants to New Jersey's proposed schedule for accelerated SIP compliance, and have found those objections wanting. Since I have an otherwise sufficient basis for accepting New Jersey's proposed schedule as plaintiffs' remedy for the state's violations of the Clean Air Act, I shall accept that schedule and impose it on New Jersey, along with certain reporting provisions, in the form of a remedial order. That order shall follow substantially plaintiffs' proposed form of remedial order, which was submitted by plaintiffs with their comments on New Jersey's proposed schedule. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize my view that the result reached today is in no way the product of judicial discretion, but instead is in every detail compelled by the statutory law of the United States. In the Clean Air Act, Congress expressed an unmistakable desire to attain acceptable levels of ozone pollution "as expeditiously as practicable." In compliance with the Act, New Jersey authored its own plan to control ozone pollution. In accordance with the Act, the EPA reviewed, tightened, and approved the plan. As permitted by the Act, private citizens brought this lawsuit to force New Jersey to follow the plan. In strict conformance with the Act, I have found in favor of those private citizens, and shall enter an order which requires New Jersey, simply, to implement its plan as expeditously as practicable. The will of Congress, as embodied in the Act, demands nothing more. But it certainly insists on nothing less. See order filed in conformance with this opinion. Scheduling Order This action having come before the Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, and the Court having granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their claims against State Defendants, the Court having considered the pre- and post-hearing papers and submissions of the parties and a decision on liability having been duly rendered on September 24, 1987, and there being no just reason for delay of entry of this final judgment on Plaintiffs' claims against State Defendants, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be entered immediately by the Clerk of the Court in favor of Plaintiffs American Lung Association of New Jersey; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; Sierra Club, New Jersey Chapter; New Jersey Audubon Society; American Littoral Society; New Jersey Environmental Federation; New Jersey Environmental Lobby; and the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group and against Thomas H. Kean, Governor of New Jersey; New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; and Richard T. Dewling, as Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection [hereinafter "State Defendants"] as follows: (1) On claims one and two, declaring and adjudging State Defendants in violation of federal Clean Air Act emission standards or limitations, under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), (f) as set forth in the New Jersey State Implementation Plan Revision for the Attainment and Maintenance of Ozone and Carbon Monoxide National Ambient Air Quality Standards, Revised, September 1983 [hereinafter "New Jersey's State Implementation Plan"], adopted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7502, in that State Defendants have failed to promulgate regulations for implementation of a Stage II gasoline vapor recovery program at service station pumps, and to implement such a program according to the descriptions and timetables in such plan; (2) On claim three, declaring and adjudging State Defendants in violation of federal Clean Air Act emission standards or limitations, under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), (f) as set forth in New Jersey's State Implementation Plan, adopted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7502, in that State Defendants have failed to propose and adopt regulatory revisions to implement a gasoline vapor control program to control emissions from barge loading activities at coastal refineries according to the descriptions and timetables in such plan; (3) On claim six, declaring and adjudging State defendants in violation of federal Clean Air Act emission standards or limitations, under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), (f) as set forth in New Jersey's State Implementation Plan, adopted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7502, in that State Defendants have failed to propose and adopt regulatory revisions to control emissions of volatile organic substances from small manufacturing sources according to the descriptions and timetables in such plan; (4) On claim seven, declaring and adjudging State Defendants in violation of federal Clean Air Act emission standards or limitations, under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), (f) as set forth in New Jersey's State Implementation Plan, adopted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7502, in that State Defendants have failed to propose and adopt regulatory revisions to control emissions of volatile organic substances from paint spraying operations at automobile refinishing facilities according to the descriptions and timetables in such plan; (5) On claim eight, declaring and adjudging State Defendants in violation of federal Clean Air Act emission standards or limitations, under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), (f) as set forth in New Jersey's State Implementation Plan, adopted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7502, in that State Defendants have failed to propose and adopt regulatory revisions to control emissions of volatile organic substances from paint spraying operations at automobile refinishing facilities according to the descriptions and timetables in such plan; (6) On claim nine, declaring and adjudging State Defendants in violation of federal Clean Air Act emission standards or limitations, under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), (f) as set forth in New Jersey's State Implementation Plan, adopted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7502, in that State Defendants have failed to propose and adopt regulatory revisions to control emissions of volatile organic substances by limiting solvent content in architectural coatings according to the descriptions and timetables in such plan; and (7) On claim ten, declaring and adjudging State defendants in violation of federal Clean Air Act emission standards or limitations, under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), (f) as set forth in New Jersey's State Implementation Plan, adopted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7502, in that State Defendants have failed to complete and publish a study of measures to reduce emissions of volatile organic substances from consumer and commercial solvents, and to promulgate final regulations and implement controls on such emissions according to the descriptions and timetables in such plan; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that State Defendants shall bring themselves into compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 7504(a)(1), (f) and New Jersey's State Implementation Plan with respect to claims one, two, three, six, seven, eight, nine and ten by completing studies, proposing and promulgating implementing regulations and taking such other actions to insure full compliance with respect to the seven strategies described in subparagraphs 1 through 7 of the first decretal paragraph of this Order including consultation with the U.S. Coast Guard on the proper substance of a gasoline vapor program to control emissions from barge loading activities, as described in subparagraph two of the first decretal paragraph of this Order; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that State Defendants shall take the above-described actions with respect to claims one, two, three, six, seven, eight, nine and ten according to the timetables set forth in Appendix "A" of this Order; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the provisions of this Judgment and Order shall apply to and be binding upon State Defendants, their officers, directors, agents, servants, employees and successors; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that State Defendants shall file with the Court and serve upon all parties on January 1, 1988, and every three months thereafter, continuing until three months after full compliance with the terms of this Order has been achieved, written reports on the progress of State Defendants with respect to the execution of this Order, such reports to: a) summarize State Defendants' progress in satisfying the provisions of this Order; b) identify any milestones of this Order that have not been met or appear unlikely to be met within the time schedules set forth in Appendix "A" or elsewhere in this Order, and the reasons therefor; and c) with respect to any provisions of this Order that State Defendants have failed to comply with in timely fashion, provide the dates by which the required actions under this Order will be undertaken by State Defendants; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that State Defendants shall promptly file with the Court and serve upon all parties, all proposed and final rules published by State Defendants pursuant to the requirements of this Order; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this Court will retain jurisdiction of the action to assure compliance with this Judgment and Order, to consider such other motions as may be made, and to consider an application by Plaintiffs for an award of fees and costs pursuant to Title 42, United States Code § 7604(d); and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, upon State Defendants taking such actions as are set forth in this Court's Order and its annexed appendix, this Order shall be deemed complied with, and an Order of Compliance and Closure shall be entered upon application on notice, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court's opinion of September 24, 1987, and the Court's opinion of November 19, 1987, and this Order shall constitute its findings of fact, conclusions of law and final judgment in this action with respect to claims against State Defendants. APPENDIX A
* Office of Administrative Law 18 ELR 20317 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1988 | All rights reserved |
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