Oklahoma Wildlife Federation v. Hodel

No. 85-C-964-C (642 F. Supp. 569) (N.D. Okla. July 14, 1986)

The court holds that the citizen suits provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) do not provide jurisdiction over plaintiffs' suit against officials of the Department of the Interior and the Oklahoma Department of Mines. The court rules that SMCRA § 520(a)(1) applies only to suits against private or government entities engaged in coal mining or reclamation activities that are allegedly violating a rule, regulation, order, or permit issued under SMCRA. The court next holds that the Office of Surface Mining's issuance of a cessation order to the coal company satisfies its nondiscretionary duty under § 520(a)(2) to take enforcement actions against violators of SMCRA. Since the Secretary has initiated the mandatory enforcement action, the court will not have jurisdiction until the administrative process is complete. Thus, the Secretary's application of the incidental mining exemption to the coal company is an exercise of discretion not reviewable under § 520(a)(2).

[A related case appears at 17 ELR 20156.]

Counsel for Plaintiff
Thomas J. McGeady
Logan, Lowry, Johnston, Switzer, West & McGeady
101 S. Wilson St., P.O. Box 558, Vinita OK 74301
(918) 256-7511

Counsel for Defendants
Dianne Shawley
Office of the Solicitor, Div. of Surface Mining
U.S. Department of the Interior
2401 E St. NW, Washington DC 20037
(202) 343-1100

H. DALE COOK, Chief Judge.

Now before the Court for its consideration is the motion for summary judgment brought by Donald Hodel (Acting Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior), Jed Christensen (Acting Director of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, United States Department of the Interior), and Gayle Townley (Deputy Chief Mine Inspector, Oklahoma Department of Mines) (hereinafter "federal defendants"). The federal defendants assert that there exist no controverted material facts and they should be granted summary judgment as a matter of law.

Federal defendants provide the Court with the legislative history of 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(1) and assert that it is only applicable against persons or government entities engaged in coal mining or reclamation activities who are allegedly violating some rule, regulation, order or permit issued under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). The federal defendants contend that § 1270(a)(1) does not provide the Court jurisdiction against the federal defendants unless the United States or its instrumentality is violating the law as a surface coal mining operator. From independent review of § 1270(a)(1) the Court finds that federal defendants' interpretation of § 1270(a)(1) is accurate in that it is a jurisdictional basis to enforce compliance against operators who are in violation of any rule, regulation, order or permit issued under SMCRA.

The federal defendants next argue that the Court's jurisdiction under 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2) is limited to compelling the Secretary of the Department of Interior or the appropriate State regulatory authority to perform any nondiscretionary act or duty that is required under SMCRA. Under the plain language of SMCRA, the Secretary or the state regulatory authority has a mandatory duty to take action for alleged violations of SMCRA. The issue before the Court is what action is required and whether the Secretary discharged that duty. The enforcement devices available to the appropriate agency are set forth in 30 U.S.C. § 1271. The Court finds that with the issuance of the December 17, 1985, Cessation Order to McNabb, the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) has fulfilled its mandatory duty. The subsequent administrative procedures must be completed before this Court has further jurisdiction to take action. The Court has no continuing authority over the Secretary or the regulatory agency once they have accepted the mandatory duty to act, otherwise the Court would be taking a premature review of the merits of the Secretary's exercise of its enforcement discretion. The Court's jurisdiction under § 1270(a)(2) is limited to compelling the Secretary to take some action. Once the administrative agency has taken action, SMCRA provides for a comprehensive system of administrative and judicial review of the enforcement taken. Section 1276(a)(2) and (b) provides the Court with jurisdiction to review final actions upon completion of the administrative process. Moreover, judicial review is particularly inappropriate at this stage because, absent a final agency decision, this Court has nothing [17 ELR 20156] before it to review. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985). Therefore the Court concludes that, once mandatory enforcement action has been initiated, the Secretary's application of the incidental mining exemption to McNabb's situation is an exercise of discretion and is beyond the jurisidictional basis set forth in 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the Order of the Court that the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Donald Hodel, Jed Christensen and Gayle Townley over and against the plaintiffs is hereby granted.