United States v. Cauffman

No. CV 83-6319-KN (C.D. Cal. October 23, 1984)

The court holds that a former owner of a hazardous waste facility may be liable for federal cleanup costs under § 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act without proof of proximate cause of the release of hazardous substances into the environment. Decisions of other courts make clear that both current and present owners of hazardou waste disposal facilities are strictly liable for response costs incurred by the United States in cleaning up a site from which there is a release of hazardous substances.

Counsel for Plaintiffs
Joseph F. Butler, Ass't U.S. Attorney
5-N-19 U.S. Courthouse
940 Front St., San Diego CA 92189
(213) 895-5610

William D. Evans, Jr.
Land and Natural Resource Division
Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(20) 633-4170

Counsel for Defendants
Alan Zuckerman
Hagenbaugh & Murphy
4th Floor, 3710 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles CA 90010
(213) 381-2600

Richard Koep
Hill, Genson, Even, Crandall & Wade
505 Shatto Place, Los Angeles CA 90020
(213) 480-4811

[15 ELR 20161]

Kenyon, J.:

Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

In its Complaint, the government alleges that the Boyers owned the hazardous waste storage facility which is the subject of this action from March 20, 1979 until October 10, 1979 at which time ownership was conveyed to Marathon Cartage. The Complaint also alleges that during the period March 20, 1979 until at least March 27, 1980 defendant General Disposal Company, as leasee of the site, disposed of hazardous waste at the facility. The Complaint goes on to allege that an explosion and fire occurred at the site on July 10, 1981, causing a release of hazardous substances into the environment and that the Environmental Protection Agency incurred substantial costs in cleaning up the site which it now seeks to recover from defendants pursuant to section [15 ELR 20162] 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607.

The defendants assert that the Complaint ought to be dismissed because they are not "responsible parties" under CERCLA and because the government has failed to allege in its Complaint that they proximately caused the release of hazardous substances into the environment at the facility.

Under Section 107(a)(1) and (2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1), (2), current owners of hazardous waste facilities, as well as those who formerly owned such facilities at the time of disposal of any hazardous substances, are strictly liable, subject to only limited defenses, for, inter alia, the costs incurred by the United States in cleaning up a site from which there is a release of a hazardous substance into the environment. See United States v. Argent Corporation, No. 83-0523-BB [14 ELR 20616] (D.N.M. May 4, 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., No. 80-1274-6 [14 ELR 20272] (D.S.C. February 23, 1984) (Order granting summary judgment); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company, 579 F. Supp. 823, 824, n. 26 [14 ELR 20212] (W.D. Mo. 1984); and United States v. Reilly Tar and Chemical Corporation, 546 F. Supp. 1100 [12 ELR 20954] (D. Minn. 1982).

In its Complaint, the government has alleged all of the elements necessary to state a cause of action against defendants under Section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Defendants clearly fit into the categories of those persons made liable under the statute. There is also nothing in the statute which requires that the government allege, and prove proximate causation before it is entitled to recover its clean-up costs under Section 107. Indeed, the requirement for proximate causation as a predicate to CERCLA liability has been rejected in United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 [14 ELR 20096] (E.D. Pa. 1983) and United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., supra.

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) be, and is hereby, denied.