National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke

No. 82-1643 (1st Cir. January 31, 1983)

The First Circuit affirms the district court's ruling, 12 ELR 20853, that certain of Rhode Island's regulations governing the transportation of hazardous materials are inconsistent with and therefore preempted by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA). The First Circuit adds that the Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations only forbid a state from requiring a written notice of an accident where such a requirement is aimed solely at hazardous materials carriers and not justified by an emergency. DOT and the district court could reasonably find a conflict between Rhode Island's regulation, which requires written notices by hazardous materials carriers, and DOT's regulation. Therefore, the regulation in inconsistent with the HMTA and invalid.

Counsel for Appellant
John R. McDermott, Special Ass't Attorney General
215 Benefit St., Providence RI 02903
(401) 277-3168

Counsel for Appellee
Lawrence W. Bierlein
910 17th St. NW, Washington DC 20006
(202) 659-9475

James J. McGair
919 Industrial Bank Bldg., Providence RI 02903
(401) 861-1717

Before Aldrich, Campbell, and Breyer, JJ.

[13 ELR 20451]

Per curiam:

We affirm the judgment of the district court substantially for the reasons stated in its opinion. National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 535 F. Supp. 509 [12 ELR 20853] (D.R.I. 1982). We simply add, as to the "accident report" requirement, that we read the opinion of the Department of Transportation as interpreting its regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 171.16 (1981), to forbid similar state regulations aimed solely at hazardous materials carriers (and not justified by, say, an emergency). State of Rhode Island Rules and Regulations Governing the Transportation of Liquified Natural Gas and Liquified Propane Gas Intended to be Used by a Public Utility; Inconsistency Ruling (IR-2), 44 Fed. Reg. 75,566, 75,572 (1979). We believe that an agency has authority to interpret its own regulations and that a court must show considerable respect to any such interpretation. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980); Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). This interpretation is reasonable, and the district court, as well as DOT, could readily find a conflict between Rhode Island's requirement and this DOT regulation as so interpreted. For that reason, the requirement is inconsistent with federal law, and therefore invalid under 49 U.S.C. § 1811(a).

Affirmed.