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11 ELR 20565 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1981 | All rights reserved California v. WattNos. CV 81-2080-MRP, -2081-MRP (C.D. Cal. May 27, 1981)The court enjoins the Secretary of the Interior from accepting or rejecting bids or issuing leases in connection with certain tracts of Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sale No. 53 off the coast of California. The court finds that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits with respect to claims based on the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. However, plaintiffs do have a very strong probability of success on the merits with respect to the claim that the Secretary improperly refused to apply the consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) to the final notice for the lease sale. The legislative history of § 307(c)(1) clearly indicates that pre-lease activities are subject to the consistency requirements of the Act. In addition, exclusion of the State of California from the decisionmaking process in violation of the CZMA constitutes irreparable harm to the state once leasing occurs. further, the potential harm to defendants from the brief delay in proceeding with he proposed lease sale is not substantial. Thus, the court finds that it is in the public interest to grant a preliminary injunction to allow a determination of the rights of the state before aditional lease sales are completed. Counsel for Plaintiffs Trent W. Orr Counsel for Defendants Michael W. Reed, Peter Steenland Counsel for Intervenor Western Oil & Gas Ass'n Counsel for Intervenor Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Pfaelzer, J.: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of plaintiffs and plaintiffs in intervention for a preliminary injunction are hereby granted, and federal defendants, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert and participating with them, are hereby restrained and enjoined from accepting or rejecting any bids, issuing any leases, or taking any other action in connection with OCS Lease Sale 53, Santa Maria Basin, for tract numbers 129 through 142, 144 through 146, 148 through 155, and 158 through 164, except for receiving and opening of bids and conducting internal administrative review of all bids. The preliminary injunction has no effect on the leasing of other tracts identified in the final notice of sale for OCS Lease Sale 53, Santa Maria Basin. It is further Ordered that no parties, bidders, or any other persons shall be deemed or permitted to acquire any rights or interests as a result of this permitted opening of bids. This Order is not intended to have to have any effect on the relative priorities among bidders based on the fact of and the amount of their bids in the event the leasing of these 32 tracts goes forward. The Court, having read and considered the pleading, memoranda, and arguments presented by the parties hereto, has determined, found, and concluded as follows: (1) the State of California and plaintiffs in intervention have a very strong probability of success on the question of the Secretary's compliance with the Coastal Zone Management Act and the requirements of consistency review, (2) plaintiffs and plaintiffs in intervention will be irreparably harmed once leasing occurs, (3) defendants will suffer no substantial harm from a brief delay and, (4) the parties and the Court have agreed that there will be a decision on the merits prior to the end of July, 1981. The Court also finds that the public interest is furthered by enjoining the leasing of the challenged tracts because of the public's significant interest in effectuating the Congressional intent. The Court hereby finds that no bond need be posted by plaintiffs and plaintiffs in intervention in this case. This Order is issued for the reasons set forth above and as more fully stated by the Court in proceedings on this date. Transcript of the Court's Ruling on Plaintiff's Application for Preliminary Injunction* The Court: Let me begin by saying that the opinion which I am going to give you now is an opinion in the case that involves the State of California only. I will discuss with you later what is to be done with the other case. I cannot deal with the other one for some reasons which are purely technical.So the opinion which I am giving you now deals with the State of California cases. Is that all clear to you? Yes. All right. Let me begin by saying that in the Ninth Circuit there is more than one test which has been articulated for the determination of the propriety of injunctive relief in any case. Under the traditional case, the Court is required to make the following determinations with respect to requests for preliminary injunctions: First: Has the applicant for the injunction established a strong likelihood of success on the merits? Second: Does the balance of irreparable harm favor the applicant? Third: Does the public interest favor granting the injunction? That is from a case which you all know, which is Sierra Club v. Hathaway, a Ninth Circuit, 1978 opinion. Under the alternative test announced by the Ninth Circuit, which is another way of looking at this problem, the alternative tests which the Ninth Circuit has defined in Inglis and the cases which follows Inglis. First, let me address the likelihood of success on the merits. The State of California has advanced several grounds as the basis for its request for preliminary injunctive relief. Although the matter is not without substantial uestion — and I emphasize that — the Court cannot conclude on the record before it that the Secretary's actions in rejecting the Governor's recommendations were so clearly arbitrary and capricious as to establish a strong likelihood of success on the issue of the violation of the Administrative [11 ELR 20566] Procedure Act and § 19 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments. The Court has reached the same conclusion with respect to the alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Although there are additional reasons for the denial of injunctive relief on those grounds, which I will deal with just briefly further on in the discussion under the factor of irreparable harm, the State of California may very well prevail on those issues at a trial on the merits. But giving due consideration to he papers which were filed in opposition to the application for injunctive relief, the Court cannot conclude that relief should be granted on those grounds at this preliminary stage of the litigation. However, the Court does find that the plaintiffs have a very strong probability of success on the merits on the issue of the violation of the Coastal Zone Management Act. The argument which have been advanced and the showings that were made by the plaintiffs in both cases, including the showings made by the local government intervenors and the coastal states' organization, and all those persons who are on that side of the case, have convinced the Court that in all likelihood the Secretary of the Interior has improperly refused to apply the consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act to the final notice for Lease Sale 53. In this regard, it is clear from the history of § 1456(c)(1) that pre-lease activities such as those which are at issue here were intended to be subjected to the consistency requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act. Indeed, this has been the view of so many government officials and agencies cited to the Court — including the Justice Department, which was requested to give an opinion on the question — that argument to the contrary seems to be without any merit. The Secretary of the Interior of course argues that the preleasing activities at issue here do not — and, under his narrow tort definition of the term, cannot — directly affect the coastal zone. And since only spre-leasing activities which directly affect the coastal zone require consistency determination, his refusal to make such a determination is proper. Although the Secretary no doubt takes the position that under his definition no pre-leasing activities could ever directly affect the coastal zone, at oral argument it was urged that the Justice Department opinion must be read to mean that whether pre-leasing activities do or do not directly affect the coastal zone is a factual question to be judged on a case-by-case basis. That is, no doubt, a more reasonable position than the one taken by the Secretary, actually taken by the Secretary. But even if that interpretation is accepted, the resolution of that factual question in every case will still turn on the definition of the term "directly affecting." And as stated by the Court at the oral argument, the Secretary's definition of that term is clearly too narrow and restrictive to give effect to the objectives which the Act was intended to achieve. Although it has been argued that until there is exploration and drilling there is no effect on the coastal zone, the reality is that the most significant steps in the whole process of oil and gas development from the standpoint of management of the state's coastal zone are taken when the tracts are selected and the lease stipulations are decided upon and imposed. To make these decisions without regard to the state's coastal zone management plan and to relegate the state to piecemeal comments and litigation regarding exploration, production and development by individual lessees frustrates the essential purpose of the Coastal Zone Management Act. That is not to say that there could not be factual situations or that factual situations may never exist in which pre-leasing activities in fact do not directly affect the coastal zone. Indeed, the Court does not altogether foreclose that possibility in this case. Accordingly, the Court proposes to dispose of that issue on the merits, along with all the other issues in these two cases, before the end of July, 1981, to avoid any possible harm to the national interests in the expeditious development of the oil and gas resources of the country. The Court will discuss with counsel how that is to take place. The Court is fully aware of the urgency of meeting the nation's energy needs and feels that an expedited disposition of these two cases is required, although 32 tracts involving only 8 percent of the oil in basin at issue here will be affected by this injunction. Now, let me turn to the next matter which is the balance of irreparable harm. In the present case, the elimination of he opportunity to enfectuate the policies mandated by Congress in the Coastal Zone Management Act in itself constitutes a serious hardship and a threat of irreparable harm to he plaintiff State of California and the other plaintiffs in that case. Congress has mandated coordination between the state and federal government in management of the coastal zone pursuant to this Act. To ensure this coordination in the management of the coastal zone, Congress imposed the requirement that certain outer continental shelf activities, including lease sales, must comply with the requirement of a consistency determination with respect to the state's approved coastal zone management plan. In order to effectuate the overriding congressional intent in enacting the Coastal Zone Management Act, the timing of the required consistency determination is crucial. As stated, the plaintiffs argue that the selection of tracts for leasing is a critical stage in the leasing process establishing which areas are subject to immediate development and which are not. Only during this initial pre-leasing stage where the tracts are selected can the Secretary and the coastal state evaluate the cumulative effects of leasing throughout an entire area. Once the individual tracts have been leased to the various bidders, the coastal state is restricted to making objections to individual exploration and development plans submitted by the lessees, and this at varying times. Further, at this stage, intergovernmental coordination of the plans for resource development in the area permits the states to have meaningful participation in decisions as to the inclusion of stipulations in the leases necessary to ensure the consistency of the project with the state coastal zone management program. Once the lease sale takes place, that opportunity is lost to the state forever. Where denial of preliminary injunctive relief is likely to prevent the effectuation of a declared congressional policy, it has been held that neither the invocation of the generalities of judicial maxims nor a traditional balancing of the equities are appropriate. That is a case called United States v. City and County of San Francisco, United States Supreme Court case, 1940. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that injunctive relief is appropriate, where necessary to satisfy statutes designed to implement important public policies. That is Lathan v. Volpe, which is a Ninth Circuit, 1971 case. It is not disputed that the Coastal Zone Manatement Act was designed to implement a very important public policy. As in the Lathan case, the central question is when and how the admittedly applicable statute must be applied. Here, also, the manner and timing of the application of a statutory requirement is crucial. If the consistency requirement is imposed now, as opposed to later, the plaintiffs will have a timely and meaningful role in the planning of offshore activities to minimize adverse effects to the coastal zone. Consideration of consistency will become a futile gesture with the passage of time. Thus, the exclusion of the State of California from the decisionmaking process in which Congress intended it to participate does constitute irreparable harm to the State of California. If the preliminary injunction is denied and the lease sale is held on the originally-scheduled date, there would be far greater difficulties than he Secretary is willing to admit in restoring the status quo if the plaintiff did prevail on the merits ultimately. The Secretary cannot terminate a lease in whole or in part at will. See also here the Union Oil v. Morton case, which is a 1975 Ninth Circuit case. Once the lease has been held, the lessees will certainly assert that certain property rights have vested with leasing. In that regard, there are many cases. Although Congress has conferred a limited power to cancel leases upon the Secretary by its 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act Amendments, the cancellation procedure clearly is cumbersome and time consuming. Section 43 U.S.C. 1334(a)(2)(A) requires that a hearing be held before cancellation. Cancellation may occur only upon the Secretary's determination after a hearing that, one, continued activity pursuant to such lease or permit would probably cause serious harm or damage to life, including fish or other aquatic life, to property, to any mineral in the areas leased or not leased, to the national security or defense, or to the marine coastal or human environment; two, that the threat of harm or damage will not disappear or decrease to an acceptable extent within a reasonable period of time; and, three, that the advantages of cancellation outweigh the advantage of continuing such lease or permit in force. Also it appears that it may be that you cannot have a cancellation of a lease until it has been in suspension or temporary prohibition for a long period of time. The Secretary argues that the federal government would be harmed by monetary losses incurred during the two-and-a-half year delay in the sale projected by the Governor. I do not take into consideration that two-and-a-half year request. To avoid the lengthy delay feared by the Secretary, both cases will be set for disposition on the merits before the end of July of this year. Thus, the potential delay in proceeding with the proposed lease sale will be insignificant, and the risk to the defendants of a financial loss as a result of delay will be minimal. Even if the Secretary were confronted with the possibility of a more substantial monetary injury, monetary injury due to lost revenues is not normally considered irreparable damage for purposes of a preliminary injunction. In that regard, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, Ninth Circuit 1980. The defendants in intervention — that is, the oil companies — claim that a delay of a portion of the sale would jeopardize the competitive positions of the bidders and compromise the integrity of the bidding process. There is considerable uncertainty as to the reality of the threat posed by these speculative harms. In any event, the brief delay before a final decision on the merits should eliminate any significant risks that may be posed by this alleged harm. In sum, the balance of hardships clearly tips in favor of the plaintiffs. An immediate harm imposed by the denial of the injunction is the exclusion from meaningful participation in the planning process relating to the state's coastal zone and the consequent denial of statutory rights given to them by Congress to the State of California. The potential harm to the defendants from a brief delay of leasing the 32 disputed tracts in the Santa Maria Basin is not substantial, especially since only 8 percent of the oil in the basin is involved. With respect to the claims that were made by the plaintiffs under the other acts which I've already mentioned — that is, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangerd Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments — the Court has already stated that it does not find the same degree of likelihood of success on the merits, although it is clear to the Court that the plaintiffs may very well ultimately prevail on those claims. However, the Court also predicates the denial of the preliminary injunction on those grounds on a feeling that there may not be at this stage a sufficient showing of irreparable harm. As the parties are aware, the defendants cited the case of North Slope Borough v. Andrus which involved the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act. They also cited other First Circuit cases. And the Court has considered the reasoning of the District of Columbia opinion which may in some limited respects be persuasive in this case on the issue of irreparable harm. However, the factual situation in that case is very different than the one in this case, and the Court mentions this point solely for the sake of completeness. Finally, turning to the issue of public intent. There can be little doubt that while the amount of oil in this basin which is involved in this case is relatively small, the issues in this case are of far reaching importance. Twenty-five states and territories have already developed and received federal approval for their coastal state management plans. Other coastal states are in various stages of the preparation of such programs. These efforts were undertaken by the State of California and other coastal states with the expectation, just as Congress intended them to expect, that they would exercise primary responsibility for the management of the coastal zone and that the activities of the federal government would be consistent with their programs pursuant to § 307(c)(1). Because of the urgent national need for energy, the pace of offshore leasing is increasing rapidly here in California and elsewhere. Indeed, the Secretary's announced goal is to move forward with domestic exploration and production as rapidly as possible and on an accelerated basis. It is therefore in the public interest that an injunction of short duration be granted to permit a clarification of the rights of the State of California and the other plaintiffs in that case before additional lease sales are consummated. I have not considered yet — I have considered it, but I have not heard from the parties, because you did not know what the decision would be, on what the form of the injunction should be. I still must discuss with you the amount of the bond, if any. I'm inclined not to impose a bond. Now, I would finally tell you that I have every intention of listening to whatever you would wish to say on the subject of how you want to dispose of both of these cases, because I have not prejudged the cases. As you can see, the injunction is partially denied and partially granted; that is to say, taking the grounds in that fashion. So it is conceivable that some of those grounds the state may want to eliminate. It's possible that some of those grounds require a factual presentation, and it's possible that some of them can be disposed of on a motion for summary judgment or on cross-motions for summary judgment. In any event, the Justice Department opinion does say what it says, which is, that direct effect is a factual question, and I am prepared to dispose of that factual question before the end of July and let the matter of the leasing go forward on a more certain basis. Now, if you wish, and you may comment on this or you may make any other proposal that you want, I will let you come back at 1:00 o'clock to set the terms of the injunction and to discuss the amount of the bond, or we may discuss it now, if you wish, or we may discuss it now and again at 1:00 o'clock. The Court: Before we discuss this matter, I know that you want an adequate record for the appellate court, and in order to shorten the time that it took me to announce the reasons for the decision, I left out purposely the citations, the exact citation of the cases and the full title, in some cases. May it be stipulated on both sides that when the transcript is prepared, the complete citation of the case will be inserted where I mentioned the case? Is it stipulated by everyone? The Court: All right. That will be helpful to you in argument. Mr. Reed: Your Honor, the defendants believe that they have a proposal ready which meets with the statement of the Court this morning. Mr. Reed: What we would recommend is that the injunction which the Court has said would be issued go to leases, that no leases be issued on the 34 tracts in contention here. This will have a number of advantages: First, it would permit the bids to be received and opened, which will show us whether there is any interest in those tracts at all and whether this lawsuit really means anything. That would be some new knowledge to all of us. We are ready on the part of defendants to go ahead with summary judgment motions, file an administrative record, and go ahead at the Court's convenience, we would hope sometime in June. The Court: You may do that at your convenience. I think it's very important that the matter be resolved. I have no desire whatsoever — and [11 ELR 20568] I'm sure you realize that from what I said. I certainly do not want in any respect to impede exploration, drilling, production. I recognize that the nation has very serious energy needs, and I don't want to impede them in any way. So I am prepared to have you agree with the other side and decide on a briefing schedule and proceed with it. Mr. Reed: That would be our recommendation, your Honor. Mr. Reed: We have not discussed it with the other side. We think that will keep any rights from vesting and thus any of the harms which your Honor mentioned this morning from being possible. Now, has he spoken for everyone at this table? Mr. Steenland: Your Honor, if I may, please. My name is Peter Steenland, from the department. If I could elaborate for just a second on my colleague from the Justice Department's remarks. There are, from an appellate perspective, benefits to Mr. Reed's or to the government's suggestion as well. If the Court were to allow the opening of the bids tomorrow, we would not have to proceed this afternoon to the emergency motions panel, which is or has been alerted to the prospect of an immediate appeal. The reason for that is that the opening of the bids confers no property interest in anyone. The Secretary has a full sixty days to make a decision on which bids he wishes to accept. Mr. Steenland: And within that time frame, there would be ample opportunity for this Court to consider summary judgment questions and, indeed, make the full determination on the merits which, as we agree, is very important in this matter. The Court: That's how the timing suggestion the Court made was decided upon, because I recognize that only a short time frame will work here. If I might add one further factor, your Honor, and that is this: When the Court moves to summary judgment, it would be most helpful, I believe, to the Court and to all the parties to know exactly what it is we're talking about in terms of consistency. Mr. Steenland: Consistency for one tract fifteen miles offshore, as opposed to eight tracts on the California line three miles offshore, may be altogether different. The Court: Definitely. You're right. Mr. Steenland: We may not have any bids on any of the tracts. And so in that fashion, if the Secretary were allowed to simply open the envelopes and read the numbers, we would know whether there's any interest in those tracts, and in that fashion we would not have to go through the entire process of re-noticing the sale. Obviously, if the Court ultimately rules against us, we would have to comply, but if the Court does not rule against us, we would be in a position, in a timely fashion, to issue those leases, and I think that's consistent with your Honor's concerns both as to the statutes involved and as to the overall policies which they are intended to implement. Ms. Berger: Thank you, your Honor. As to the timing of a decision on the merits in this case, we'd just like to mention that we have one concern which is out of our control, and that is: Secretary Watt's imminent decision on the northern four basins. In the event he decides to go forward on those basins, I anticipate further litigation on behalf of the State of California. The Court: Well, if that litigation — I don't know where that litigation might be filed. But if that litigation were filed in this court, it would come to this particular Court. If it were filed in this district, it would come to this district under the low-number rule. What would happen someplace else, I really don't know. Ms. Berger: Well, I just wanted to bring that to the Court's attention. But certainly we will be — The Court: Part of the reason for deciding on this accelerated time schedule is that I am aware that the other ones are under consideration. Ms. Berger: All right, your Honor. I would like to address for a moment the form of the injunction. Ms. Berger: We certainly take issue with the defendants' view that the bids should be accepted and opened. In fact, it is very interesting — The Court: Well, are they to be accepted? They are just going to be opened, aren't they? Ms. Berger: As I understand it, they have to be accepted physically and then opened. The Court: "Received," is the word. Ms. Berger: Yes, pardon me — received and opened. It is interesting to hear the defendants arguing in favor of that now when just last Friday they were telling the Court that the confidentiality of the bidding process was going to be — The Court: Well, everyone is entitled to change their position, everyone. Ms. Berger: As long as that includes us, your Honor. But more importantly, that does not preserve the status quo. We feel that that will dilute the effect of the Court's ruling because — The Court: Well, that is all they can do. I can't say what the harm in that would be. You have to tell me. The Court: I don't see what they could do other than open them. If they find that no one has bid on a particular part of these tracts, that would resolve the question with respect to that area. Ms. Berger: But if they have bid on some or all of those tracts — The Court: Then they have to sit with them, they would have to sit with the bid. It may be opened, and that will tell them something, but that is all they have in front of them. It is informational only. Mr. Reed: Yes, your Honor, that's right. Now you can assure yourself by the form of the injunction that you draw — I am looking at the one that I received from you — and you can take it and tailor it to say what you want. The Court won't leave because I am prepared to sign the injunction anytime you have got it in the form that you think is satisfactory. As a matter of fact, I have the original here and I will give it to you. Now I suggest that that proposal be accepted because there is nothing they can do. When they open bids, that's it. If nobody bid on that parcel, then we don't have to litigate about that. What is at issue here is a principle, and it is a far reaching principle. It won't be affected at all by opening the bids. Ms. Berger: Your Honor, there are just a couple of other things that I'd like to mention just for the record. First of all, there may be the possibility that the federal government will have to pay interest on the money. I understand that a certain amount of money has to be put aside in the event of this bidding process. I don't know; perhaps the federal government can address this, whether there is any financial burden that will result from that. Secondly — and there is just one last point, and that is: that the government would maximize the recovery on the bids for the Santa Maria Basin if they did not received bids on those tracts, simply because the oil companies would be more inclined to pay higher amounts if they believe that the remaining 79 tracts were the only tracts to be leased. The Court: Well, I am inclined to let the Secretary decide about that. Now what do you say about the bond? Ms. Berger: About the bond, your Honor, we have a section on that in our brief where we cite legislative history. The Court: Yes, I have read it. Ms. Berger: And the purpose of the bond was to prevent frivolous lawsuits. As your Honor, I believe, indicated this morning, this certainly is not a frivolous suit. The Court: This is not frivolous. I would be inclined — I ask the government now: I would be inclined not to impose a bond. Mr. Reed: We would concur in that, your Honor. The Court: All right, that is fine. Now then, I would suggest to you that you take the time now to meet with your co-counsel. If you wish to confer with anybody else by telephone, that is fine, because you can just tell my clerks when you are ready, and communicate with the opposing counsel and let them know that you are ready to discuss the terms of it. Show it to them, and then anything you can't resolve, the Court will resolve for you. In addition, I will await whatever you have to say, today or at another time that you set with the Court, to discuss how we are going to dispose of the case. Now you may not be able to respond to that today. I am hoping you can do that by stipulation; that you will agree that in the matter there will be cross-motions for summary judgment or that one issue will be tried, or any other method that you have for disposition, which is perfectly satisfactory with the Court. The only thing that I insist on is that the time limitation must be adhered to. The disposition of the cases must take place before the end of the summer. What I'm saying to you is that I want the disposition of the cases to take place in July. This will be the only case — these will be the only ones that take precedence over the Speedy Trial Act. All right. Now is there anything else that you wish to take up with the Court? You will indicate in the injunction, in the form of the injunction, that no bond is required by stipulation. All right. Now is there anything further? Mr. Privett: Your Honor, may we settle the form of the injunction with counsel under the Local Rule 7? Mr. Privett: So that that order that is submitted to you was approved by defendants. The Court: Yes, by all means. That is the way it should be. This isn't very complex order. I made the findings of fact on the record. I have come to the conclusions of law as well. The record will show that what I read to you are my findings and my conclusions. The only other thing I would say is that the form of the injunction should indicate the ground on which the injunction was granted, which was a single ground. All right. Now if there is anything further, I will be here and you can tell Mr. Flores and he will tell me to come back into the courtroom. * Index of Cited Cases: North Slope Borough v. Andrus, No. 80-1148, slip op. at 29-30 [10 ELR 20832] (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1980). Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162 [8 ELR 20736]. Aleknagik Natives v. Andrus, No. 78-2986, slip op. at 2648 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1980). William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975). U.S. v. County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 [1 ELR 20602] (9th Cir. 1971). Union Oil v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 [5 ELR 20218] (9th Cir. 1975). Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980). 11 ELR 20565 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1981 | All rights reserved |