The Office of Technology Assessment Says ERDA's National Energy Plan Slights Energy Conservation

6 ELR 10017 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1976 | All rights reserved


The Office of Technology Assessment Says ERDA's National Energy Plan Slights Energy Conservation

[6 ELR 10017]

"Energy" is today more than a household word. In the two years since the Arab oil embargo, a great deal has been said, somewhat less has been done, and much remains to be achieved to solve the problem of energy shortage. The problem has two basic handles: increasing the supply of energy, or reducing the demand for energy. Both have their side effects. Increasing supply has a tendency to scar the land, foul the air and hasten the day when the earth's depletable resources will be exhausted. Reducing demand requires adjustment in lifestyles, lifestyles which depend heavily upon the use of energy for their convenience, mobility and luxury. Which of these approaches willbe emphasized by the federal government may depend on plans presently being laid and debated in the Washington bureaucracy.

Section 6 of the Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 19741 (hereinafter the Act) ordered the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) to prepare a comprehensive plan for energy research, development, and demonstration; and a program to implement this plan. ERDA's report, entitled Creating Energy Choices for the Future, was submitted to Congress on June 30, 1975.

In October the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), acting pursuant to a request by the Chairman of OTA's Congressional Board, Olin Teague, and Congressman Mosher, issued a critique of ERDA's effort. The Congressmen felt that such analysis, interpretation and evaluation were necessary before Congress could satisfactorily judge ERDA's effort. In OTA's words, "Since the ERDA plans reflect the President's view of national energy R&D policy, they will in large measure determine the broader options for our future national energy policy."2

Both the ERDA plan and the OTA analysis raise significant questions concerning the role which ERDA [6 ELR 10018] should play in the nation's energy program, and the larger problem of just what the nation's energy program will be.

ERDA's Pro-Supply Bias

One of the national policy goals stressed by the ERDA plan is "[t]o provide for future needs so that life styles remain a matter of choice and are not limited by the unavailability of energy."3 This language is one of many clues that ERDA's plan is weighted toward supplying energy rather than moderating demand (by increasing efficiency of use, employing austerity measures, or otherwise). In OTA's words, the plan "appears to focus on the necessity of supply at any price and does not acknowledge that life styles can be maintained and improved with more cost-effective use of energy."4

Further indication of a supply-oriented bias is found in ERDA's tentative, wait-and-see attitude toward future demand:

It is not possible to predict what our Nation's interests and its people's desired life style will be at the end of this century. Whatever those interests and desires are, however, energy should serve them.5

While there may be dangers in charting too rigid a course for reducing end-use demand, they should not totally forestall efforts to develop such a program. Further, the end of this century is well within the near term, a projected time segment for which conservation alone is likely to produce the best solutions to energy scarcity. For example, it has been projected that 85 percent of the commercial office buildings that will be around in the year 2000 have already been built.6 Buildings are major energy users. In some instances they can be modified ("retrofitted"), but to realize the full effect of newly developed building technology (heating, cooling, etc.), it is usually necessary to start from scratch. Given the long life of most buildings, conservation is crucial to the reduction of energy use in existing structures.7

A related issue involves the need for research on nontechnological barriers to the implementation of both existing and new technologies. Citing the mandate in § 5(a) of the Act, OTA faulted ERDA on this score: "[a]lmost total attention is given to creation of technologies and not encough to analysis and evaluation of alternatives."8 Section 5(a)(1) speaks of "implementation" as well as "design" of the energy program and requires energy conservation to be a primary consideration for both.

OTA's Criticisms Emphasize Conservation

OTA's specific evaluation of ERDA's Plan and Program for energy conservation is set out in a series of "Conservation Issue Papers." The first of these simply states that ERDA's program priorities and funding requests do not reflect ERDA's assertion that energy conservation is of "crucial" importance.9 For example, ERDA's proposed budgetary allocation to conservation versus supply development is only about two percent, and only about half of this relates directly to end-use conservation. OTA points out that cost-effectiveness, as well as conservation, is slighted; a few pennies spent in this area can often yield many dollars savings. While conservation in the sense of curtailment of use need not require large expenditures, ERDA has specifically excluded itself from responsibility for developing such methodologies, explaining, "The ERDA program is directed at increased efficiency of energy utilization (as contrasted to the FEA role which is concerned primarily with curtailment)…."10

Another evaluation area involves the influence of historical, institutional, governmental, economic and social forces (i.e., nontechnological forces) on present inefficient patterns of energy use. Implementation of energy-efficient technologies, says OTA, "requires an understanding of how these forces operate and how changes in these forces will influence energy consumption patterns and fuel use."11 OTA suggests that ERDA should examine the regulatory policies and programs of various agencies to see how they can be modified to promote greater energy efficiency. Inasmuch as it is not tied to a particular technology, this role seems to be one which ERDA would not select for itself.

According to OTA,12 ERDA does not adequately confront the nontechnological barriers to energy conservation in building construction. Technology capable of saving 20 to 30 percent of the energy consumed in commercial and residential buildings is already available, OTA notes, is cost-effective and is presently inhibited by such barriers as the minimum first-cost syndrome (spending as little as possible to construct a building even though initial savings are soon gobbled up by high operational energy cost), antiquated local building codes, and industry and consumer resistance.

Conservation in Search of a Home

Even this very brief examination of the OTA Analysis is sufficient to highlight a problem that might well be expected to afflict a newly-created network of federal agencies, i.e., defining precisely their respective roles. OTA's comments fault ERDA for pursuit of technological options at the expense of a focus on a broader approach toward the solution of energy problems and for emphasis on options directed toward increased energy supply, relative to the programs in end-use demand reduction.13 ERDA foresees a more limited role for itself, with the Federal Energy Administration performing most of what OTA would require of ERDA:

For example, to achieve full effectiveness, programs in conservation of energy are likely to require legal, financial, educational, [6 ELR 10019] and other implementation measures developed and managed by FEA, as well as technical R,D&D programs managed by ERDA. Also, FEA policies affecting supply, and demand will help to determine how soon new energy technologies may become commercially viable.14

In short, ERDA sees the task of curtailing energy demand as falling on FEA, and limits its own role to a technological orientation toward improving the efficiency of energy utilization.15

Are OTA's comments designed to foist a role upon ERDA which the Act does not require? On is ERDA attempting to escape dealing with the complex social issues which will influence the effectiveness of the various technologies which it may develop? Obviously these questions are not susceptible to a simple answer. Like many pieces of legislation, the Act provides a starting place but leaves much to subsequent interpretation. There are several references to energy conservation in the Act,16 and there is a requirement that environmental and social consequences be considered in evaluating the potential of a proposed program.17 These provisions support OTA's position. On the other hand, energy conservation is linked to "technologies"18 and the the "comprehensive program in research, development and demonstration" which is the keystone of the Act. Narrowly construed, these provide support for ERDA's position.

This controversy, while sounding in semantics, is of critical significance. The FEA is currently in danger of losing funds earmarked for energy conservation because the House Appropriations Interior subcommittee believes that FEA's efforts in that area duplicate ERDA's. Subcommittee Chairman Sidney Yates recently asked ERDA Administrator Robert C. Seamans if he thought that all of the government's energy conservation programs should be assigned to ERDA. If this transfer should coincide with the realization of OTA's fears, United States' energy policy would suffer. As suggested earlier many strategies for energy conservation are nontechnological (such as implementation of institutional disincentives to energy use), and many more strategies can use existing technology. While twentieth century America has learned to rely on technology research and development to solve everything from tooth decay to post-nasal drip, it must learn not to search the moon for what can be found in the cupboard.

Institutional recalcitrance may be a further stumbling block in the path of energy conservation at the hands of ERDA. Ralph Nader recently testified that conservation, if encouraged by effective government leadership, could so cut demand for electricity that additional nuclear power generating capacity would be unnecessary. The fact that ERDA's most current mandate comes from an Act labeled "Non-Nuclear"19 cannot obliterate ERDA's institutional origin Established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,20 ERDA took over the research and development responsibilities and much of the manpower of the Atomic Energy Commission, which was abolished by that Act. The Atomic Energy Commission's scientists and other employees had a twenty-year history of commitment to "… conducting, assisting, and fostering research and development [of nuclear energy] in order to encourage maximum scientific and industrial progress."21 In this context, is the $156.2 million 1976 authorization for ERDA conservation research and development22 likely to yield a high rate of return? It would seem that Congress could find more fertile ground in which to nurture conservation efforts.

1. Public Law 93-577, Dec. 31, 1974.

2. OTA Analysis, at vii.

3. ERDA Plan, at S-1.

4. OTA Analysis, at 173. OTA suggests an alternative formulation of this goal: "to provide the opportunity for present and future generations to enjoy those amenities which they deem worthy at minimal total cost to themselves and society."

5. ERDA Plan, at S-1.

6. Introductory letter of Arthur F. Sampson, former Administrator, General Services Administration, in GSA, Energy Conservation Guidelines for Existing Buildings (1974).

7. Perhaps even the Act was short-sighted in lumping both "short-term" and "middle-term" into this century, § 6(a).

8. OTA Analysis, at 174.

9. OTA Analysis, at 176.

10. ERDA Program, at 54.

11. OTA Analysis, at 183.

12. OTA Analysis, at 191.

13. OTA Analysis, at 1.

14. ERDA Plan, at VII-3.

15. ERDA Program, at 53.

16. E.g., §§ 5(a)(1); (6)(a)(3)(A).

17. Section 5(a)(2).

18. Section 6(a)(3)(A).

19. Public Law 93-577, supra fn. 1.

20. Public Law 93-438, Oct. 11, 1974. Contrary to what is stated in the Introduction to the OTA Analysis, the Non-Nuclear Research and Development Act did not establish ERDA.

21. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq., as amended.

22. Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 94-696, adopted by the Senate on Dec. 9, 1975.


6 ELR 10017 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1976 | All rights reserved