5 ELR 50202 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1975 | All rights reserved

A Look at the Present Status of the Breeder Reactor Program: Power "Too Cheap to Meter" [5 ELR 50202]

I. Introduction

Recent developments in both the Congress and various federal agencies may have significantly altered the once rosy future of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) program. Only four years ago, the program was endorsed by the Nixon Administration for commercial development in this decade as urgently as the Kennedy Administration pledged to place an astronaut on the moon by the end of the last.¹ As recently as his State of the Union Message last January, President Ford stressed the importance of the breeder reactor as a means of achieving energy independence. But the program has received an increasing amount of criticism over the last several years on the basis of seemingly inherent environmental, safety and economic problems. A battle royal thus seems to be brewing over the breeder, of which we may have seen only the opening skirmishes. This Note will recount and examine the arguments of both sides in this dispute, and will then focus on certain recent legislative and administrative developments in an attempt to determine where the breeder program now stands and to discern the likely directions of future conflict in this area.

II. Breeder Physics

The LMFBR program was vigorously promoted by the now-defunct Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)² as an alternative source of energy in the face of dwindling domestic petroleum reserves. AEC considered the breeder concept an attractive replacement for fossilfueled generating plants and an essential supplement to the current generation of uramium fueled light water reactors (LWRs) because it produces or "breeds" more nuclear fuel than it consumes.

Light water reactors and the breeder both use essentially the same energy conversion principle. Heavy atoms in the core of the reactor are split (fissioned), producing heat. This heat is then used to convert water into steam which in turn powers a conventional steam turbine to generate electricity. The breeder differs from the current light water reactor in two important aspects, however. First, unlike the light water reactor, its fission process is not moderated (or controlled) with water but instead utilizes no moderating agent and substitutes liquid sodium as a cooling agent.³ Second, the breeder is not fueled with the enriched uranium (U-235) used in LWRs, but uses both the non-fissile, more abundant form of natural uranium (U-238) and plutonium (Pu-239), a highly toxic element which is the raw material from which nuclear explosives are constructed. In the course of breeder operation, the plutonium fuel is fissioned. At the same time, neutrons from the fissioning plutonium strike the nuclei of the non-fessile uranium (U-238), resulting in the production (breeding) of plutonium. It is this "breeding process," which produces more fissionable fuel than is consumed, that makes the LMFBR such an appealing concept. The AEC has estimated thatt the "doubling time" of a commercial breeder — the length of time required for a breeder to produce as much fissionable material as the amount usually contained in its core and tied up in its fuel cycle — will be 25 years initially and will eventually decrease to ten years.⁴

Proponents of the LMFBR program argue that the breeder offers an "essentially inexhaustible" energy source to meet a major portion of the nation's long-term (2000 and beyond) energy needs.⁵ The research and development phase of the program must be vigorously carried out, they argue, because continued use of enriched uranium in LWRs is depleting United States' reserves of low-cost nuclear fuel. Development and commercial introduction of the LMFBR, which generates more fuel than it consumes, could greatly expand the supply of fuel and allow recycling of a greater amount of uranium which would otherwise become a waste product. Thus, fuel costs would theoretically be kept at a minimum.

Proponents also argue that the breeder must be strongly emphasized because, of the three potential technologies which offer the promise of "essentially inexhaustible" energy sources — LMFBR, solar-generated electricity, and fusion — the breeder is the nearest to commercial reality. Since the AEC essentially agreed with this position, solar-generated electricity and fusion power have traditionally occupied a low-priority research and development position. Although regarded [5 ELR 50203] by many as technologies potentially superior to the LMFBR, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) still does not anticipate their commercialization until after the year 2000. The AEC's original timetable called for the commercial introduction of 400 LMFBRs by the turn of the century, but that goal has been discarded. The AEC, in its proposed final environmental impact statement on the breeder reactor program⁶ (completed prior to the agency's bifurcation), continued to urge the introduction of a commercial-size breeder by the early 1990's. In its first comment on the AEC's proposed final impact statement, ERDA declined to take a firm stand on the date for commercial introduction of the breeder. Estimating the introduction of anywhere between zero and 80 breeders by the year 2000, ERDA was adamant on at least one issue, however: the breeder reactor program will continue to enjoy highest priority in ERDA's research and development efforts.⁷

III. Elements of th the Breeder Program

Two components of the total breeder reactor program are currently receiving federal funds. The first project, the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), under construction since 1966, is designed to "provide capability for conducting a comprehensive testing program to develop and demonstrate fuels and materials for the LMFBR program."⁸ The test facility was originally scheduled to be completed before construction was begun on the secondproject, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) demonstration plant, and was originally planned to cost $87 million. Neither goal has been achieved. As a result, the fast flux facility, which was designed to test components of the demonstration plant, will be completed after construction has begun on that plant, and at a cost, according to the latest estimate, of $933 million, an overrun in excess of 1000 percent.⁹

The Clinch River demonstration plant is to be the exemplar of the nation's breeder reactor program. Although it will not be the first operating breeder built in the United States, AEC and now ERDA have considered successful completion of the demonstration plant as necessary to stimulate the utility companies' interest in the breeder concept. In the ideal case, successful completion of the Clinch River plant would be followed by construction of the Near Commercial Breeder Reactor (NCBR), an intermediate step between demonstration and full commercial introduction. According to the plan envisioned in the AEC's environmental impact statement on the LMFBR program, the Clinch River plant will stimulate utility interest in the breeder by demonstrating its "reliability, maintainability, safety, environmental acceptability, and economic feasibility [and will] confirm the value of [the breeder concept for long-term energy needs]."¹⁰ Critics, on the other hand, argue that the Clinch River project, if completed at all, will demonstrate none of the attributes claimed in the impact statement. The Clinch River project, like the fast flux facility, has experienced timetable "slippage" and massive cost overruns. The most optimistic completion date is now set at mid-1983; cost estimates have climbed steadily from $700 million three years ago to $1.77 billion earlier this year.¹¹ Critics also argue that the tendency among proponents to promote as a "sure thing" a technology which at best is highly complex and at worst could pose risks to human survival for tens of thousands of years will act ultimately to increase the likelihood of the program's failure.

IV. Breeder Litigation

The AEC prepared a comprehensive impact statement for the entire breeder program only after it was forced to by the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. (SIPI) v. Atomic Energy Commission.¹² Writing for the court, Judge J. Skelly Wright rejected the AEC's argument that to require such a comprehensive impact statement for the entire breeder program would be to compel "crystal ball inquiry." Reversing a lower court ruling, Judge Wright ordered the AEC to prepare an EIS outlining:

… the reasonably foreseeable environmental impact of the program, alternatives to the program and their reasonably/foreseeable environmental impact, and the irreversible and irretrievable committment of resources to the program….¹³

But the court held that NEPA does not require the AEC:

… to forecast the development and effects of LMFBR power reactors in the year 2000 in the same detail or with the same degree of accuracy as another agency might have to forecast the increased traffic congestion likely to [5 ELR 50204] be caused by a proposed highway….¹⁴

The proposed final statement issued by the AEC last January has been the source of controversy among commenters both within and outside of government agencies. The Natural Resources Defense Council, which represented SIPI in the breeder litigation, has termed the statement woefully iandequate, a position shared by most other environmental groups. These groups have urged a delay in the program until certain environmental and safety problems can be more fully examined and increased emphasis in the meantime on alternative energy sources. Criticism from federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the General Accounting Office and the Council on Environmental Quality has been less harsh than that offered by nongovernmental groups. The agencies have acknowledged the iandequacies of the environmental impact statement, but have nevertheless urged continuation of the breeder research program.

In addition, the State of New York commenced a NEPA action last May in federal court against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), ERDA, the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of State, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the United States Customs Service¹⁵ which seeks to prohibit authorization of air transport (and related ground-support transport) of so-called special nuclear material, including plutonium, into New York City or New York State until such time as the defendants file an environmental impact statement. On September 9, 1975, the court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and the New York Attorney General's office is currently deciding whether to appeal the ruling.

V. Points of Controversy

Controversy over the LMFBR program has centered around several issues treated in the final environmental impact statement. These are the plutonium fuel cycle, breeder economics and cost-benefit analysis, and the timetable for commercial introduction. An inherent concern underlying all of these issues is the question of public safety.

A. Plutonium Fuel Cycle

Opponents of the program have expressed concern over the use of plutonium as a reactor fuel and the problems presented by what is termed the shift from a petroleum economy to a "plutonium economy."¹⁶ Plutonium fuel-cycle problems center around the following: reactor safety; safeguarding the plutonium supply from sabotage or diversion; waste management; and risks to public health. The breeder program's environmental impact statement, in which the AEC attempted to confront these problems, was widely criticized as constituting little more than glib assertions that these problems were either so remote that they should not cause concern, or that the established AEC guidelines and regulations were adequate to eliminate any risks involved.

In ERDA's view, one of the conditions precedent to the commercial success of the breeder reactor is the establishment of an efficient fuel cycle in which spent fuel from the reactor core can be reprocessed to separate waste products from the reuseable plutonium in the original fuel and recover the new plutonium bred during the reaction process. As presently contemplated, such a fuel cycle would require continuous shipment of vast amounts of plutonium: first, from the reactor site to a fuel reprocessing plant where the plutonium would br recovered from the spent fuel; next, in oxide form, to fuel fabricating and assembly plants to be refashioned into a form suitable for use in the reactor core; and, finally, back to the reactor site for actual use. The process is similar to that proposed for present-day light water reactors by which the supply of enriched uranium-235 fuel would be supplemented by incorporating the plutonium by-product produced by the LWR into its fuel cycle.

There is an important distinction to be drawn between the fuel cycles for the two reactor types, however. In the light water reactor, use of recycled plutonium as a fuel supplement is optional. In the breeder, on the other hand, plutonium is fundamental to the entire reactor concept; plutonium bred by one reactor provides fuel for other breeders coming on-line (in addition to providing its own fuel), which in turn breed even more plutonium for future plants, and so on. Without the plutonium fuel cycle the breeder's promise as an "essentially inexhaustible" energy source vanishes; the breeder is no longer a breeder at all.

Last May, however, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) began to re-evaluate the generic environmental impact statement for the use of mixed-oxide fuel (a mixture of plutonium-oxide and uranium oxide) including recycled plutonium in light water reactors, prepared by the former AEC in August, 1974. NRC's review of the mixed-oxide fuels impact statement is not expected to be completed until at least mid-1978. In the interim, the NRC's provisional view is to grant no licenses for the use of mixed-oxide fuels in light water reactors. Critics of the breeder program point out that a final decision by NRC to prohibit licensing of plutonium recycle in LWRs would almost certainly preclude further development of the breeder. This is so because the impacts of the plutonium fuel cycle are essentially the same for both light water reactors and the breeder and because plutonium recycle is not optional in the breeder technology. Such an argument was made on the floor of both houses of Congress in debate urging the adoption of an amendment to the ERDA authorization bill which would have imposed a one-year [5 ELR 50205] moratorium on all Clinch River breeder reactor activity.¹⁷

In addition to the environmental questions raised by the plutonium fuel cycle, critics point out that diversion of as little as ten pounds of plutonium (one-tenth of one percent of the annual output of a single breeder) would be sufficient to produce an atomic weapon capable of destroying an area the size of Wall Street.

This possibility led the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to call the draft generic impact statement:

… incomplete because it fail[ed] to present a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the environmental impacts of potential diversion of special nuclear materials and of alternative safeguards programs to protect the public from such a threat.¹⁸

The dangers implicit in diversion become even more startling in the light of the NRC's present regulation regarding inventory control of nuclear materials. Under the rules, up to one percent of the nuclear inventory can be lost (or diverted) each year without exceeding acceptable limits of error. This creates the potential for undetected diversion of enough plutonium to manufacture as many as ten nuclear explosive devices from each breeder reactor every year!

B. Breeder Economics and Cost-Benefit Analysis

The environmental and safety questions posed by the breeder reactor program will undoubtedly be the source of future public dispute and continuing litigation. However, in addition to these issues, the economics of the breeder program in general, and the projected cost-benefit ratio of the program in particular, have also been the subject of extreme controversy among commenters both within and outside of the federal agencies.

The original 1969 research and development estimate for bringing the breeder reactor programs to the point of commercialization was $3.9 billion;¹⁹ by 1974 the estimated cost used in the AEC's impact statement was $10.7 billion.²⁰ In a more recent estimate, however, a Rand study indicated that, based on the breeder program's history, "… it would not be a unique outcome if [breeder] costs rose to several times the current estimates, given the long time horizon over which they are projected."²¹

But critics rest their opposition on other economic considerations, as well as the mammoth dollar costs involved. The most recently published official cost-benefit analysis prepared by the AEC is contained in the final breeder environmental impact statement,²² and concludes, as have all the AEC's analyses, that the program's benefits outweigh its costs. Many commenters have observed that the impact statement analysis demonstrates net benefits only because it assumes a combination of highly improbable conditions favorable to the breeder. EPA, in its comments on the impact statement, explored several factors used by AEC in its analysis, including the future supply of uranium; capital cost differentials between breeder reactors and light water reactors; and level of future demand for electrical power.²³ While it is elementary that the results of an analysis can vary widely depending upon assumptions made about each variable, the problem is further compounded in this case because the variables represent uncertain future conditions. However, EPA, the Natural Resources Defense Council,²⁴ the Rand Corporation,²⁵ and the General Accounting Office (GAO),²⁶ all managed to reach similar conclusions: the AEC made assumptions in the breeder impact statement which did not accurately reflect recent data and resulted in an overstatement of the potential benefits of the breeder program. EPA noted "… that with respect to the base energy demand [and] capital costs …, deviations from AEC's base projection are likely to be in only one direction — definitely downward…."²⁷

In the area of capital cost differentials, the conclusions of the Rand study cast serious doubt on the economic feasibility of the breeder's commercial introduction before the year 2000. The AEC estimated thatt the capital cost of the breeder at commercial introduction would be $520 per kilowatt (kW), or $100/kW higher than the light water reactor. The AEC further assumed that the breeder costs would fall by the year 2000 so that the cost differential between the two reactors would drop to zero. The Rand study differs sharply. It estimates that the capital cost/kW of the Clinch River plant (based on a $1.2 billion projected cost which is already below the most recent official estimate of $1.7 billion) will be more than $3,400. The Near Commercial Breeder Reactor is estimated to fall into the area of $2,000/kW. After this point, the AEC and ERDA rely heavily on a not yet visible "learning curve" to improve the breeder's cost-benefit ratio. A learning curve is a widely used, empirically [5 ELR 50206] based relationship for projecting the reduction in unit costs associated with each doubling of cumulative units produced.A 90 percent curve means that the cost of the last unit produced is reduced by 10 percent when the quantity produced is doubled. Applying a hypothetical 80 percent learning curve, a figure which Rand termed "highly unlikely," the Rand study concludes that breeder capital costs would equal light water reactor costs in 1990, assuming a $1000 initial cost case; in 1999, in the $2000 case; and in 2020, for the $3000 case.

In its environmental impact statement, the AEC applied a 98 percent learning curve to the breeder reactor in the early stages of commercialization, and assumed that over time this would drop to a 90 percent curve, which it claims is characteristic of the light water reactors.²⁸ Even if a 90 percent learning curve were applied, the Rand study suggests that breeder costs will exceed light water costs until at least the year 2020. The Rand study points out further that if light water costs fall by one percent a year, "… a 90 percent learning curve applied to $1000, $2000, $3000/kW initial costs does not bring down [breeder] costs far enough to meet the slowly falling LWR costs…."²⁹ As the GAO Issue Paper on the breeder concluded, although proponents and opponents of the program disagreed on which cost-benefit assumptions were proper, "… the LMFBR program cannot fulfill its economic promise as long as the LWR produces electricity at a more economical cost."³⁰

The Natural Resources Defense Council's viewpoint is even more pessimistic. First, the group claims, there is no evidence that any nuclear plants are on a learning curve. This conclusion is based on the increasing constant dollar capital cost of light water plants. Second, learning curve effects, if experienced at all, would first reduce light water reactor costs. In effect, this would penalize the breeder reactor in the manner described in the preceding paragraph. The Natural Resources Defense Council refutes the hypothesis that the breeder system would experience greater learning curve savings that the less complex light water reactor system, arguing that "… it is impermissible to apply a learning curve to [breeder] capital costs."³¹ According to Natural Resources Defense Council's estimates, "[f]or every $10 spent on the development of the [breeder], the public will get back only $1 or less in lower energy costs."³²

ERDA's Internal Review Board responded that increased environmental and safety design costs had "eclipsed" the light water reactor's learning curve, but that "… latent learning reduction [would] soon become visible. The breeders by contrast will benefit from the environmental and safety design work which has accumulated in the LWR industry so that their entry onto the learning curve will be expedited."³³

Of the remaining cost-benefit variables — future uranium supply and future electrical demand, for example — the greatest disagreement between ERDA on the one hand, and various federal agencies and nongovernment commenters on the other is over the electrical demand issue. The final breeder impact statement estimated an average annual demand growth rate of 6.2 percent in the period from 1974-2020.³⁴ ERDA's Internal Review Board states that "[t]he industry and ERDA staff views on the matter are that the recent downturn in demand is a minor perturbation in an otherwise stable demand curve which correlates positively with the gross national product."³⁵ EPA, on the other hand, has calculated the demand in the year 2020 to be 28 to 33 percent less than the breeder impact statement's projection, citing as a reasonable possibility a demand 50 percent below the impact statement's estimate.³⁶ The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) has termed the breeder impact statement projection "out of date" and has calculated a 25 percent lower demand rate through the year 2000.³⁷ Natural Resources Defense Council estimates are comparable.³⁸

C. Timetable for Commercialization

Because of breeder economics, as noted above, it is not likely that the breeder reactor will compete with existing energy sources until the year 2010, if at all. Given this fact, critics conclude, the headlong drive to introduce the breeder into commercial operation by the turn of the century could, and should, be delayed until the ecological and technological issues can be resolved. This delay, they contend, could be accomplished without irretrievable loss to the program should the unsettled issues be resolved in the breeder's favor. Dr. Thomas Cochran, J. Gustave Speth, and Dr. Arthur Tamplin of the Natural Resources Defense Council argue that:

… a delay [in the breeder program] would provide the time needed to show what many experts now believe to be the case — that environmentally preferable, non-fission energy options can be made available in time to eliminate the need for the LMFBR altogether….

… The most serious danger is that the program will proceed as now planned, consuming the $10 billion presently estimated and plenty more besides, cutting deeply into energy R&D funds, and holding back the development of the preferable, non-fission technologies….³⁹

Of great concern to the Natural Resources Defense Council is the likelihood that failure to delay and reevaluate the breeder program before the Clinch River demonstration plant is begun will result in the nation's [5 ELR 50207] being forced to rely on the breeder "… only because of the great public and private investment in it and [because of the] failure [to develop] appropriate alternatives."⁴⁰

The Environmental Protection Agency filed its formal comments on the breeder environmental impact statement in April, 1975. While EPA criticized the paucity of substance contained in the impact statement, it stated that it was nevertheless not "able to identify any unresolvable problems that would preclude LMFBR commercialization."⁴¹ Although more optimistic about solutions for environmental issues than have been critiques by non-governmental groups, the EPA's comments on the impact statement address the same environmental issues which the AEC had previously dismissed as emotional and irrational fears when raised by environmental groups. To cite one example, EPA disputed the figure cited in the impact statementas to the probability of a major reactor accident: one in ten-million per year.⁴² Opponents of the breeder have long argued that such a figure is overly optimistic. EPA's own conclusions lend support to this argument:

… a great deal more testing and performance data and analyses are required before the risks of the LMFBR can be evaluated…. To our knowledge such conclusions [of risk acceptability] have not yet been reached for the LWR [the reactor currently in use], much less for the LMFBR⁴³

Other federal agencies have pressed for a modification of the former AEC's hard-line attitude toward the inevitability of breeder commercialization. The GAO's LMFBR Issue Paper concludes that:

… the LMFBR program should be clearly identified for what it is: a research and development program. There has been premature concern and emphasis on commercializing the LMFBR at a time when the Nation is years away from demonstrating that commercial-size LMFBR plants can be operated reliably, economically, and safely.⁴⁴

The GAO also asserts that "[n]ot until some point in the future perhaps 7 to 10 years from now, need a firm decision be made as to whether the Nation will commit itself to the LMFBR as a basic [source of energy]."⁴⁵ Perhaps in order to combat NRDC's assertions that the program may develop an irreversible momentum, ERDA itself has expressed a similar viewpoint toward commercialization, stating that continuing the breeder program "… would not lead inexorably or irresistibly to a full 'breeder economy,' if further work were to demonstrate that the problems of the breeder cannot be resolved."⁴⁶

The GAO's statement on commercialization is no call to retard the program's speed, however. The Issue Paper recommends continuing the research and development program, urging a delay only in the timing of a decision to commercialize the breeder. It is important to remember that the Clinch River demonstration plant is not scheduled for completion until mid-1983 at the earliest, eight years hence. Thus it would appear that GAO is urging no more than a postponement of a decision on commercialization until after performance data from Clinch River becomes available. Such a recommendation is trivial though, since no decision could be reached vis-a-vis a commercial-sized plant in any event until the demonstration data from the Clinch River project has been appraised.

VI. Recent Congressional Developments

Recent developments in the Congress also may have significantly affected the long-term prognosis for the breeder. Opponents of the breeder program were able to muster large anti-breeder votes in both Houses on amendments to the ERDA authorization bill and the entire nuclear program was dealt serious psychological blow with the adoption of an amendment prohibiting the air shipment of plutonium.

Introduced by Rep. James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.), the amendment prohibits NRC's licensing air shipments of plutonium of domestic transport until the NRC has developed, and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) has approved, containers which conform to specifications in the amendment. The provision, which was signed into law as part of the NRC Authorization Act⁴⁷ on August 9, 1975, differs in a number of ways from the relief sought in the New York suit⁴⁸ against the NRC: 1) the amendment applies only to plutonium (the suit seeks to control shipment of all special nuclear material); 2) the amendment does nto apply to ground transport (the suit would affect such transport); 3) the terms of the amendment are satisfied by JCAE certification of the container (the suit seeks the preparation of an EIS); and 4) the amendment applies only to NRC licensing (the suit would extend to a number of federal agencies).

In the congressional fight over the breeder thus far, both sides can point to gains and losses. The House approved the McCormack amendment which cut a total of $71.2 million from the breeder program: $20.8 million from the base program and $50.4 million from the Clinch River project. Of the latter sum, $31.4 million came from so-called "long lead time items" authorization. Long lead items for the Clinch River [5 ELR 50208] plant were included for the first time in this year's authorization bill.⁴⁹

It is important to note, however, thatt the cut appears to have been made as a result of project time already lost due to delays in the preparation of the site-specific environmental impact statement, further timetable "slippage" in projected start-up time, and licensing problems encountered by the project. In addition the entire sum cut from Clinch River has been authorized for other nuclear fission projects, including a proposed increase of $6.9 million for the Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) program.⁵⁰ It should be further noted that the non-ERDA industrial participants in the Clinch River project announced that they would increase their fiscal committment to the program in the coming year by as much as $37 million. From these facts it can de concluded that the McCormack amendment amendment was chiefly cosmetic and did not really slow down the breeder program.

An anti-breeder amendment introduced by Rep. Lawrence Coughlin (R-Pa.), on the other hand, would have eliminated funding for on-site construction of the Clinch River plant in fiscal year 1976 and forbidden procurement of components and long-lead items for the Clinch River project by deleting $94 million from the breeder budget. A similar amendment was offered by Sen. John Tunney (D-Calif.)⁵¹ In floor debate on the amendment, Clinch River proponents argue that to delete funds for the demonstration plant would result in "gutting" an energy program essential to achieving energy self-sufficiency; the program must continue because the United States is already far behind the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain in breeder technology; and to impose a one-year moratorium on the Clinch River project would, by breaking the project's continuity, result both in the loss of key project personnel and a decline in staff morale.

Opponents of the program countered by contending that the delay was compelled by prudence and common sense because numerous technical, environmental and safety questions are still resolved. Opponents also scored the program's repeated cost overruns. In addition, they expressed the fear that if long-lead items were funded, the project would become self-perpetuating and the program itself would become more difficult to stop each year as the investment of funds in it increased.

The amendment failed in both the House⁵² and Senate.⁵³ Both votes (136-277 in the House, 30-66 in the Senate) were significant, however, in that the anti-breeder votes represented almost one-third of the membership of each chamber, by far the most impressive showing to date by opponents of the program.

Even though defeat of the Coughlin amendment was disappointing to opponents, they did score what they considered a victory of sorts with the passage of the Montoya amendment.⁵⁴ That measure mandates a congressional review of breeder funding on a year-by-year basis, altering the former open-ended funding scheme.

In the end, the breeder program had survived its most formidable challenge to date. Lop-sided budget authorizations left no doubt that the breeder in particular and fission programs in general, for the next year at least, continue to occupy the highest priority among ERDA's energy programs. Subject to resolution of minor differences by a House-Senate conference, the ERDA authorization bill allotment for the entire non-military reactor program is nearly one-third of ERDA's civilian budget. By contrast, combined solar and fusion authorizations represent only about one-fifth of the budget. For the short term, Congress has approved continuation of the Clinch River project by allocating $131 million for the present fiscal year.

However, the extent of opposition within Congress to the breeder demonstrated by the Coughlin amendment vote underscores the fact that the nuclear program no longer occupies the secure position is enjoyed in years past. The breeder program is clearly in trouble. On its own initiative, ERDA has acknowledged that there are "significant omissions" in a number of critical aspects of the program. If past experience can serve as prologue, questions about fuel cycle and waste disposal, unresolved after twenty years of light water reactor experience, are not likely to be resolved in the breeder's favor in the near future.

Information thus far uncovered in the ever-increasing scrutiny of the breeder by groups both within and outside of the government leads to the conclusion thatt the more than is learned about the questions of the social, technical, and economic feasibility of the LMFBR, the less attractive an option it will become. Members of the scientific community who are not opposed to nuclear power per se, are now questioning the reliability of untested components of LWRs and breeders, undercutting the arguments of government and industry proponents that criticism is based simply on emotional fears.

The basic short-term choice facing the Congress this year was a simple one. On the one hand there was ERDA's argument that although there are problems with breeder technology, those problems can be solved by continuing with the Clinch River demonstration plant. ERDA contended that the only way to determine the feasibility of the breeder concept was to proceed through the demonstration stage and then reassess the program at that point. Critics argued on the other hand for a moratorium and reassessment to begin now, before more capital was invested in Clinch River. That capital, freed from nuclear fission commitments, could be used to develop other energy options. For the time being ERDA's position, which can be characterized as [5 ELR 50209] "full speed ahead with Clinch River, wait and see on commercialization," has prevailed.

VII. The Breeder Outlook Under ERDA

In essence, ERDA has conceded that there are significant defects in the reactor safety analysis contained in the breeder environmental impact statement. Unlike its former AEC counterpart, the ERDA Internal Review Board echoed EPA's concern over the "significant omission" of specific information concerning reactor safety matters. ERDA's Internal Review Board in the June, 1975, report to the Administrator acknowledged that certain aspects of risk quantification methodology remained to be resolved. The Board specifically cited as problem areas: 1) operating data on components; 2) lack of large scale plant data; and 3) lack of detailed understanding of in-core phenomena.⁵⁵ However, the Board concluded that "… [the environmental impact statement] presents the currently available data in as much detail as can be expected … [and that] answers to the outstanding questions are to be found, if at all, by continuation of [research, development, and demonstration] efforts, at least for the near term."⁵⁶ The Board remained confident that further research would result in development of risk assessment procedures which could be utilized by mid-1985.

The agency thus rejected the position of NRDC and other critics of the program that the "significant omissions" in the impact statement relating to safeguards, waste management and risks of a large-scale accident, render it a defective basis on which to justify continuation of the breeder program. Instead, ERDA has concluded that the answers to these nagging questions will be found in the process of developing and demonstrating the breeder concept.

In accepting the report of the Internal Review Board, ERDA Administrator Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., shifted the burden of proof for discontinuing the breeder research and development program to the critics by asserting that "… only a demonstration that the LMFBR can not be developed as a safe, environmentally sound and economically competitive energy source would justify a decision to discontinue the program. The record before us does not so indicate."⁵⁷ ERDA responded to additional criticisms by EPA and others on the issues of waste management and disposal, plutonium recycle and safeguards, and the health problems associated with plutonium as it had on the reactor safety question: the problems should be studied and resolved as research, development and demonstration of the breeder continues. Responding to recommendations that the breeder program should be slowed ortemporarily halted until progress is made toward solving the inherent environmental and technical problems, ERDA in another report, Creating Energy Choices for the Future (National Plan)⁵⁸ advanced six possible strategies, or "scenarios," to meet energy needs through the 21st Century. "Scenario O" hypothesizes no new energy initiatives; "Scenario V" focuses on development of all promising technologies. Because only the latter strategy can possibly result in the widest range of energy options for the future, ERDA argues that it is the preferred "scenario."

The National Plan asserts that in the past, there has been a transition period of 60 years from the point at which utilization of a new, major energy source was first discernable to the point where that source itself has peaked and had begun to decline. Noting that domestic petroleum supplies have peaked, the report concludes that although alternative energy sources must replace reliance on petroleum sources, the United States cannot afford to wait a full 60 years to complete the transition. Instead, the report urges the vigorous pursuit of all energy-source options in an attempt to make a transition from reliance on petroleum to at least one of the so-called "inexhaustible" sources in one-half the time.⁵⁹

The cornerstone of the National Plan is flexibility, ERDA argues. None of the long-term options is assured of commercialization because of unresolved economic, environmental, or technical problems; each must be pursued not only in an attempt to assure future success in one or more, but also to avoid premature foreclosure of any option.⁶⁰

In contrast to pronouncements by the former AEC, the National Plan ostensibly supports vigorous research and development efforts not only for the breeder, but also for fusion and solar-generated electricity, representing the first time that solar electricity has been accorded a 'top priority' position alongside the other 'long-term' technologies. However, the apparent co-equal status of the "priority" technologies must be tempered by subsequent statements of ERDA personnel as well as the fiscal realities of the Plan. Testifying before the JCAE Ad hoc Subcommittee to Review the National Breeder Reactor Program, ERDA Administrator Seamans acknowledged that all three technologies occupy "priority" status, but clearly implied that solar and fusion are not co-equal with the breeder. In assessing the three, Seamans noted that although "… the LMFBR technology is not the only technology which may be able to satisfy [long-term energy needs], significant uncertainties concerning timely availability of the other major candidates [solar electricity and fusion] make it risky and imprudent to disregard the LMFBR program on the basis of what we presently know."⁶¹

[5 ELR 50210]

Although ERDA does concede that each technology is not problem-free, the prognoses for eventual success are dissimilar. Seamans justified continued research and development for the LMFBR claiming that "[t]he record strongly suggests that the significant problems identified in the LMFBR concept are amenable to solution … by a continuation of the program"⁶² On the other hand, responding to a question posed by subcommittee member Lujan (R-N.M.) Seamans stated that although each "priority" technology has possibilities, they all "… do not have the same emphasis."⁶³ He further stated that engineering problems surround the development of solar electricity and that it was still unknown whether fusion would be scientifically or economically feasible.

ERDA's stance thus should be viewed as a shift to a "step-by-step" approach to a decision on commercialization rather than an actual "slowing of the fast breeder program." As such it demonstrates that ERDA is willing to assume a more open-minded attitude toward the program than that taken by the former AEC, which consistently regarded commercialization as a foregone conclusion. ERDA's attitude may be, at least in part, the result of efforts to avoid being recast in the image of its predecessor. This approach may also be due to the fact that a separate agency, NRC, and not ERDA itself, will decide whether the full-sized breeder shall be licensed for commercial use. Moreover, assuming licensability, the marketability of the breeder will be ultimately determined, not by ERDA, but by private utility companies. ERDA's attitude seems to be a modification of the former AEC's "full speed ahead to commercialization" position to an attitude characterized above as "full speed ahead with Clinch River, wait and see on commercialization," but it does not necessarily indicate any lessening of agency support for the breeder program. This view is supported by testimony by Administrator Seamans before the JCAE subcommittee concerning ERDA's request for funding cuts:

[t]here has been speculation that these funding changes indicate a lessening of resolve on [ERDA's] part to continue the breeder program. Such speculation is erroneous. The importance and priority of the LMFBR program remain unchanged.⁶⁴

While ERDA's modification of program focus at this point seems to be "good politics," an attempt to insure approval of the Clinch River project by insisting that building the demonstration plant would not automatically be followed by commercialization, this slight change of tune is nevertheless one of the first cracks in the administrative stone wall which has thus far surrounded the breeder.

VIII. Conclusion

The future progress of the LMFBR program depends on a number of factors, any one of which is capable of dealing the breeder a fatal blow. An unfavorable NRC report on the plutonium fuel cycle generic EIS would remove the breeder's raison d'etre by effectively precluding use of "bred" plutonium as nuclear fuel. Secondly, congressional opposition may soongrow to a majority. Such a development has been made more likely by the change to annual appropriations votes for the LMFBR program so that Congress will now have to face the program's massive cost overruns and unresolved technological and environmental problems each year. Thirdly, growing opposition to nuclear power among the general public, evidenced by anti-nuclear citizen referenda and initiatives in many states, will continue to be reflected in the Congress.⁶⁵ Especially noteworthy along this line will be the outcome of a statewide referendum in California next June seeking to impose stricter regulations on all nuclear power plants.

If the Clinch River plant is ultimately completed, the final decision on widespread commercial use of the breeder will be made by the utility companies. As the data from the cost-benefit analyses demonstrate, however, it is unlikely that the breeder will be able to compete with other energy sources until well into the 21st century, if at all. Even assuming that all the safety and environmental issues can be satisfactorily resolved, such solutions, in most cases can only be achieved to the detriment of the economics of the system. For example, if restrictions are placed on the core temperature to reduce the likelihood of an accident to more acceptable levels, the effect is to reduce the net theoretical efficiency of the system and thereby increase the cost of breeder-produced electricity.

The short-term future of the breeder program has been decided for at least another year; its long-term fate depends on events yet to come. In the interim, however, it seems fair to draw analogies between the breeder program and the defunct supersonic transport (SST) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) programs whose histories have striking similarities. Early congressional enthusiasm waned as more was learned about the long-range ramifications of these programs. Although congressional opposition to the breeder was insufficient to impose a moratorium on the Clinch River project this year, it should be remembered that in the cases of the SST and ABM, opposition continued to grow as more and more funding was requested while the technology, as it was examined more thoroughly, appeared to become less and less desirable.

And it may not be stretching a point to say that as with the SST and ABM, the real question has already become not whether the breeder reactor will be a commercial success, but rather how much capital will be invested before ERDA finally admits that the LMFBR is fraught with environmental, safety and economic problems which preclude its playing the miraculous role in commercial power generation envisioned by its proponents.

1. See 117 Cong. Rec. 18200 (1971).

2. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1242, divided the AEC's responsibilities between two new agencies: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).

3. To the extent that the implications of the use of sodium as a core-cooling agent are beyond the scope of this Note, they will not be discussed. For a comprehensive analysis of the environmental, economic and technological drawbacks of the fission concept, see W. Clark, Energy for Survival: The Alternatives to Extinction, at 292 et seq. (1974).

4. AEC, Proposed Final Environmental Impact Statement: Liquid Metal Breeder Reactor (1974), at Vol. I, § 3.5. [Hereinafter cited as Breeder PFEIS.]

5. In its first official report to the Congress ERDA categorized future energy needs over time as follows: (a) the immediate and short-term (to the early 1980's); (b) the middle term (the early 1980's to 2000); (c) the long-term (beyond 2000).See ERDA, A National Plan for Energy Research, Development and Demonstration: Creating Energy Choices for the Future, Vol. I, The Plan (1975). [Hereinafter cited as National Plan.] For the sake of simplicity, ERDA's time categories will be retained herein.

6. Breeder PFEIS, supra n. 4, Vol. I, § 3.3. The breeder EIS was issued immediately prior to the assumption of the AEC's research and development role by ERDA in January 1975. ERDA published its first official comment on the LMFBR program on June 30, 1975. See infra n. 7 and text at n. 55.

7. ERDA, Administrator's Findings (June 30, 1975) on the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program Proposed Final Environmental Statement WASH-1535 (December 1974) with the Report to the Administrator on the Proposed Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor by the Internal Review Board (June 20, 1975) and the Reviews of Several Knowledgeable Scientific and Technical Individuals Outside the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) (1975), Administrator's Findings, P7, at 4. [Hereinafter cited as ERDA Report, with the relevant section, i.e., Administrator's Findings, Review Board or Reviews, in parentheses.]

8. Breeder PFEIS, supra n. 4, at Vol. I, § 3.4.

9. U.S. General Accounting Office, Staff Study, Fast Flux Test Facility Program at 7 (1975).

10. Breeder PFEIS, supra n. 4, at Vol. I, § 3.5, P2.

11. U.S. General Accounting Office Report RED-75-352, The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: Past, Present, and Future (1975). [Hereinafter cited as GAO Report, Breeder's Future.]

12. 3 ELR 20525, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

13. Id. at 20532, 481 F.2d at 1092.

14. Id. at 20531, 481 F.2d at 1092.

15. State of New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. 75 Civ. 2121 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 5, 1975). See also discussion of the Scheuer admendment, infra, text at n. 47.

16. The term was first used in 1970 by former AEC chairman and co-discoverer of plutonium, Glenn Seaborg.

17. 121 Cong. Rec. S14609 (daily ed. July 31, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Tunney) and 121 Cong. Rec. HR5861 (daily ed. June 20, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Frazer). The Coughlin-Tunney Amendment is discussed more fully below. See text infra at n. 51.

18. 40 Fed. Reg. 20142 (May 8, 1975).

19. GAO Report, Breeder's Future, supra n. 11.

20. Breeder PFEIS, supra n. 4, at Vol. IV, § 11.2, p. 33. In its draft EIS, AEC's estimate was $5-billion.

21. Letter from Donald B. Rice to Dr. Robert C. Seamans, June 4, 1975, in ERDA Report, (Reviews), supra n. 7, at 9. [Hereinafter cited as Rand Study, ERDA Report, (Reviews)].

22. Breeder PFEIS, supra n. 4, vol. IV, § 11.

23. EPA Comments on Proposed Final Environmental Statement: Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Program, PF-AEC-A0010600 (April 1975) at 3-4.

24. Cochran, Speth & Tamplin, The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: A Poor Buy, 7 Environment Magazine (June 1975) at 12-20. [Hereinafter cited as Cochran et al.]

25. Rand Study, ERDA Report (Reviews), supra n. 21.

26. U.S. General Accounting Office, Issue Paper to the Congress: The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: Promises and Uncertainties, OSP — 76-1 (1975). [Hereinafter cited as GAO, LMFBR Issue Paper.]

27. EPA Comments, supra n. 23, at 4.

28. See Breeder PFEIS, supra n. 4, at vol. IV, § 11.2, p. 84.

29. Rand Study, ERDA Report (Reviews), supra n. 21, at 3.

30. GAO, LMFBR Issue Paper, supra n. 26, at 60.

31. Cochran et al., supra n. 24, at 15.

32. Id. at 16.

33. ERDA Report (Review Board), supra n. 7, at 26-27.

34. GAO, LMFBR Issue Paper, supra n. 26, at 56.

35. ERDA Report (Review Board), supra n. 7, at 25.

36. EPA Comments, supra n. 23, at 3, 10.

37. Federal Energy Administration, Comment Letter 89, May 1, 1975. [Cited in Rand Study, ERDA Report (Reviews), supra n. 21, at 11.]

38. Cochran et al., supra n. 24, at 15-16.

39. Speth, Tamplin, & Cochran, Bypassing the Breeder, Environmental Action (Apr. 12, 1975) at 11-12.

40. Id.

41. EPA Comments, supra n. 23, at 2, 21.

42. Breeder PFEIS, supra n. 4, at vol. II, § 4.2, p. 235.

43. EPA Comments, supra n. 23, at 22.

44. GAO, LMFBR Issue Paper, supra n. 26, at 93. [Reprinted, in part, at 121 Cong. Rec. S14631 (daily ed. July 31, 1975)].

45. Id.

46. ERDA Report (Administrator's Findings), supra n. 7, P9, at 6.

47. Pub. L. 94-79 (Aug. 9, 1975).

48. Supra, text at n. 15.

49. 121 Cong. Rec. HR5850 et seq. (daily ed. June 20, 1975).

50. Id. at HR5847-5867.

51. 121 Cong. Rec. S14604 (daily ed. July 31, 1975).

52. 121 Cong. Rec. HR5867 (daily ed. June 20, 1975).

53. 121 Cong. Rec. S14636 (daily ed. July 31, 1975).

54. Id. at S14603.

55. ERDA Report (Review Board), supra n. 7, at 10.

56. Id. at 11-12.

57. ERDA Report (Administrator's Findings), supra n. 7, at 5. (Emphasis in original.)

58. National Plan, supra n. 5.

59. Id. at V-6.

60. Id. at VI-2 and S-6.

61. Prepared statement of Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration, delivered before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, ad hoc Subcomm. to Review the National Breeder Reactor Program (July 17, 1975), 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6. (Hearing transcript not yet published.)

62. Id.

63. Oral testimony of Dr. Seamans, before the Joint Comm on Atomic Energy ad hoc Subcomm. hearing, supra n. 61.

64. Prepared statement of Dr. Seamans, supra n. 61, at 8.

65. See New York Times, July 29, 1975, at 15.

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5 ELR 50202 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1975 | All rights reserved