The Deepwater Ports Act of 1974: Half Speed Ahead

Robert Meltz

On January 3, 1975, the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974¹ was signed into law, and the United States thereby prepared to join the sizeable fraternity of nations already using this type of facility. Congressional consideration of deepwater ports — offshore tanker moorings at which oil is unloaded and piped ashore — led House and Senate committees through a tangle of vexing issues, including supertanker design, conflicting local and national interests, international law, antitrust implications, and the ubiquitous clash between energy needs and environmental considerations. The legislation, which was backed by both the Nixon and Ford administrations, gives primary responsibility for licensing and regulating deepwater ports beyond the 3-mile limit to the Secretary of Transportation and contains strong environmental safeguards. The immediate effect of the Act, therefore, is to extend federal jurisdiction to facilities beyond the territorial waters of the United States, and thereby fill the regulatory void which has so far deterred deepwater port development.

Background

Proponents of deepwater ports advance a simple, and seemingly irrefutable, argument² based on three premises. First, the inability of domestic oil production to meet domestic oil consumption, which began about 1971, promises to continue and in fact increase for the foreseeable future. Neither Project Independence (by increasing production) nor high oil import tariffs (by decreasing consumption) can eliminate this shortfall, so that oil importation in substantial amounts will be necessary for some time to come. Second, the most economically and environmentally sound way of transporting large amounts of oil over long distances, as from the Persian Gulf, is by supertanker. Supertankers, or "Very Large Crude Carriers," range up to 1200 feet in length and have carrying capacities of 200,000 to 500,000 deadweight tons (dwt), as much as twelve times the capacity of conventional tankers currently using United States ports. Thus, the argument goes, use of supertankers will result in a substantial reduction of per-barrel shipping costs. At the same time, supertankers will bring environmental benefits by reducing port congestion and hence the number of vessel collisions and groundings. Third, deepwater ports located as much as 20 to 30 miles offshore will be necessary to accomodate supertankers, since existing inshore ports are too shallow to take their 60 to 90 foot drafts.³ Indeed, the Gulf of Mexico ports, where most supertanker-imported oil will probably arrive, are currently restricted to ships of 50,000 dwt or less.

This, then, is the rationale for superports, and while numerous cautionary qualifications will be discussed throughout this Note, its logic is basically sound. At least two other factors, however, played significant roles in the enactment of the Deepwater Ports Act. The first was the unbridled enthusiasm of the Gulf Coast states, with the exception of Florida, for deepwater port development off their shores. This has been in marked contrast to the hesitation — in some cases even staunch opposition — of East Coast and West Coast states. Louisiana and Texas have been separately laying the groundwork for superport development since 1971;⁴ Alabama and Mississippi have been proceeding jointly since 1972.⁵ Costly studies have been done at both state and industry expense, enabling legislation has been enacted,⁶ superport authorities created, and statewide public relations campaigns conducted. For Texas and Louisiana, the stakes are particularly high. The heavily oil-dependent economies of these states are today facing the prospect of prolonged economic decline as oil production within their borders drops off, seemingly irreversibly. In Texas, 25 percent of public school funds and 18 percent of state tax revenues are derived from the oil industry. Under such circumstances the federal government is unlikely to ignore altogether the desires of these states.

A second, more tacit, factor favoring superport legislation is the Maritime Administration's program of [5 ELR 50044] tanker subsidization,⁷ which is designed to sustain the American shipbuilding industry by covering the difference between the costs of building a ship in the U.S. and the lower costs of constructing the same vessel abroad. The 225,000-dwt Brooklyn, for example, received a 43 percent subsidy of $24.6 million. To date, MARAD has committee $457.1 million in subsidies for 13 tankships in the over-200,000-dwt class. Applications for supertanker construction subsidies are arriving in record numbers. Until the United States builds its own superports, however, such ships will be forced to use Canadian and Caribbean ports where the oil can be transferred to smaller tankers that can enter our existing ports. Such transfers cut into the transportation cost savings which can be realized by supertankers, an increasingly unpalatable situation in light of the magnitude of MARAD's commitment.

Bills to authorize the construction of United States deepwater ports were first introduced in the 92nd Congress. At that time, the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee conducted fact-gathering hearings on deepwater port policy pursuant to the National Fuels and Energy Policy Study.⁸ The legislative pace quickened early in the 93rd Congress when the Nixon Administration introduced its own bill (S. 1751, H.R. 7501),⁹ giving broad licensing authority to the Secretary of the Interior and providing for "consultation" with, but not veto power for, affected coastal states. Hearings would be granted only at the Secretary's discretion. Coastal states objected vehemently to all these features, and the bill died in both houses. The final bills to pass each house¹⁰ were distinct improvements over the Administration's bill from the viewpoint of both state and environmental interests. The Senate bill, the stronger of these two, was substantially adopted in conference¹¹ and enacted.¹²

The Environmental Threats

The environmental provisions of the Deepwater Ports Act are responses to the specific environmental threats posed by superports and supertankers. Hence, some familiarity with superport procedures is indispensible to an understanding of the Act.

Since U.S. planners favor the floating "monobuoy" type of deepwater port over the large artificial sea island, the main environmental threats appear to lie in the operation, rather than construction, phase. The monobuoy itself consists of a flat cylindrical disc 20 to 50 feet across, anchored at several points to the seabottom. The mooring procedure is as follows. A "Mooring Master" would board the supertanker while it was still some distance from the buoy, advising the Captain as to the requirements for berthing and the best approach to the buoy. Approach is made at a speed sufficient to maintain steerage, but by the time the vessel is close enough to bring aboard the mooring lines it should be dead in the water. Caution must be exercised to prevent the vessel from running over the floating hoses by which oil is transferred from the tanker to the buoy. Agreements between the ship and terminal would be made regarding transfer rates, signals to be used, and emergency procedures. Oil transfer would proceed at a slow rate until all connections are checked.¹³ Regardless of vessel size, it takes four hours to berth at a monobuoy and three hours to deberth. Once the tanker is moored, oil transfer may be carried out with waves as high as 20 feet. A high-powered launch should remain with the supertanker to keep it at a safe distance from the buoy, because one disadvantage of the monobuoy is that a tanker tends to creep toward it in calm seas, thus fouling the mooring chains and submarine hoses. Also, a craft equipped with lifting gear and diving equipment would be needed for the regular inspections, maintenance, and repairs of buoy, hoses, chains, and anchors. Needless to say, the huge size of supertankers drastically reduces the margin for error in all these operations, and greatly increases the consequences of any mishap. The effects of major oil spills have been extensively documented elsewhere; suffice it here to say that the damage wrought by a major spill off the East Coast could run in the billions of dollars. The technology of oil spill containment is still in its infancy.

Landside impacts of port-induced industrial growth present another distinct set of problems. According to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement on Deepwater Ports, such landside effects "could havea more significant environmental impact than any other component of a deepwater port system over a long period of time."¹⁴ New facilities construction near the point of pipeline landfall might include tank farms, refineries, petrochemical plants, pumping stations, and pipelines — with an influx of personnel and an attendant surge in local population. In currently industrialized regions [5 ELR 50045] (e.g., the Texas and Louisiana coasts), the incremental pollution would be added to already high pollution levels. This is avoided in non-industrial regions, but there the aesthetic impact is greater, and non-degradation issues¹⁵ may be raised. Effects of added industrialization may in part be mitigated by piping some of the incoming crude oil to refineries far inland.

Provisions of the Act

The regulatory scheme set forth by the Deepwater Ports Act begins at the beginning. Preconstruction testing of potential port sites is limited where the environment could be adversely affected. Thereafter, no person may construct, operate, or own a deepwater port except in accordance with a license issued by the Secretary of Transportation. The license may contain any appropriate conditions, and may be issued only if the Secretary determines, inter alia, that the applicant is financially responsible (important for oil apill liability, infra); that the deepwater port will be in the "national interest" and consistent with United States energy and environmental goals; and that the port will utilize the "best available technology" to minimize adverse environmental impacts. The Secretary is directed to establish environmental review criteria consistent with NEPA for use in evaluating proposed ports. A separate NEPA impact statement is mandated for each local area in which applications are being considered. Further provisions require the Secretary to establish procedures with respect to vessel movement, loading and unloading, and equipment necessary to prevent or clean up discharged pollutants, or minimize other environmental effects.

The EPA Administrator has both binding and advisory functions under the Act. His determination that the proposed port will not conform with the Clean Air Act¹⁶ or the Federal Water Pollution Control Act¹⁷ bars the issuance of a license. (Deepwater ports are defined as "new sources" for the purposes of these statutes.) On the other hand, EPA's role in developing the environmental review criteria is purely one of recommendation. Since the Act makes all federal laws applicable to deepwater ports, other statutory responsibilities of EPA will undoubtedly come into play.

Other aspects of the Act's regulatory scheme address primarily the landside impacts. First and foremost is the state veto: all adjacent states must approve the issuance of a deepwater port license. "Adjacent state" is liberally defined to include the pipeline-connected state, any state within 15 miles of the port, or any state threatened with environmental impacts equal to or greater than the pipeline-connected state. Secondly, a license may not issue unless the pipeline-connected state is making "reasonable progress" in developing its coastal zone management plan under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.¹⁸ Lastly, the laws of the nearest adjacent coastal state are declared applicable to superports as federal law.

The remedies and liability sections of the Act include a large arsenal of enforcement techniques. Any failure by the port licensee to comply may result in suspension or revocation of the license. When an "imminent and substantial" threat to the environment is involved, suspension is immediate. More stringent remedies for failure of compliance include civil monetary penalties, criminal fines for willful violations, specific equitable relief, and in rem liability of vessels used in violations of the Act. The oil spill liability provisions are patterned after the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,¹⁹ and are especially strict. Any discharge of oil, from either vessel or port, leads to civil fines — and vessel and port operators are required to report all such discharges. Most important, strict liability for clean-up costs and damages resulting from escaped oil is imposed on owners and operators of vessels, and on port licensees. Liability ceilings of $20 million²⁰ and $50 million, respectively, are set. Damages and cleanup costs beyond these ceilings may be recovered from a Deepwater Port Liability Fund,²¹ which is financed by a 2 cent per barrel port fee and is liable without fault or limit for the remainder. The Attorney General may bring class actions on behalf of any group of damaged citizens; otherwise, the group may sue on its own. Should there be damage to the public lands, the Secretary of Transportation may act on behalf of the public as "trustee of the natural resources of the marine environment" to recover for damage to such resources. Citizen suits to compel compliance are also authorized, with provision for recovery of attorneys' fees. States are not pre-empted and may impose additional requirements or liabilities.²²

Strengths

As is apparent, the Deepwater Ports Act displays an environmental concern one could well wish were evident [5 ELR 50046] in all energy legislation. A wide spectrum of environmental issues is addressed — oil spillage, cleanup side effects, land-based development, oceanographic effects, and human health and welfare. The interests of virtually all directly affected third parties are considered — nearby states (the veto), alternate users of the ocean²³ (in the environmental review criteria), shore dwellers (unlimited strict liability for polluters), and recreational users of the public shorelands (suits by the Secretary as trustee of the marine environment). The licensing process for each port is exhaustive, emphatically recognizing the importance of planning in the early stages of development.

Liabilities incurred for oil spill damage are harsh, but no harsher than necessary considering the possible dimensions of supertanker oil spills. Deterrence was an express congressional objective.²⁴ On the other hand, the liability limits set for port licensees and vessels using deepwater ports are no higher than the insurance available to them, so as not to impair competition for deepwater port licenses.²⁵ Recovery without limit, through the Deepwater Port Liability Fund, ensures that no person suffering oil spill damage will be barred from full compensation. The element of strict liability provides injured parties with easily reachable defendants and shifts the evidentiary burden of determining the negligent party to the polluter. Individually and jointly, the liability provisions accomplish another important shift by placing a portion of the risk burden on the consuming public who ultimately benefit from the use of deepwater ports and supertankers.

The class action provisions of the Act warrant special attention. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,²⁶ the Supreme Court held that a class action employing only publication notice of its members could not stand, since Rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires "individual notice." The decision represented a setback for public interest litigation, where class representatives rarely have the funds to personally notify each member. In an apparent attack on this provision, however, the Senate Interior Committee introduced an amendment to the deepwater ports bill eliminating the personal notice requirement for classes whose members exceed 1,000. In explaining the amendment the Committee stated that "… in the case of damages caused by a discharge of oil or natural gas, notice by publication will be sufficient to meet the intent of Rule 23(c)(2)…."²⁷ This provision was adopted in the final legislation.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that a companion amendment to further relax class action restrictions was also proposed. This second amendment attempted to undermine another recent Supreme Court decision, Zahn v. International Paper Co.,²⁸ in which the Court held that in class actions founded on diversity jurisdiction every member of the plaintiff class must meet the jurisdicational amount of $10,000.²⁹ The amendment allowed aggregation of injuries to meet the jurisdictional amount, but was not offered on the Senate floor.

Weaknesses

The many strengths of the Deepwater Ports Act ought not obscure its weaknesses, which, although not damning, are troublesome. Pre-eminent among these is the failure of the Act to impose a nationwide limit on the number of superports that may be built. This is no academic issue, as there are currently at least nine active proposals.³⁰ All the Act requires is that each deepwater port licensed must be "in the national interest," but in a nation which has no coordinated port policy, this phrase can have little meaning. Nor is the legislative history encouraging. The Senate Report, for example, states that "operating a number of deepwater ports of limited throughput, and dispensing them at various locations along the coast is [environmentally] preferable to operating a limited number of facilities with high throughput capacities."³¹ This view, however, does not seem tenable. It is based, to be sure, on the safe assumption that the greater the volume throughput of a deepwater port, the greater the likelihood of adverse environmental impacts. But while a large number of lowthroughput ports would result in less environmental impact per port, the total impact might be greater than for a small number of high throughput ports. A declining environmental impact per additional unit of throughput would seem the appropriate relationship. Similarly, marginal capital outlay per unit throughput would almost certainly be a declining function. (Once the port-to-shore pipelines are installed, the expense of adding extra monobuoys to an existing cluster is relatively minor.) Hence, a large number of deepwater ports, each with limited throughput, would not seem to make economic or environmental sense.

Another area of omission is the failure of the Act to cover deepwater ports within the 3-mile limit, the extent of state jursidiction. Again, the issue is more than [5 ELR 50047] hypothetical — as the Act now stands, both the Estero Bay, California proposal (2.6 miles out) and the Eastport, Maine Proposal (immediately offshore) would be exempt. The argument for non-coverage has been that port licensees within territorial waters would still be required to obtain authorization from state or local governments, as well as a federal permit under the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act.³² However, it is the close-in sites where supertanker collisions and groundings are most likely, and where spilled oil is surest to reach shore. The Maine Proposal, in particular, ignores treacherous navigation conditions in order to utilize naturally occurring deep water close to land. Subjecting ports far off shore to an extensive regulatory apparatus while relegating the most potentially harmful ports to the limited resources of local enforcement seems at best unjustifiable.

At any distance from shore, the basic problem with superports is, quite simply, supertankers. To what extent, then, should the Deepwater Ports Act have required that supertankers using licensed deepwater ports employ the full panoply of structural safeguards — in particular, double hulls and segregated ballast? A bitter, longstanding controversy swirls around these features. It is no small matter, since the cost of a double hull/segregated ballast system may add 17 to 23 percent to the construction cost of a vessel. Even a single hull/segregated ballast system adds 4 to 10 percent.Much as these structural features may be environmentally desirable, therefore, the fact that they have substantial economic consequences suggests that imposing them as merely an ancillary matter in deepwater ports legislation would be inappropriate. A more suitable route would seem to be through separate legislation. Certainly there is little likelihood that a full complement of structural safeguards will be required in forthcoming Coast Guard regulations under the Ports and Vaterways Safety Act.³³ Current proposed regulations³⁴ contain liberal tank size restrictions, require segregated ballast only for new vessels of 70,000 dwt or greater, and do not mention double hulls. Moreover, these regulations will apply only to domestic vessels engaged in coastwise trade (from one U.S. port to another). As for U.S. vessels in foreign trade and foreign vessels entering U.S. waters, pressure from maritime nations against unilaterally-imposed design requirements makes tough Coast Guard controls here even less likely.

Other deficiencies of the Act are less significant than the foregoing, but still bear watching as the regulatory process unfolds in the months ahead. Potentially troublesome is the requirement that the Secretary consider, as an alternative to any offshore port, pre-existing plans for dredging a nearby harbor to supertanker depths. Though generalizations are difficult due to varying site conditions, the dredging alternative must result in at least three environmental impacts: direct loss of bottom habitat, effects of particle suspension in the water (on filter-feeding animal life in particular), and effects of deposition of suspended matter and dredging spoils (further loss of habitat, and estuary damage). Annual redredging may also be required, and the poor maneuverability of supertankers leaves the groundings and collisions problem unresolved. Such consequences have prompted several environmental groups to favor a total ban on dredged insore ports, regardless of how advanced the planning might be. They argue that the Act and its legislative history represent a clear Congressional finding that inshore deepwater ports are an unacceptable alternative. Moreover, the dredging provision would require consideration of facilities that could not even be licensed under the Act, since they would be within the 3-mile limit. The entire issue might just as likely be settled on economic grounds, however, due to the relative inexpensiveness of offshore monobuoys.

The massive landside industrialization which a superport would induce has led the Sierra Club to favor a ban on superport licensing pending actual approval of the adjacent state's coastal zone management program. As the Act now reads, a coastal state need only be making "reasonable progress" toward its program, and even that is defined as meaning that the state need only be receiving federal funds for program development under the Coastal Zone Management Act. Time, however, may be working in the environmentalists' favor. All states contemplating offshore ports are now receiving coastal program development funds, while the lengthy superport licensing process cannot even begin until final regulations are issued, probably this summer. Should licensing precede coastal plan approval despite this, there will be only the adjacent states to blame, since their veto prerogative enables them to delay a deepwater port indefinitely.

Conclusion

Despite the awsome implications of 300,000 dwt tankers plying U.S. coastal waters, superport legislation did not achievecause celebre status among environmentalists. To some extent this lesser rank may have been due to the eclipsing of the superport issue by contemporaneous legislative battles last year — most notably, those surrounding the stripmining and national land use policy bills. Partly, however, it may have been fixed by the fact that the superport concept is difficult to object to in the abstract. The cost savings derived from supertanker transport of oil are widely conceded. Even if one assumes that there will be little monetary saving passed through to the consumer, the environmental superiority of offshore ports over ever-increasing inshore congestion is reasonably certain. Thus the real [5 ELR 50048] problem lies not in the concept, but rather in the details of implementation: Do the proposed leak detectors represent the mandated "best available technology?" Is a particular port necessary at all, given prior license grants in the region? Already, local environmental groups are closely monitoring individual port proposals.

Besides embracing superports, the Deepwater Ports Act constitutes a formal recognition that supertankers are here to stay, having years ago become the norm of oil transport outside the United States. The practical choice faced by the Congress during its legislative deliberations was simple. Shoud deepwater ports be built off our own shores, or should we resign ourselves to small tanker transshipment from Canadian and Caribbean superports, with the loss of jobs and refinery capacity that would inevitably result? Faced with this choice, it was not surprising that the primary focus of the Congressional superport hearings was not on whether United States superports should be built, but only on how and where.

Always lurking in the background, of course, are the long-range energy concerns. Will the construction of deepwater ports, facilities intended primarily for oil importing, discourage capital investment in alternate energy sources? (The threat is real, even though the useful life of the superports soon to be built will not exceed the period in which U.S. dependency on oil importation is a certainty.) And should an all-out superport construction effort be permitted to a time when the United States does not yet have a national energy policy? Whatever the answers, a good argument can be made that only two or three deepwater ports be licensed initially, until the nature of the beast is better understood.

Assuming that at least a small number of superports should be built, the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974 marks an environmentally sound beginning. In creating numerous channels for local input, the Act assures that coastal interests will not be sacrificed to satisfy the oil appetite of consumers a thousand miles inland. And the administrative sequence established for superport licensing follows an unequivocal "plan first" approach. As always, the evolving regulatory process may bring its surprises, but an this time the Deepwater Ports Act seems a reasonable legislative response to a complex problem.

1. ELR 41705.

2. See, e.g., Staff of Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Deepwater Port Policy Issues, 1 (Comm. Print 1974).

3. The deepest United States ports have vessel size capacities as follows: Long Beach, Cal. — 100,000 dwt; Los Angeles, Cal. — 100,000 dwt; Portland, Me. — 80,000 dwt; Beaumont, Tex. — 80,000 dwt; and Nisiki, Alaska — 60,000 dwt. Petroleum Publishing Institute, International Petroleum Encyclopedia 407 (1972).

4. The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port proposal, or LOOP, would be sited some 20 miles off Bayou Lafourche. Its onshore terminal would be connected with CAPLINE, a major overland pipeline supplying Mid-West refineries. The Texas proposal, SEADOCK, would be 25-30 miles off Freeport, near Texas refinery centers.

Both proposals would be initially constructed as a two-or three-monobuoy cluster, more monobuoys to be added at a later date. Both would be entirely financed by oil company consortia.LOOP and SEADOCK are the most advanced deepwater port proposals.

5. Their proposal, Ameraport, would be operated by a stateowned corporation. Its viability depends on attracting considerable new refinery capacity to the area.

6. 34 La. Rev. Stat. §§ 3101 et seq.

7. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.

8. S. Res. 45, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 13227 (May 3, 1971).

9. 119 Cong. Rec. 8461 (daily ed., May 8, 1973) (Senate); 119 Cong. Rec. 3357 (daily ed., May 3, 1973) (House). See, Comment, Deep Water Ports: Energy Demands Versus Environmental Safeguards, 3 ELR 10165, 10167 (Nov. 1973).

10. H.R. 10701, 120 Cong. Rec. 4857 (daily ed., June 6, 1974); S. 4076, 120 Cong. Rec. 18643 (daily ed., Oct. 9, 1974).

11. S. Rep. No. 1360, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).

12. 120 Cong. Rec. 21773 (daily ed., Dec. 17, 1974) (Senate); 120 Cong. Rec. 12148 (daily ed., Dec. 17, 1974) (House).

13. Hearings on S. 1751 and S. 2232 Before the Special Joint Subcomm. on Deepwater Ports Legislation of the Senate Comms. on Commerce, Interior and Insular Affairs, and Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 383 (1973).

14. Dept. of the Interior, Draft Environmental Impact Statement on Deepwater Ports, at IV-85 (1973).

15. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 2 ELR 20262 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 2 ELR 20656 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by equally divided court, sub non. Fir v. Sierra Club, 3 ELR 20684 (U.S. 1973).

16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq., ELR 41201.

17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq., ELR 41101.

18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq., ELR 41701.

19. 33 U.S.C. § 1331.

20. For smaller tankers, the liability limit is $150/gross ton.

21. Patterned after the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Liability Fund established by the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act (86 Stat. 862).

22. The power of a state to set oil spill liability limits higher than the federal limits was accepted in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 3 ELR 20362 (U.S. 1973). The Act's provision merely ensures that power with regard to deepwater ports.

23. For example, from the general vicinity of the LOOP proposal (n. 4, supra), comes half of our Gulf shrimp production.

24. S Rep. No. 1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974).

25. Id.

26. 4 ELR 20513 (U.S. 1974).

27. S. Rep. No. 1217, supra, n. 24, at 29-30.

28. 4 ELR 20100 (U.S. 1973).

29. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

30. These are: Puget Sound, Wash.; Estero Bay, Calif.; Harbor Island, Texas; Freeport, Texas (SEADOCK); Bayou Lafourche, La. (LOOP); Alabama-Mississippi (Ameraport); Stone Beach, Del.; Newburyport, Mass. (MASSPORT); and Eastport, Me.

31. S. Rep. No. 1217, supra, n. 24, at 42.

32. 2 ELR 41141.

33. Pub. Law 92-340, 86 Stat. 427.

34. 39 Fed. Reg. 24150 (June 28, 1974).