Competing Agendas and the Climate Change Negotiations: The United States, the European Union, and Japan

Miranda A. Schreurs

The author is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland in College Park. Many of the ideas reflected in this Dialogue are based on her book manuscript, Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the U.S.: Competing Paradigms, currently under review.

[31 ELR 11218]

Human-induced climate change is considered by many scientists to be one of the most pressing international problems facing our planet. Yet, international efforts to address greenhouse gas emissions have been repeatedly stymied by differences in national perspectives.

The Kyoto Protocol¹ was dealt a near-death blow by the Bush Administration in March 2001. After President George W. Bush labeled the protocol "fatally flawed" and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Christine Todd Whitman announced that the Protocol was as good as "dead" in the Administration's eyes, the future of this international agreement looked bleak.² The European Union (EU) reacted with shock, anger, and dismay.

The Bush Administration appears to have believed that its actions would kill the agreement. Instead, the Administration's antipathy for the Protocol galvanized the EU into action. Japan initially waffled. Its position was ambiguous. It criticized the U.S. decision calling for the United States to return to the Protocol discussions, but then raised questions about whether or not it would participate without the United States. Yet, in the end the EU and Japan formed a coalition and most of the rest of the world joined them in proving the Bush Administration wrong. America stood essentially isolated in its dismissal of the Kyoto Protocol.

This Dialogue examines the roles played by the United States, the EU, and Japan in relation to a decade of climate change negotiations leading up to the events in Bonn. Of course, many other nations have also been involved in these negotiations. My reason for focusing on these three players is that as the economic heavyweights, they have been pivotal players throughout the process.

In Bonn on July 25, 2001, 178 nations formally agreed to the provisions drawn up at the 6th Conference of the Parties (COP Part II). As a result, the Kyoto Protocol continues to survive, although in a much weakened state. The Worldwide Fund for Nature has estimated that the original 5.2% global greenhouse gas reduction goal developed in Kyoto was watered down to 1.8% in Bonn.³ The Kyoto Protocol has not yet been ratified by the 55 states totaling 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions necessary for the agreement to go into force. The goal is to achieve this level of ratification in time for the next global environmental summit on sustainable development, which will be held in South Africa in 2002. Whether or not this can indeed be achieved remains uncertain. The EU and Japan have both indicated their intentions to ratify (as have most of the other Annex 1 nations present in Bonn).

One of the ironies of the whole process is that the deal that was struck in Bonn looks like it was written for the United States. The EU was in a weak bargaining position going into the Bonn negotiations. Efforts to achieve a workable implementation arrangement for the Protocol had collapsed the previous November in The Hague because of the sharp differences in opinion that existed between the EU on the one hand, and the United States and its umbrella group (Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand), on the other. To get Japan to side with the EU rather than the United States in Bonn, the EU had to give in to almost all of Japan's demands, plus some others. Thus, the EU's original goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions primarily from domestic sources was largely written out of the agreement. Instead, there is now tremendous room for nations to use a wide variety of flexible mechanisms to meet their reduction goals. These were the kind of mechanisms the United States had been supporting under the Clinton-Gore Administration. They were nevertheless rejected by the Bush Administration.

What happened between December 1997 when the Kyoto agreement was formed and July 2001 when the Bonn negotiations ended to explain this outcome? How can the positions of the EU, Japan, and the United States be understood? On a more technical note, what came out of the Bonn agreement, and what is left for the 7th COP scheduled for fall 2001? Finally, what does the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Protocol mean? Each of these questions will be addressed below. But first, before turning to these questions, a brief history of the negotiations leading up to Bonn is presented [31 ELR 11219] emphasizing the different historical positions of the EU, Japan, and the United States. This discussion introduces the roots to many of the problems that surfaced in the months leading up to Bonn 2001.

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and the Framework Convention on Climate Change

In 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, over 150 nations met at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) to discuss four main issues: sustainable development, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and climate change. At the UNCED, several important international agreements were formed: Agenda 21⁴ (an action plan for sustainable development), the Biodiversity Convention,⁵ and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). National disagreements regarding the seriousness of the environmental threats being discussed and the best means for addressing them were already starkly apparent at this time.

Going into the UNCED, the EU was calling for the establishment of binding emission reduction targets and timetables for meeting those reduction goals. By this time, the EU already had established a goal for itself of stabilizing carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Japan, too, had introduced a domestic CO₂ stabilization goal for 2000 relative to 1990 levels on a per capita basis. The United States had no such goal going into the agreement. The George H.W. Bush Administration was still skeptical of climate change science and argued that it was premature to establish targets and timetables. The United States argued instead for an agreement that would promote greater understanding of the issue from a scientific and technological per-spective. The words of Bush Sr. are echoed in the actions of Bush Jr.

The disagreements between these powerful blocs resulted in a mild-toned framework convention. The FCCC did not establish targets or timetables. Instead, in a compromise the agreement's ultimate objective was described as "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."⁶ The agreement went on to state that "such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."⁷

The tortured language of the FCCC represents the struggle of ideas among these nations. Article 3, Principle 3, for example, states:

Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.⁸

The first part of this statement reflects the EU's embracement of the precautionary principle. The second part of the statement reflects the strong U.S. concern with cost-benefit analysis.

The FCCC had several notable provisions. It established two groupings of nations: Annex 1 and Annex 2 countries. Annex 1 countries are those developed nations that agreed to take measures to mitigate climate change "by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs."⁹ They also agreed to make regular national inventories of greenhouse gas sources and their removal by carbon absorbing sinks, e.g., forests, agricultural land, wetlands, and report their mitigation measures to the FCCC Secretariat.¹⁰ Annex 2 countries were those that agreed to provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries, and especially highly vulnerable countries, to help them deal with the impacts of climate change.¹¹

Many of the commitments discussed in Article 4 and agreed to by the Parties have not been met. The most important was the nonbinding agreement to limit anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. With the exception of Germany and Great Britain, most nations have seen their green-house gas emissions rise since 1990. Germany slashed its emissions substantially, but this was primarily because of the collapse of the East German economy. Great Britain cut its emissions by switching from coal to newly discovered natural gas sources.

The FCCC established a COP to work out the technical details of the agreement. The FCCC made mention of sinks and joint implementation, for example, but there was as of yet no agreement on what qualified as a sink or how joint implementation was to work. Common methodologies also needed to be established. Following the example set by the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,¹² the FCCC also called for periodic review of the goals of the FCCC based on scientific and technological developments. Within a year or two of the time of the UNCED, most of the developed nations had prepared national climate change reports outlining measures to be taken to address climate change. By 2001, 185 states and the European Community had become Parties to the FCCC.

[31 ELR 11220]

The Road to Kyoto

The change of administration from George H.W. Bush to William J. Clinton led to a few changes in approach to the FCCC. The Clinton-Gore Administration's Climate Action Plan proposed a stabilization target, thus joining the EU and Japan in embracing targets. The Administration also attempted but failed in its effort to pass a British thermal unit (Btu)—a standard measure of energy—tax on the energy content of fuels.¹³ Instead, it merely succeeded in getting a small federal gasoline tax of 4.3 cents per gallon through Congress. The United States also shifted its negotiating position by giving up its staunch opposition to the establishment of quantifiable emissions targets in an international agreement. This opened the way to discussion on a protocol to implement a treaty.

It did not take long to realize that the voluntary measures nations had agreed to early in the decade would not suffice as a means of getting countries to reduce their emissions. Trend data suggested the opposite to be the case. Emissions were growing in the developed countries (with the exceptions of Germany and Great Britain). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 1995 report,¹⁴ moreover, gave the most serious warning to date regarding the likelihood that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions would cause a warming of average global temperatures of between 1 and 3 degrees Celsius and that this would be accompanied by greater severity in weather patterns.¹⁵

Pressure built, and an agreement was reached to form a binding agreement by the time of the 3d COP. Japan offered to host the meeting.¹⁶

In the period leading up to the formation of the Kyoto Protocol, the sharp divisions that were evident at the time of the UNCED continued as the negotiating process became increasingly complex. The first big area of debate concerned the use of flexible mechanisms. This, too, is a debate that spilled over into the Bonn negotiations. The United States lobbied hard for the inclusion of flexible mechanisms in the Protocol. The EU was reluctant to allow heavy reliance on flexible mechanisms and instead wanted nations to reduce their actual emissions. Japan, although not as strong a supporter of the flexible mechanisms as the United States, had been won over to the idea by the United States and the difficulty that the highly energy-efficient Japan would have in making further emissions cuts domestically.

Emissions trading, which had proved quite effective at reducing sulfur dioxide (SO₂) emissions under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, was an idea the United States wanted to extend to carbon trading. This idea met with considerable skepticism in the EU, which had no domestic experience with emissions trading. Moreover, even though emissions trading worked well with SO₂ pollution,¹⁷ there were far greater uncertainties regarding how emissions trading would work internationally and in relation to a pollutant with a far higher number and variety of sources than was the case with the SO₂ emissions trading scheme. SO₂ emissions trading was domestic to the United States, and basically only encompassed utilities. A carbon emissions trading system would be international and would extend to all sorts of industrial and other activities. Moreover, no international monitoring system existed.

Also seen as problematic by the EU was the U.S. (and, increasingly, the Japanese) interest in relying heavily on joint implementation, the clean development mechanism, and sinks to meet commitments. The idea behind joint implementation is that a developed nation listed in Annex 1 of the Kyoto Protocol can work jointly with a nation in economic transition to help the developing country reduce emissions through specific projects, for which both the developed and the transition nations would get some credit. The clean development mechanism is a somewhat similar idea. It would allow the developed countries to cheaply reduce emissions in developing countries and thereby receive offset emissions credits. Sinks would give a country the chance to offset domestic emissions through reforestation or afforestation activities.

Another point of contention regarded the emissions targets to be achieved. The EU, it will be remembered, proposed a 15% reduction target for all industrialized nations, but then suggested a "bubble" approach for the EU. The EU bubble gave different reduction targets for individual EU member states reflecting their different national circumstances. France, for example, which heavily depends on nuclear energy, was given a 0% goal. Germany, which was closing down factories in the East and where there was a strong Green Party calling for action, had a much higher emissions reduction goal (21%). The United States entered the negotiations merely agreeing to a stabilization target at 1990 levels for the 2008-2012 period, with additional reductions after that time. Japan suggested a 5% reduction target, but with adjustments for each country according to per capita emissions levels.

An additional important difference regarded the gases to be included in the agreement. The EU and Japan wanted three gases to be controlled by the agreement: CO₂, nitrous oxide (NO_x), and methane. The United States argued that this mix of gases excluded several important greenhouse gases with high global warming potentials and also favored the EU and Japan. The United States wanted to include three additional gases: hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Inclusion of these gases would make it easier for the United States to meet a strong reduction goal. There were also differences regarding budgeting periods—a single-year-budget period, as argued for by the EU, or a multiple-year-budget period endorsed by the United States. The multiple-year idea would allow countries to average their emissions over a set of years to avoid being [31 ELR 11221] caught with high emissions as a fluke related to, for example, a bad weather year.¹⁸

The Kyoto Protocol

Some, but not all, of these differences were ironed out in the Kyoto negotiations. The EU and Japan agreed to the U.S. demand to have six greenhouse gases included in the Protocol. They also agreed to set a 2008-2012 time frame as the first period for emissions reductions, or what is commonly called the first commitment period.¹⁹ After Vice President Albert Gore made a last-minute trip to Kyoto, the United States agreed to a 7% reduction for the basket of six greenhouse gases. The EU's 15% reduction goal, which would have been difficult to meet once the three additional gases were added to the mix, was brought down to an 8% goal, and Japan committed to a 6% reduction figure. The Japanese commitment was 1% more than the Ministry of International Trade and Industry had said would be possible for the country and came after Vice President Gore made a concession and then-Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto ordered his negotiators to reach a deal. Baselines were set for 1990 for CO₂, NO_x, and methane. Baselines were set for 1995 for the three additional synthetic gases.

Thus, the final emission targets set in Kyoto were as follows:

Austria (-13%)

Belgium (-7.5%)

Denmark (-21%)

EU bubble (-8%)

Finland (0%)

France (0%)

Germany (-21%)

Greece (+25%)

Ireland (+13%)

Japan (-6%)

Luxembourg (-28%)

Netherlands (-6%)

Portugal (+27%)

Spain (+15%)

Sweden (+4%)

United Kingdom (-12.5%)

United States (-7%)

No agreement was reached, however, on such important issues as how the flexible mechanisms were to work, how sinks were to be measured, how compliance would be assured, or what percentage of emissions reductions could be met through use of the flexible mechanisms. These points, and many other complex technical details, were left for subsequent negotiations.

The 6th COP—Parts I and II

The 6th COP proved a turning point in international efforts to address climate change. At this meeting in The Hague, in November 2000, negotiations on the implementation of the Protocol collapsed. The reason was the division between the EU, on the one side, and Japan, the United States, and several other countries on the other side over whether or not "caps" should be placed on the percentage of emissions reductions a country could get credit for by nondomestic means. Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States objected to the establishment of a 50% cap called for by the EU. They instead called for giving countries a great deal of flexibility in the methods they could use to achieve assigned targets. These included credits for maintaining and expanding carbon "sinks" and heavy reliance on the use of other flexible mechanisms. France and Germany were strongly opposed to the idea of allowing countries to depend heavily upon sinks to offset emissions reductions. There were also disagreements left unsolved regarding financing and technology transfer issues, measures to assure compliance, and the extent to which countries should be allowed to supplement domestic emission reduction efforts with joint implementation and the clean development mechanism.

These differences suggested a sharp ideological difference that had emerged between the EU and the United States. The EU felt that there was a moral obligation for the developed countries to take domestic emissions reduction measures first. The United States, which had grown increasingly hesitant to use regulations to address environmental and other policy matters and where there were strong calls to balance economic and environmental costs, was steadfast in its support for market-based mechanisms.

When The Hague conference ended in indecision, negotiators agreed to resume the 6th COP in 2001. This was the meeting that was held in Bonn.

The Bush Administration's Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol

In the interim between COP-6 Part I and COP-6 Part II, however, President Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol. On March 13, 2001, he sent a letter to four conservative Republican senators indicating that he did not plan to consider CO₂ as a pollutant (thus contradicting a campaign pledge) and that he was opposed to the Kyoto Protocol. Pressured by the oil and coal lobbies, and supported in his decision by Vice President Richard Cheney and White House Economic Advisor Lawrence Lindsey, Bush announced his decision to withdraw from the Protocol. The reasoning of the Bush Administration was that the nation was in an "energy crisis" and that the Protocol would force the United States to move away from coal to natural gas, thus driving up the costs of energy. Moreover, he argued that agreement exempted developing countries from having to make emissions cuts, and would put the United States at a competitive disadvantage. In sum, the Kyoto Protocol would harm the domestic economy.²⁰

The EU was left in a quandary. Tempers flared. Campaigns were launched to try to persuade the Bush Administration to change its mind. Boycotts were announced of Exxon [31 ELR 11222] (Esso in Europe), a strong opponent of the Kyoto Protocol. Japan joined in the campaign to shift the Administration's viewpoint. There was some success. The Bush Administration stopped referring to the Protocol as "dead." Administration officials eventually announced that they considered climate change a legitimate concern, and that the United States would draw up plans to address the matter on its own terms, through a focus on scientific research, technological development, and voluntary actions.²¹ But the efforts to shift the Bush Administration's viewpoint on the Kyoto Protocol met with strong resistance.

Building a Coalition in Support of the Protocol

Resolve grew within Europe to move forward with ratification even without the United States. At the Gothenburg meeting of EU heads of state in June, the EU agreed to move forward with ratification. This confirmed a similar agreement made more than a month earlier by the EU environment ministers. Under the rules set at Kyoto, however, they knew that doing this would require winning the support of Australia, Canada, Japan, and Russia. Without these nations, it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to achieve the 55% of global emissions goal required by the protocol for it to go into force. Going into Bonn 84 countries had signed the Protocol and 37 had ratified the agreement, but most countries, especially those required under the Protocol to make emissions reductions, were waiting for the implementation details to be worked out before ratifying.²² Winning Japan's support was particularly crucial.

Japan's position proved difficult to read. Some within Japan were calling for ratification of the Protocol with or without the United States. Indeed, the upper house of Japan's legislature voted unanimously in April that the government should work to persuade the United States to change its mind and that Japan should ratify the agreement.²³ The Environment Minister, Yoriko Kawaguchi, made numerous visits to the United States to try to convince the United States to reenter the Protocol. She also met several times with her European counterparts to discuss strategies. Yet, there were mixed signals coming from the newly elected Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi on his first visit to the United States met with President Bush at Camp David and in a press statement announced that he had no intentions of acting without the United States. Yet, he also stated that he planned to find a way to bring the United States back into the agreement.²⁴ This position reflected concern on the part of Japanese industry about its ability to meet the 6% emissions reduction target after over a decade of economic recession.

Essentially this meant that the EU was in a very weak bargaining position going into the Bonn negotiations. Japan's position was ambiguous. Australia and Canada were also sending mixed signals. The EU was left with little choice but to make heavy concessions if it wanted to see Bonn succeed. Indeed, Bonn 2001 is so watered down that it would never have been accepted by the EU member states one-half year ago. Circumstances had changed a lot in the interim.

The Agreement Reached at COP-6 Part II in Bonn

The broad outlines of the agreement that were hammered out in Bonn should make it easier for countries, including those in Europe, to meet their emissions reduction targets. The negotiations were aided by the work of COP President Jan Pronk of the Netherlands, who provided a draft political compromise position to the negotiators and pushed them hard to reach an agreement.

In the negotiations, the EU basically gave in to Japanese demands to include emissions trading, joint implementation, and the clean development mechanism as means for meeting emissions reduction targets. No cap was placed on the use of these mechanisms, although the COP agreed that "the use of mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall constitute a 'significant element' of the effort made by each Annex I Party to fulfill quantitative emissions commitments."²⁵ Another significant concession made by the EU was the agreement to allow countries to meet their reduction targets through development and management of sinks, both domestically and in developing countries. Australia, Canada, Japan, and Russia successfully argued for the establishment of negotiated maximum levels of forest management credits for countries.²⁶ Under these negotiated maximums, Japan, for example, will be able to get credit for up to 13 million tons of carbon per year (Mt C/yr) through forestry management and domestic farming activities. Canada can get up to 12.00 Mt C/yr, Germany 1.24 Mt C/yr, and Russia 17.63 Mt C/yr. For Japan, this means that it can use forest management activities for up to 3.8% of its required reduction, or close to two-thirds of its 6% reduction target.²⁷

Countries can also offset their emissions by exporting clean technology (solar, wind, energy efficiency, and other renewable energy sources) through the clean development mechanism to developing countries for up to 1% of existing emissions. Although Japan had argued to have nuclear power included in this mix, its proposal was not accepted. Countries can also get credit under the clean development mechanism for enhancing sinks in developing countries through reforestation and afforestation activities. A major concern of the EU and some developing countries is that this would lead to the destruction of tropical rainforests and their replacement with mono-culture plantations. To protect against this, countries will have to show that their reforestation efforts protect biological diversity.

The EU also gave in on counting nuclear energy development as a means of meeting emissions targets domestically; it remained opposed to its use under the clean development mechanism.

Those not meeting their Kyoto emissions reduction targets will be penalized by having to reduce more from domestic [31 ELR 11223] sources in future periods (an extra 1.3% for every 1% shortfall). This would be for the second accounting period for which targets and timetables have yet to be set. Additional penalties were considered but due to lack of consensus were left for future negotiations. Countries that fail to meet their targets could also be denied the right to be involved in carbon trading in the future. The United States, as a non-party, will be excluded from the carbon trading system if the Protocol is ratified by 55 countries accounting for 55% of global emissions. This could also put great pressure on the United States to act should industry feel threatened by being left out.

Developing countries were also promised close to a $ .5 billion in aid under several financial arrangements, including the Global Environment Facility, a special proposed climate change fund, and bilateral and multilateral channels. This will include the transfer of new technologies to help make developing country economies less carbon intensive.

The Political Meaning of Bonn 2001

Bonn 2001 may not have a big environmental impact. The agreement is weak and does not require countries to take many of the painful steps initially proposed and argued for by environmental groups and many members of the EU. Yet, it was a huge political victory for the EU. Seldom in history has the United States suffered the kind of international criticism that its decision to withdraw from Kyoto elicited. Seldom in history has the rest of the world worked so hard to send a united message of criticism to the United States. Bonn 2001 will go down in history as a major political achievement for the EU. Japan, too, wins some points for its role in saving the international community's first joint effort, however belabored, to address climate change.

The decision by the EU, Japan, and many other nations to work together toward ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has also begun to reverberate in the United States. Several major corporations, including Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Enron, British Petroleum, Cinergy, AEP, and Entergy, having taken steps to reduce their own emissions, would like the Bush Administration to take some action that would credit them for their efforts. They also want regulatory certainty, which will make it easier for them to make investment decisions in the future.²⁸ Several bills are pending in Congress that would require the United States to take some actions toward reducing CO₂ emissions. Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.), Senate Environment and Public Works Committee Chairman James M. Jeffords (I-Vt.), and Rep. Sherwood Boehlert (R-N.Y.) are all intent on seeing some regulatory action.²⁹ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved a nonbinding resolution calling upon the White House to rejoin the negotiations on climate change, either through a proposal for a revised Kyoto Protocol or by way of a new binding agreement for reducing greenhouse gases. This is especially significant given that the vote included several senators from coal-producing states. Even typically conservative Sen. Jessie Helms (R-N.C.) endorsed the Proposal.³⁰ In the months leading up to the formation of the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate had voted 95-0 on the Byrd-Hagel resolution to require the Clinton Administration to oppose any international agreement on climate change that did not include binding commitments by developing countries.

To date, the Bush Administration has not budged on the CO₂ issue, and it is uncertain whether or not the Administration will present a proposal in time for the next COP, which will take place in Morocco this November.³¹ Yet, clearly the international community's actions are having political ramifications in the United States and pressure is building on the Administration to act. Still, the situation looks all but certain. At the same time that the Senate passed its resolution urging the Bush Administration to develop an international climate change plan of action, the House of Representatives was voting on and endorsing the president's energy plan, which includes billions of dollars in tax incentives, many of them targeted at fossil fuel industries.³²

Moreover, the Global Climate Coalition, which opposes the Protocol, continues to have much sway at the White House. Many businesses have joined the Administration in calling for a long-term approach to addressing climate change that focuses on additional scientific research, technology development, and technology transfer to the developing world. This approach avoids short-term measures in favor of long-term structural change. This could mean that there will be little in the way of action in the United States in the short term.

COP—7 and Beyond: What's in Store?

Several issues were left unresolved in Bonn and will have to be worked out in subsequent negotiating sessions. These include further details regarding how financial burden sharing is to work, the technical nuances determining project eligibility under the clean development mechanism, issues regarding the eligibility of various sinks (technically, land use, land use change, and forestry), environmental impact assessment matters, details of an emissions trading system, and the like. Discussions must also begin on measures to be established for subsequent commitment periods.

A big uncertainty that remains is what the United States will bring to Morocco, if anything? The Protocol still hangs in the balance. Ratification will still be an uphill struggle. Even though the world has sent President Bush a strong message, it still waits to see what the White House will do.

Comparing the Political Responses of the EU, Japan, and the United States

Together the EU, Japan, and the United States dominate the global economy. They are among the richest countries in the world and share many political philosophies. Yet, as a decade of negotiations on climate change mitigation suggests, there are important differences among them in terms of their environmental management philosophies. The U.S. position in the climate change negotiations is particularly disturbing [31 ELR 11224] given the leadership role that the nation played in the period leading to the formation of the Montreal Protocol. Where did that leadership go? Why, instead of trying to negotiate a better international agreement, did the Bush Administration abandon the Kyoto Protocol?

The kind of blatant criticism lashed out at the Kyoto Protocol by many U.S. industries would be almost inconceivable in Europe or Japan. In the social market economics of Europe (especially continental Europe), citizens have a stronger expectation that governments will intervene in markets. Governments are expected to redistribute wealth. They are expected to ensure health care. Increasingly, they are also expected to legislate to protect the environment.³³ There is a greater willingness to pay higher taxes for these goods than appears the case in the United States. In Europe, the precautionary principle has taken root.³⁴ Green parties are represented in numerous national parliaments and in the EU parliament. Concerns about acid rain, the ozone hole, the Chernobyl nuclear accident, and the environmental nightmare left by the Soviet bloc have helped to sensitize Europeans to the need for environmental protection in a way that is less evident in the United States. European environmental groups have succeeded in greening the political and industrial landscape to a considerable extent. Industries, government, and environmental groups still have their disagreements, but they work in a far more cooperative relationship than is common in the United States. In Europe (especially continental Europe), there is considerable support for ecotaxes, regulations to promote renewable energies, and regulations to control polluting industries.

In Japan, too, there has been a growth in environmental awareness in the past decade. Concerns about transboundary pollution from China and interest in making environmental protection a major foreign policy area have led Japan to introduce many new environmental policies in recent years. Compared with Europe, however, the position of environmentalists in Japan is still weak. Thus, although Japan is becoming a greener society, it does not embrace ecotaxes in the way that Europe does and is more reluctant to introduce regulations to control industrial pollution. Voluntary approaches are preferred and increasingly, in part due to persuasion by the United States, market-based mechanisms are being considered. In addition, because of Japan's close security relationship with the United States, it remains reluctant to take positions internationally that could strain the bilateral relationship. This was the case during the negotiations in Bonn, where Japan looked out not only for its own interests, but for those of the United States. Japan's hope is that the United States will one day decide to rejoin the fold of the Protocol. That would be a true political victory for Japan.

The United States stood isolated in Bonn. The great puzzle is that the United States has the world's largest environmental groups, but they were unable to sway the Administration. The Bush Administration's position reflects the growing faith in this country in market-based mechanisms to control pollution,³⁵ cost-benefit analysis (weighing the environmental protection benefits to the economic costs of action),³⁶ and technological solutions.³⁷ It also reflects a growing questioning in society of the benefits of regulatory approaches to environmental protection. Advocates of these positions are often supported by wealthy industries, which can provide huge campaign contributions to politicians that back their views. In this context, environmental groups are at a disadvantage.

Clearly, not all in the United States embrace the approach of the Administration. There are supporters of environmental regulations and some who support environmental taxes. Yet, at least in the current political milieu, these groups are fighting an uphill battle. The United States was recognized as a global leader in the development of environmental policies for much of the 1970s and into the 1980s. The image of the United States as a global environmental leader has been lost in the battle over Kyoto. There will be strong pressures coming from environmental groups in the United States and from the international community for the resumption of a leadership role. The question is whether or not the United States will succeed in drafting a persuasive alternative to the Kyoto Protocol that convinces other nations that it is indeed serious about climate change.

1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (available in ELR STAT. 50343) [hereinafter Framework Convention]; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add. 1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].

2. Eric Pianin, U.S. Aims to Pull Out of Warming Treaty; "No Interest" in Implementing Kyoto Pact, Whitman Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2001, at A1.

3. Vanessa Houlder, Bonn Climate Meeting Hangs in Balance, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at World News, 6.

4. Adoption of Agreements on Env't & Dev., U.N. Conf. on Econ. Dev., 47th Sess., Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/4 (1992), ch. 2, para. 2.1. See also Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, U.N. GAOR, 19th Special Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/S-19-29, & 49 (1997).

5. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-20, 31 I.L.M. 818, 822-23 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).

6. Framework Convention, supra note 1, art. 2. See John Dernbach, Moving the Climate Change Debate From Models to Proposed Legislation: Lessons From State Experience, 30 ELR 10933 (Nov. 2000).

7. Id. For an account of the UNCED, see IRVING M. MINTZER & J.A. LEONARD, NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RIO CONVENTION (1994).

8. Framework Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, princ. 3.

9. Id. art. 4.2(a).

10. Id. art. 4.2(b), (c).

11. Id. art. 4.3. See also id. arts. 11, 21.3.

12. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.

13. See generally ARNOLD W. REITZE JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (Envtl. L. Inst. 2001); Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Global Warming, 31 ELR 10253, 10265; Neil E. Harrison, From the Inside Out: Domestic Influences on Global Environmental Policy, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 89 (Paul G. Harris ed., 2000).

14. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1195: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (John T. Houghton et al. eds., 1996).

15. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995; IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS, AND MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL ANALYSES (1996).

16. This was done over the express concern of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry), which feared that hosting the COP would force Japan to take a stronger position on climate change.

17. See, e.g., Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap-and-Trade Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ELR 10330 (Mar. 2001); Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 26 ELR 10411 (Aug. 1996).

18. For a fuller discussion of these differences, see BUREAU OF OCEANS & INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (1998), available at http://www.state.gov/www.global/oes/fs_Kyoto_climate_980115.html (last visited July 25, 2001). See also SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (1999) and MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999).

19. The measures stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol are recognized as being only small first steps to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Scientists are warning that far higher emissions reductions will be necessary to arrest climate change. Thus, after the first commitment period additional commitments will be necessary.

20. Amy Goldstein & Eric Pianin, Hill Pressure Fueled Bush's Emissions Shift, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at Al.

21. Katherine Q. Seelye, In a Shift, White House Cites Global Warming as a Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2001, at A 18; Bush Pledges Research, Diplomacy on Climate Change, Reuters, June 11, 2001.

22. 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 176 (2001), available at http://www.iisd.ca./cliamte/cop6bis/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2001).

23. UN Climate Head Urges U.S. Not to Block Kyoto Treaty, Reuters, Apr. 19, 2001.

24. Andrew C. Revkin, Burden Seems to Be on Japan to Salvage the Fast-Eroding Climate Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at A9.

25. See EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., supra note 22.

26. An informative source regarding developments during COP-6 Part II is provided by Earth Negotiations Bulletin, see id.

27. Editorial, Time to Clarify Will to Ratify Kyoto, DAILY YOMIURI, July 25, 2001, at 6.

28. Andrew C. Revkin & Neela Banerjee, Some Energy Executives Urge U.S. Shift on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at C1.

29. Eric Pianin, Emissions Treaty Softens Kyoto Targets, WASH. POST, July 29, 2001, at A23.

30. Eric Pianin, Bush Urged to Negotiate Global Warming Treaty, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2001, at A14.

31. But see Eric Pianin, Aide: Bush Warming Plan Likely; Card Is "Optimistic" Kyoto Alternative Will Be Ready by Fall, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2001, at A6.

32. Lizette Alvarez, Bush's Energy Bill Is Passed in House in a G.O.P. Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at A1. See also Jack Kemp, No Science a Match for Nonsense, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2001, at A13.

33. See James A. Lofton, Environmental Enforcement: The Impact of Cultural Values and Attitudes on Social Regulation, 31 ELR 10906 (Aug. 2001) (discussing the differences between the European and U.S. approaches).

34. See Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ELR 10790 (July 2001).

35. For cautionary views, see, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 31 ELR 11086 (Sept. 2001); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the Future of Environmental Enforcement, 30 ELR 10803 (Oct. 2000); Jon D. Silberman, Does Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence and Experience Say Yes, But We Need to Understand How and Why, 30 ELR 10523 (July 2000).

36. See David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight: One Strand of the Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 ELR 10003 (Jan. 2001) (voicing concerns about the use of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decisionmaking).

37. See generally John Voorhees, The Changing Environmental Management Scene: Federal Policy Impacts the Private and Public Sectors, 31 ELR 10079 (Jan. 2001); WILLIAM L. THOMAS ET AL., CRAFTING SUPERIOR ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT SOLUTIONS (Envtl. L. Inst. Monograph 2000).