The Inconsistent Implementation of the Environmental Laws of the European Community

Jody Meier Reitzes

Editors' Summary: The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) was intended to create a unified European market. The 1987 Single European Act, which amended the EEC Treaty, provided the legal framework to achieve that goal by 1992, and added provisions for a common environmental policy. Despite recognition by European Community (EC) Member States of the need for a common environmental policy, EC environmental legislation has not been uniformly implemented and enforced in Member States. The author examines the inconsistent implementation of EC environmental legislation and discusses the legal situation that allows for varied implementation. She compares this situation to the situation in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s when U.S. environmental law faced federalism problems. The author concludes that a remedy to the EC's problem would be to adopt a stronger enforcement policy that sanctions Member States that do not properly implement EC environmental directives.

Ms. Reitzes is an associate in the Environmental Department at Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin in Washington, D.C. She received a B.A. magna cum laude from Tufts University in 1985, where she majored in Economics and French, and received a J.D. cum laude from Georgetown University Law Center in 1991. From 1985 to 1986, Ms. Reitzes was a Fulbright Scholar in Brussels, Belgium, where she researched and studied the laws of the European Economic Community at the Institut d'Etudes Europeennes.

[22 ELR 10523]

The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community¹ (EEC Treaty) was signed in Rome in 1957 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.² The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the European Community (EC or Community) in 1973.³ Greece became a member in 1981, and Spain and Portugal became members in 1986.⁴ The basic objective of the EEC Treaty was to create a single, integrated European market within which there would be freedom of movement for goods, services, labor, and capital.⁵ The EC, however, is not yet a true "common market." Many barriers to a unified market still remain, such as obstacles to the free movement of labor, differences in national health and safety standards, and variations in tax policies.⁶

In 1985, the EC Commission (Commission)⁷ published the "White Paper," which sets forth a comprehensive plan to remove, by 1992, the physical, technical, and fiscal barriers that have prevented the free functioning of the internal market.⁸ The Single European Act (SEA),⁹ amending the EEC Treaty, entered into force on July 1, 1987, and provides the legal framework to achieve a unified market by 1992.

The SEA also added Title VII entitled, "Environment," to the EEC Treaty.¹⁰ Prior to this amendment, there was no [22 ELR 10524] mention of a common environmental policy in any of the EC treaties. In fact, the word "environment" did not appear in the treaties until the SEA amendments.

Although there was no "constitutional" base for a common environmental policy prior to 1987, the Community has had an environmental policy since November 22, 1973, when it adopted a first action programme¹¹ on the environment. Three more action programmes on the environment followed, and the fourth programme¹² is currently in effect and will run until the end of 1992.

The Member States recognize the need for a common environmental policy, as is evidenced by their continual adoption of environmental action programmes and the inclusion of Title VII in the SEA amendments. Compliance and implementation of the EC environmental legislation, however, has not been uniform among the Member States. According to Stanley Clinton Davis, former EC environmental affairs commissioner, the "worst aspect" of a common policy is the "failure or refusal by so many countries to comply" with the Community requirements.¹³

This Dialogue first provides examples of inconsistent implementation of the EC environmental legislation by the Member States. Next, it provides an overview of the underlying legal status that permits inconsistent implementation to exist. The Community's problems with its environmental policy are then compared to those of the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, this Dialogue advocates that a stronger enforcement policy, one that sanctions the Member States that do not properly implement the environmental directives, is essential if the Community expects to adequately combat transboundary pollution and create a true common market.

The Problem of Inconsistent Implementation

Examples of Inconsistent Implementation

The biggest problem with the EC environmental legislation is that it is not implemented uniformly. Directives are the most common tool used by the EC to address environmental matters since they give the Member States flexibility to adapt their own legislation and administrative arrangements in accordance with Community law.¹⁴ Article 189 of the EEC Treaty provides that "[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods."¹⁵ That is, directives do not become effective until a Member State enacts implementing legislation.¹⁶

Even though a Member State may decide how to implement a directive, it must choose a method that has the "force of law" within that country.¹⁷ Law at the national level must supplement EEC-level directives. In EC Comm'n v. Belgium,¹⁸ for example, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found a government circular to be inadequate to implement a toxic waste directive since government circulars can be altered by the national authorities at any time. In that case, the ECJ held that each Member State must implement directives in a manner that fully meets the requirement of "legal certainty."¹⁹ In order to fulfill the obligation imposed by Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, each Member State must transpose the terms of the directive into national law as binding provisions.²⁰

Despite this "limitation," each Member State tends to use different criteria when implementing an environmental directive, thus frequently producing inconsistent results. For example, in order to implement the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive,²¹ Germany incorporated the general principles of the directive into its preexisting process.²² Similarly, the United Kingdom amended its existing procedures to comply with the EC requirements.²³ Italy and Spain, however, did not have existing legislation that could be amended or expanded. Consequently, these two countries introduced national environmental impact legislation to implement the EC directive.²⁴

Environmental directives usually allow the national governments two years to adopt the legislation necessary to implement the EC policy.²⁵ The environmental directives, however, are rarely transposed into the national law of the Member States within that time.²⁶ For the 90 environmental [22 ELR 10525] directives that were adopted and due to be implemented fully by 1990, the Member States took less than 90 percent of the requisite measures by that date.²⁷

Denmark has been uniquely successful in ensuring that environmental directives are transposed into national legislation within the required time period.²⁸ In fact, Denmark has taken almost 99 percent of the measures required to fully implement the 90 environmental directives.²⁹ Denmark's level of implementation of the EC directives is due, for the most part, to the high level of environmental awareness that exists in that country and in its official bodies. For example, when an environmental directive is negotiated initially and adopted by the EC ministers, the Danish Parliament closely watches the actions of the Danish environmental minister.³⁰ Adoption of an environmental directive frequently represents a binding commitment by the Danish government and the Parliament.³¹

In Germany, the level of official awareness is not as high. The states are frequently responsible for transposing EC directives into national legislation; however, they prefer to implement EC directives through internal circulars, a method that the ECJ has determined to be invalid.³² Perhaps the local authorities resort to the use of internal circulars since Germany's environmental legislation is highly sophisticated, and the country tries to amend it as little as possible when implementing an EC directive.³³ Furthermore, the local authorities generally know very little about the EC provisions and their scope.³⁴ As a consequence, Germany's legislation frequently omits important aspects of the EC directives.³⁵

Belgium and Italy are among the worst offenders with respect to adequate implementation of the environmental directives. Belgium's difficulties are largely due to its political structure.³⁶ While the national government binds the country by signing the environmental directives, it has no power to implement the directivesinto national law.³⁷ The three regions (Flanders, Brussels, and Wallonia) have jurisdiction over environmental matters and are responsible for executing the EC environmental directives.³⁸ Consequently, the national laws are often modified and executed differently in the three regions.³⁹

The situation in Italy also leads to inconsistent implementation. The role of the central government is frequently confined to the adoption of framework laws or decrees, while the regional or local authorities are responsible for transposing the environmental directives into national law.⁴⁰ Furthermore, once the directives are transposed, the regional and local authorities have difficulty effectively applying the laws.⁴¹

Why Inconsistent Implementation Exists

The EC cannot administer its environmental policy directly since it has no agents of its own in the Member States.⁴² Consequently, the EC produces legislation and places obligations on the Member States that must be complied with if the desired policy objectives are to be achieved.⁴³ The result is that the EC is dependent on the Member States for information concerning their implementation and application of the EC directives.

The existing procedures, however, are clearly inadequate to promote the effective monitoring of the application of the EC directives. Many of the directives require the Member States to send copies of the laws, regulations, and administrative procedures, commonly called "compliance letters," to the Commission within a specified time period — usually two years.⁴⁴ It is unusual, however, for the Member States to follow this requirement and send the compliance letters.⁴⁵ Additionally, the Commission has had difficulty getting the necessary compliance information through other sources. For example, studies commissioned from private contractors tend to have limited value since these individuals do not have access to data held by private firms or by the authorities responsible for monitoring the implementation and application of the directives.⁴⁶ Furthermore, many national administrators do not reply to Commission letters and questionnaires seeking specific information on the practical application of a directive.⁴⁷

The Commission's most effective source of information on the inadequate implementation of environmental directives comes from complaints by private individuals and companies that are dissatisfied with the measures their countries have taken. There is a major drawback to the complaint system, however, since it is based entirely on the efforts of the individuals making the complaints.⁴⁸ In practice, adequate and timely implementation ofthe environmental directives has depended on the climate of opinion in the Community, which itself is "news-driven."⁴⁹ Unless individuals are members of "green" pressure groups, they tend to become involved in environmental concerns only when they are personally affected by a potential hazard.⁵⁰ For [22 ELR 10526] example, the "Sandoz incident"⁵¹ in 1986 motivated Member States to introduce safety standards for industrial chemical hazards that should have been fully implemented by 1984 under the "Seveso Directive."⁵²

Additionally, the United Kingdom's recent privatization of its water industry has focused attention on the Member States' failure to properly implement the Drinking Water Directive.⁵³ In 1989, the Commission brought the United Kingdom before the ECJ for its failure to cut the levels of lead and nitrates in the drinking water in England and Scotland.⁵⁴ This action was fueled by information from Friends of the Earth and other environmental pressure groups that were concerned about the quality of the drinking water in the United Kingdom.⁵⁵ Similarly, in January 1990, the Commission commenced actions against Germany for its failure to comply with the Drinking Water Directive.⁵⁶ Germany's irregularities were brought to the attention of the Commission in part by the efforts of the German news media.⁵⁷

Under the current enforcement system there is little incentive for a Member State to fully implement an environmental directive. While the principal means by which the Commission can enforce the EC directives is to commence a proceeding in front of the ECJ, this procedure is not calculated to find an immediate solution to the problem.⁵⁸ More than three years can elapse between the Commission's decision to open a case and a final ruling by the ECJ.⁵⁹

A Member State cannot be sanctioned for its failure to fully implement an environmental directive. When the ECJ renders a judgment against a Member State, the judgment merely takes the form of a declaration that the Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the EEC Treaty.⁶⁰ The ECJ specifies the act or omission that is the source of the violation, but cannot force the Member State to comply with its judgment.⁶¹ However, the ECJ judgment against a Member State is binding, and failure to comply with the judgment constitutes a further Treaty infringement warranting new action by the Commission.⁶²

The Federalism Problems Facing EC Environmental Law

The EC now has a clearly established common environmental policy, Title VII of the EEC Treaty, that provides a sound "constitutional" base for the creation of environmental legislation. As the discussion above implies, however, there is general dissatisfaction throughout the Community with the way the institutions are implementing the EC environmental policy. This dissatisfaction is coupled with the fact that there is no environmental enforcement policy at the Community level.

The problems the EC is facing in implementing an effective common environmental policy are similar to the federalism problems U.S. environmental law faced in the 1950s and 1960s prior to the creation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. For example, by the 1960s, federal institutions had been established in the United States to perform research on air and water pollution and to establish uniform national standards to control the interstate movement of pollutants.⁶³ As with the EC today, at that time there was widespread dissatisfaction with the way the federal institutions were functioning.⁶⁴ There was a general belief that the federal agencies responsible for carrying out the federal environmental laws either did not give environmental protection the priority it warranted, or tended to have conflicting institutional interests. Most importantly, there were no federal enforcement procedures to compel compliance with the federal pollution laws.⁶⁵

The United States attempted to solve its problems in 1970 by reorganizing most of the federal government's environmental responsibilities into a single agency with comprehensive environmental management capabilities, thus creating EPA.⁶⁶ EPA was given the authority to conduct research, monitor the application of the environmental laws, and coordinate and support research and antipollution activities carried out by state and local governments.⁶⁷ Additionally, EPA was given the power to enforce the federal environmental laws through its Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring.⁶⁸

The EC is now at the point where it needs to create a Community institution with powers similar to thoseof EPA. In fact, there is a belief in the Community that the environmental policy is being jeopardized by the fact that there is still no single Community institution that oversees the implementation and application of the environmental directives within the Member States.⁶⁹

Policy Conclusions: the Need for Stronger Institutions

The European Environment Agency (EEA) was established by a regulation of the EC Council of Ministers on May 7, [22 ELR 10527] 1990.⁷⁰ However, the EEA is not yet operational and its role has not yet been clarified, since the regulation First requires a site to be chosen.⁷¹ Once operational, the EEA will not be an institution with sufficient power to solve the EC's environmental problems.

The EEA is unlikely to play a regulatory role in environmental affairs since it will not have its own environmental inspectorate to enforce the EC directives.⁷² Rather, the EEA will be responsible merely for collecting, processing, and evaluating data on the environment and disseminating this information throughout the Community.⁷³ While the EEA's powers may be increased at a future date,⁷⁴ the Member States have ruled out increasing its responsibility to a regulatory role that could conflict with the responsibilities of the Commission.⁷⁵

According to EC Environment Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana, "the agency will be the scientific arm of the Commission which has the specialized environmental knowledge. But only the EC Commission will have the power to take any legal action against offenders before the European Court of Justice."⁷⁶ That is, as previously discussed, the only recourse against a Member State remaining is for the Commission to institute an infringement proceeding before the ECJ, with the result that the infringing Member State will not be penalized for its violation of EC law.

Clearly, a stronger environmental enforcement policy is needed in the Community. The European Parliament is particularly dissatisfied with the Commission's ability to force Member States to comply with the EC environmental directives.⁷⁷ The Parliament has, consequently, set up a "committee of inquiry" to investigate Member State compliance and document all the cases in every Member State where there is a "blatant disregard" for the directives.⁷⁸

The Commission has also recognized the need for a stronger enforcement policy, and is considering setting up a "green police force" to investigate whether the Member States are properly implementing the environmental directives.⁷⁹ Ideally, the green police force would be able to sanction the Member States that fail to comply with the EC directives by imposing a fine or withdrawing EC funds and subsidies.⁸⁰ Before sanctions can be imposed, however, the EEC Treaty must be amended to permit such penalties.

The Commission can establish a green police force pursuant to its powers under the EEC Treaty by claiming that the force is necessary to ensure that the EC directives are being implemented in the Member States.⁸¹ It is doubtful, however, that the EEC Treaty will be amended to permit the green police force to sanction Member States. Some of the Member States, particularly the United Kingdom, objected to an EEA with enforcement powers since they feared the agency would become a green police force outside the control of the other EC institutions.⁸² While the proposed green police force would be under the control of the Commission, and therefore, not an independent enforcement agency, it is unclear whether the Member States would be willing to subject themselves to penalties for failure to comply with the EC directives.

The green pressure groups in the Community constitute the single most important motivating force behind the necessary environmental reforms. The European green movement has undergone unprecedented growth in the past few years, and many Europeans now rank preservation of the environment among their principal national concerns.⁸³ The Council adopted the Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment in June 1990, that now enables green pressure groups to have free access to factual and legal environmental data collected by public authorities in each Member State.⁸⁴ Under the directive, public authorities must release information on the environment to anyone who asks for it, regardless of whether the person has a direct interest in the matter.⁸⁵ It is anticipated that enactment of this directive will create an "avalanche of demands" for information by the various environmental groups throughout the Community.⁸⁶

The Commission also plans to aid the green pressure groups in their efforts to force the individual Member States to comply with the environmental directives. The Commission will now allow public access to its database containing the information on each Member State's national legislation that formally implements the EC directives.⁸⁷ This will enable the environmental groups to more efficiently target [22 ELR 10528] the directives that are not being adequately implemented in the Member States.

The green pressure groups are likely to arouse greater public discontent with the national governments by publicizing the environmental data from the Member States that fail to comply with the environmental directives. As the level of public awareness increases, the citizens of the EC will recognize that a stronger enforcement policy is essential, and that monetary penalties must be imposed on the Member States that continue to thwart progress toward a common environmental policy. Public outcry may lead the Member States to make the necessary amendments to the EEC Treaty.

1. Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. There are three treaties establishing the European Community: one for the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; one for the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 295 U.N.T.S. 259; and one for the European Economic Community. This Dialogue only discusses the EEC Treaty, however, since the common environmental policy comes within the auspices of this treaty.

2. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EEC COMPETITION POLICY IN THE SINGLE MARKET 9 (1989).

3. Id.

4. Id.

5. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS — COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET 9 (1989) [hereinafter EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS].

6. See generally id. at 9-59.

7. The Commission consists of 17 members, at least one national of each of the Member States. The Commission members are required to be independent of their national governments in the performance of their duties. EEC TREATY, art. 157. For a comprehensive discussion of the institutions of the EC, see generally Turner T. Smith, Jr. & Roszell D. Hunter, The European Community Environmental Legal System, 22 ELR 10106, 10107-08 (Feb. 1992).

8. EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 5, at 20. For a complete discussion of the White Paper and its proposals to achieve a "common market" by 1992, see generally id. at 19-59.

9. 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.

10. Id. at 11-12. For a complete discussion ofTitle VII and the European Economic Community's power to adopt environmental measures pursuant to Title VII, see generally Smith & Hunter, supra note 7, at 10114-17.

11. Council Declaration on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Environment, 1973 O.J. (C 112) 1. The action programmes are not legally binding. Rather they outline the EC Commission's intentions for legislation and other activities for the years ahead. NIGEL HAIGH, EEC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BRITAIN 9 (2d rev. ed. 1989).

12. Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment (1987-1992), 1987 O.J. (C 328) 1 [hereinafter Fourth Action Programme]. The Commission is in the process of drafting its fifth action programme, which will begin running in 1993. Tony Carritt, Environment Action Programme Draft Targets Five Sectors, Reuters, Oct. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.

13. Clinton Davis Hits Lack of Enforcement as Contributing to "Democratic Deficit," [Current Report] 12 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 579 (Dec. 13, 1989).

14. Nigel Haigh, The Environmental Policy of the European Community and 1992, [Analysis and Perspective] 12 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 617, 619 (Dec. 13, 1989).

15. EEC TREATY, art. 189.

16. For a complete discussion of the use of directives rather than regulations in drafting environmental legislation, see generally Smith & Hunter, supra note 7, at 10108-12.

17. Browne v. An Bord Pleanala, 57 C.M.L.R. 3 (Ir. H. Ct. 1990).

18. Case 239/85, Commission v. Belgium, 1986 E.C.R. 3645, 51 C.M.L.R. 248 (1988).

19. Id.

20. Id.

21. Council Directive 85/337 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40.

22. Members Seen Using Different Criteria in Implementing Impact Assessment Directive, [Current Report] 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 216 (Apr. 24, 1991).

23. Id.

24. Id. Italy's new national legislation, however, has succeeded in implementing the EC directive only partially. Id.

25. See, e.g., Council Directive 79/409 on the Conservation of Wild Birds, 1979 O.J. (L 103) 1 (Article 18 provides for the Member States to bring into force the laws, regulations, and administrative procedures necessary to comply with the directive within two years of their being notified of its issuance); see also Council Directive 80/778 Relating to the Quality of Water Intended for Human Consumption, 1980 O.J. (L 229) 11 [hereinafter Drinking Water Directive] (Member States must bring into force laws and procedures necessary to comply with the directive within two years, but water quality standards must be met within five years of the Member States' being notified of the directive's issuance).

26. Eighth Annual Report to the European Parliament on the Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community Law, COM(91)321 final at 1, 305 [hereinafter Eighth Annual Report].

27. Id. at 82.

28. Id. at 275.

29. Id. at 82. Furthermore, in 1990, Denmark was not the subject of any new prosecutions by the Commission for alleged noncompliance with the EC environmental directives. Britain Dispels "Dirty Man" Tag, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.

30. Eighth Annual Report, supra note 26, at 275.

31. Id.

32. Id. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.

33. See id. at 274.

34. Id.

35. Id.

36. Christel Smets, Is Belgium Polluting the European Environmental Picture?, [Analysis and Perspective] 13 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 180 (Apr. 11, 1990).

37. Id. at 181.

38. Id.

39. Id.

40. Eighth Annual Report, supra note 26, at 273.

41. Id.

42. Haigh, supra note 14, at 1.

43. Id.

44. Id.

45. Eighth Annual Report, supra note 26, at 306.

46. Id.

47. Id.

48. Id.

49. Towards a Green Consensus, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 12, 1989, at 20, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.

50. Smets, supra note 36, at 184.

51. The Sandoz incident involved a chemical spill into the Rhine River in Germany. See Towards a Green Consensus, supra note 49, at 20.

52. Council Directive 82/501 on the Major-Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, 1982 O.J. (L 230) 1.

53. Drinking Water Directive, supra note 25.

54. EC Plans Court Action Against Britain Over Water Quality, Reuters, Sept. 20, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.

55. Id.

56. Spotlight on EC's Failure to Implement Pollution Law, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 1990, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.

57. Id. In October 1991, the ECJ ruled that the German government had failed to fully transpose the directive into national law within the required time period. Germany Found in Violation of EC Drinking Water Directive, [Current Report] 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 570 (Oct. 23, 1991).

58. For a discussion of the procedure, pursuant to article 169 of the EEC Treaty, by which the Commission may bring a Member State before the ECJ, see Turner & Smith, supra note 7, at 10113-14.

59. EEC Law: Report on EEC Law in the Member States, EUR. INTELIGENCE, Aug.-Sept. 1991, § 3, at 2.

60. 51 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND P 2.34, at 195 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone ed., 4th ed. 1986).

61. Id.

62. Id.

63. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1986).

64. Id.

65. Id. at 9-10.

66. Id.

67. See 40 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1989).

68. 40 C.F.R. § 1.35 (1989).

69. EEB Energy Tax Highlights Gap Between Policy Aims and Reality, FIN. TIMES (London) (EC Energy Monthly), Nov. 8 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.

70. Council Regulation 1210/90 on the Establishment of the European Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network, 1990 O.J. (L 120) 1 [hereinafter EEA Regulation].

71. The EC governments have been unable to agree on a location for the EEA since its location is linked to negotiations on the seats of other EC institutions. New Tactics Seen Needed to Break Deadlock Over Siting Environment Agency, [Current Report] 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 304 (June 5, 1991).

72. Parliament Calls for Stronger Role for Proposed European Environment Agency, [Current Report] 13 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 43 (Feb. 14, 1990).

73. EEA Regulation, supra note 70, art. 2, at 2. The EEA will "provide the Community and the Member States with the objective information necessary for framing and implementing sound and effective environmental policies." Id.

74. Id. at 20, at 5. Article 20 states that "[n]o later than two years after the entry in force of this Regulation, … the Council shall … decide on further tasks for the Agency …." Id.

75. Environment Ministers Agree on Plan to Set Up European Environment Agency, [Current Report] 12 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 579 (Dec. 13, 1989).

76. Environment Ministers Set Up Agency, [Current Report] 13 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 144 (Apr. 11, 1990).

77. Parliament Plans to Establish Committee to Study Compliance with Environment Laws, [Current Report] 13 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 320 (Aug. 8, 1990).

78. Id.

79. "Green Police" Proposed to Enforce EC Directives, EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION (Buraff Publications, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 23, 1990, at 8.

80. Id.

81. Under article 155 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission is required to "ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market … [by] ensur[ing] that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied." EEC TREATY, art. 155.

82. Environment Ministers Set Up Agency, supra note 76, at 144.

83. Focus on Environment; Green Wave Surging Over West Europe, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1989, at 1.

84. Council Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56.

85. Id. art. 3, at 57.

86. See Public to Get Wide Access to Environmental Data in EC, Reuters, Mar. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.

87. Fourth Action Programme, supra note 12, § 2.2.3, at 8.