Oil Spill Compensation and Liability Legislation: When Good Things Don't Happen to Good Bills

Walter B. Jones

Congressman Walter B. Jones (D-N.C.) has represented the First District of North Carolina since a special election brought him to the 89th Congress in 1966. In 1981, he became Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, which has a diverse jurisdiction ranging over the U.S. Merchant Marine, Coast Guard, oceanographic programs, fisheries and wildlife issues, and the Panama Canal. He is an original sponsor of oil spill compensation and liability legislation.

[19 ELR 10333]

In the beginning, God created man and woman.

Soon thereafter, oil spill compensation and liability legislation sprang from the primordial slime. This development sent man and woman scurrying off to law school (and a few straight to Congress) — destined to argue the finer points of the bill throughout eternity.

Though an exaggeration of its antiquity, there is no exaggeration of the perverse legislative hell that has dogged consideration of oil spill compensation bills in the United States Congress. Rarely has such a good idea, boasting so many proud mothers and fathers, proved so recalcitrant.

Fourteen years ago, in the 94th Congress, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee held the first hearings on comprehensive oil spill liability and compensation legislation. The Committee approved a bill in that and every subsequent Congress. While our sister House committees of jurisdiction (Public Works and Transportation and, more recently, Ways and Means) have been less aggressive in reporting a bill, we have taken a proposal — in some form — to the House floor and had it passed in the 95th, 96th, 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses.

Though the Senate has twice passed oil spill compensation bills, and House-Senate Conferences on such diverse topics as hazardous waste site cleanup and budget reconciliation have debated the bill's merits, it has yet to become law. The primary stumbling block has been the inability to reach agreement on the preemption of state oil spill cleanup funds and state liability laws.

There are compelling reasons for getting the bill enacted that remain as clear today as they were in 1975:

* a guarantee that those who suffer damage from an oil spill will receive prompt and fair compensation for their loss, no matter what;

* the strict liability that would be imposed on the oil industry would encourage a higher standard of care and make certain that those who make the mess clean it up;

* an industry-financed cleanup and compensation fund takes the burden off the back of the taxpayer; and

* a simpler, clearer, more predictable legal and regulatory system will benefit spillers, claimants, and insurers alike.

Compelling reasons indeed, but obviously we have not convinced everyone. For those of us who early on rallied 'round the idea of a federal "superfund" (yes, the term was first applied to the oil spill fund), there is genuine frustration at the lack of progress that has been made in 14 years.

The bill has outlasted most of its original sponsors. Of the 16 House members who introduced H.R. 14862 in 1975, 6 are still in Congress and only 3, myself, Gerry Studds, and Don Young, remain at the forefront of the fight. Little did any of us know what a long and tortured battle we were starting.

Congressional Response to Oil Spills of the 1960s

Huge oil spills in the late 1960s focused public and congressional attention on the enormous devastation they can cause in a marine environment — and how costly they can be.

On March 18, 1967, the Liberian-flag tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground and spilled 29 million gallons of crude oil that soiled the coastlines of France and Great Britain. This spill cost an estimated $ 15 million to clean up and spawned damage claims of $ 25 million that were ultimately settled for approximately $ 7 million.

Less than two years later, on January 28, 1969, the blowout of an offshore production platform in Santa Barbara channel spewed approximately 700,000 gallons of oil into the Pacific Ocean and onto Southern California beaches over the course of 300 days. The Santa Barbara spill brought the grim, gooey, reality of oil pollution onto American shores, and, through the miracle of television, into American living rooms.

Also in 1969, the oil barge Florida went aground in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts. This spill, while not notable for its size — 158,000 gallons of No. 2 fuel oil — is important because it has provided one of the best case studies of short-and long-term biological effects of an oil spill, since the barge had the "good" fortune to go aground in the backyard of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI). Since it already had baseline data on the area, WHOI was able to demonstrate that even though the visible evidence of the Florida spill was gone within a few weeks, oil persisted and the effects of the spill remained in the Bay ten years later.

In the wake of these spills, the 91st Congress passed the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, which added § 311 to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act¹ (FWPCA). Section 311 declared that as a national policy, there should be no discharges of oil into the navigable waters of the United States, the adjoining shorelines, or from vessels operating in the contiguous zones.

This new law for the first time established a spiller's liability for cleanup costs: $ 8 million for oil facilities and the lesser of $ 100 per gross ton or $ 14 million for vessels. The 1978 amendments to the FWPCA upped this to $ 50 million for onshore facilities — offshore facilities were covered in separate law — and to $ 150 per gross ton for vessels, and $ 125 per gross ton for inland oil barges.

Section 311 also established a legislative requirement for a national oil spill contingency plan and created a $ 35 million revolving fund made up of appropriated monies, recovered costs, and fines to cover federal government- incurred cleanup costs. This fund has never reached its authorized size — the highest it has ever been was approximately $ 24 million in 1985 — and as of June 1989 had a [19 ELR 10334] balance of $ 7.3 million, little more than pocket change when faced with cleaning up a spill of the size of the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska. In many cases, the fund has been depleted and then been unable to achieve full reimbursement for spill cleanups because of what have become unrealistically low liability limits. Since 1971, nearly $ 150 million has been obigated from the $ 311 Fund, but only $ 82.5 million has been reimbursed or paid in fines.

Three years after the enactment of $ 311, legislation authorizing the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS) created a new fund specifically for marine accidents involving TAPS oil.² This fund expanded significantly on the concept in FWPCA § 311 in that it covers not only cleanup costs but also claims for economic damages.

In addition, the TAPS Fund is derived not through appropriated, taxpayer monies (as the § 311 Fund is), but through a five cent per barrel fee on oil carried by vessels leaving the pipeline terminus in Valdez, Alaska. Spillers are strictly liable for $ 14 million, with the Fund responsible for remaining claims to a total of $ 100 million per incident.

The TAPS fee was suspended in 1981 when the Fund reached its authorized level. The Fund has never been used, and investments have increased its balance to nearly $ 250 million. At this writing Exxon, which has spent over $ 200 million on the Prince William Sound cleanup, has not called on the Fund for assistance.

While the pipeline legislation was progressing elsewhere, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee was considering the High Seas Oil Port Act (later known as the Deepwater Port Act of 1974), which was signed by President Ford on January 4, 1975. The Deepwater Port Act³ authorized the issuance of licenses to construct and operate offshore oil ports to handle the new generation of crude carriers. There is only one such port: the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. A fund similar to that established under the TAPS law was created and liability limits set at $ 20 million for vessels and $ 50 million for the port itself.

The Birth of a Comprehensive Oil Spill Bill

Simultaneously, but not necessarily in concert with this growing body of federal legislation, a number of states were producing a number of laws addressing oil pollution in a number of ways.

These legislative activities resulted in a patchwork of sometimes conflicting provisions of both state and federal law relating to liability for oil discharges. Recognizing the deficiencies, the Congress, in the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, directed the Attorney General, in cooperation with various governmental bodies, to study the matter and make recommendations for legislation to provide a comprehensive system for liability and compensation. The Congress stressed that the Attorney General should address the means of insuring a fair and expeditious compensation to the victims of pollution, without imposing unreasonable financial burdens on the persons involved in the necessary activities associated with the production and movement of oil.⁴

That study, "Methods and Procedures for Implementing a Uniform Law Providing for Cleanup Costs and Damages Caused by Oil Spills From Ocean Related Sources," was submitted with accompanying legislation to the 94th Congress on July 3, 1975.

In addition to establishing a domestic oil spill regime, the bill, as proposed by the Administration, would have implemented two international agreements: the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC Convention),⁵ and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (Fund Convention).

The CLC Convention provides for shipowner liability in the case of tanker spills. It covers cleanup, natural resource damages, and third-party claims to a maximum of $ 18 million. The CLC Convention has been ratified by 64 countries and entered into force in 1975. The Fund Convention is a companion to the CLC Convention and is financed by oil-receivers bringing the total maximum compensation available to $ 78 million. Contributions from member countries are based on the annual amount of oil received. It entered into force in 1978 and has been ratified by 42 countries. Both Conventions have been signed by the United States but they have not yet been ratified by the Senate.

The Administration proposal provided the basis for eight days of hearings followed by five days of markup in the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The Subcommittee action produced a clean bill, H.R. 14862, which was referred to the Merchant Marine and Public Works Committees.

The Merchant Marine Committee further amended the bill and reported it to the House after two days of markup on August 24-25, 1976. As reported, the bill established an industry-financed $ 200 million oil pollution compensation fund derived from a per barrel fee not to exceed three cents. The fund would be available as a backup to provide restitution when a spiller's liability had been exceeded or the source of the spill was unidentified.

Liability limits were set at $ 30 million for tankers, $ 150 per gross ton for other vessels, and $ 50 million for facilities. These limits to liability did not apply if the accident was caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct. The Committee debated the issue of imposing unlimited liability for cleanup costs but decided that such a provision would make the liability uninsurable.

A cornerstone of the reported bill was the preemption of duplicative state law. It specifically prohibited litigation in federal or state courts to assert claims for damages covered in the bill and precluded the imposition of a fee to build a state fund for the same purposes as the federal fund.

In tandem with the preemption of state law, the bill eliminated the federal liability and compensation provisions in the FWPCA and the Deepwater Port Act. With the removal of duplicative state and federal law, a single, comprehensive, national system was created that would provide quick compensation to those damaged by oil pollution and a streamlined legal and regulatory regime on which those engaged in the necessary production and transportation of oil could rely.

The Committee also considered the inclusion of landbased [19 ELR 10335] spills and spills of hazardous materials, and nixed both ideas. Land spills were deemed an inherently state matter and hazardous waste cleanup was considered radically different from oil spill cleanup and should therefore be dealt with separately. As reported, the bill deleted the implementation of the two international conventions based on what were considered inadequate levels of liability.

The Public Works Committee took no action, and the bill died with the adjournment of the 94th Congress in October 1976.

More Oil Spills and More Unsuccessful Bills

Two months later, just before Christmas 1976, the Liberian-flag tanker Argo Merchant grounded in international waters 27 miles southwest of Nantucket Island and over the next month leaked an estimated 8.5 million gallons of oil. With the vision of this latest incident still fresh, work on oil spill legislation began anew in the 95th Congress and a bill, H.R. 6803, was approved by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on May 4, 1977.⁶ After satisfying what were generally technical and clarifying questions raised by the Public Works Committee, on September 12, 1977, the bill passed the House by a vote of 322 to 59.

In the Senate, the legislation was referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Environment and Public Works, and a bill, S. 2083, was passed by the Senate on October 5, 1978, ten days before the end of the session. The nearness of adjournment prevented the calling of a conference to work out what were major differences between the two bills: the perennial stumbling block — the preemption of state oil spill laws — and the addition of hazardous substance cleanup by the Senate, a concept that the House had earlier deemed critical but unwieldy in the context of the oil spill bill.

Despite Congress' inability to act, accidents continued to occur. The need for the compensation bill was again dramatically demonstrated during 1978 when on March 16, the Liberian-flag tanker Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the Brittany coast of France. With salvage impossible, the supertanker was finally blown up and its entire cargo of 68 million gallons of crude oil was lost into the sea. Initial damage claims totaled over $ 2 billion but the actual liability of Amoco is still under litigation, 11 years after the disaster.

The 95th Congress did have some limited success with oil spill compensation legislation with the passage in 1978 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments.⁷ It established yet a third federal oil spill fund, this one with $ 200 million to cover spills from offshore production facilities and vessels transporting oil from these facilities. A $ 35 million liability limit for damages and unlimited liability for cleanup were imposed.

As was becoming tradition, the 96th Congress began with the introduction of an oil spill bill, H.R. 85, which was approved by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on May 9, 1979.⁸ The following month, on June 3, 1979, disaster struck again when the Ixtoc I well blew out in the Bay of Campeche and leaked unchecked for nine months. An estimated loss of between 125 and 140 million gallons of oil made this the largest spill in history.

A little less than a year later, on May 16, 1980, the House Public Works Committee reported H.R. 85 with minor changes to the oil spill title, but with the major addition of a parallel regime for the cleanup pf hazardous substances.⁹ The Ways and Means Committee received a sequential referral and reported the bill on June 20, 1980,¹⁰ with a new title establishing two trust funds, one for oil and one for hazardous substances. The oil trust fund was to receive a 1.3 cent per barrel tax on crude oil and be available to reimburse cleanup costs and a much more limited scope of damages than provided in the bills reported from the other two Committees. The House considered H.R. 85 on September 18, 1980, and passed it the following day by a vote of 288 to 11.

The report of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on H.R. 85 unwittingly speaks to what has become one of the great ironies of the bill's history:

It is the belief of the Committee that the subject of hazardous substancces liability and compensation deserves the same through study and extensive input from concerned interests as has been the case withoil. While it is hoped that this process can be accomplished in a considerably shorter period of time than has been spent so far on oil pollution, the Committee feels that the present bill should not be delayed while the necessary developmental work is done on the issues involved in hazardous substances.¹¹

Stimulated by such catastrophic events as Love Canal and Times Beach, congressional attention was diverted from oil spills to hazardous wastes, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)¹² became the "fast train" to which we added the provisions of H.R. 85. However, protracted discussion in the House-Senate Conference ultimately resulted in dropping the oil spill provisions, but only after Senate leaders gave assurances to move the bill quickly in the next Congress. To add insult to the injury of being left in the dust, CERCLA even appropriated oil spill's nickname — Superfund.

Then things got worse.

In 1981, the Reagan Administration came to town armed with an ideological agenda and an opposition to our bill —the first administration to take this position — and the Republicans gained control of the Senate. A consequence of this latter fact was that those in the "other body" who had promised rapid consideration of oil spill legislation were no longer in the driver's seat.

These were the unpleasant circumstances I faced as the newly elected Chairman of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. But we persevered, introduced a bill — H.R. 85 again — held hearings, reported it from sub-committee, reported it from our Committee,¹³ and watched it sit untouched for the remainder of the Congress.

To allay state concerns about the adequacy of the federal program, that year's version of the bill included a three year phase-in of the preemption of existing state funds. It also changed the offshore facility liability limit to $ 75 [19 ELR 10336] million (from the cost of cleanup plus $ 50 million) and, rather than folding the money from the TAPS fund into the new trust fund, the bill authorized the rebate of TAPS contributions.

This last change reflected a sensitivity to a legal concern that grabbing the TAPS fund monies for the new trust fund could arguably be an unconstitutional "taking" of the assets of a private corporation since the TAPS Fund is not a trust fund in the U.S. Treasury but rather a privately administered fund.

Eternally optimistic, the 98th Congress became the fifth Congress in which we attempted the enactment of oil spill compensation legislation. As approved by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on June 28, 1983,¹⁴ H.R. 3278 differed from earlier bills in several ways.

First, it addressed only vessels and offshore facilities. Second, the bill established a corporation patterned after TAPS to administer a $ 300 million fund ($ 100 million per incident) rather than a public fund administered by the Secretary of Transportation. Third, it implemented the two international conventions dealing with oil pollution liability and compensation. While the liability limitations under these two conventions were still considered inadequate, implementing language was included to enhance the United States' negotiating position as our representatives sought to broaden and increase the scope of the CLC and Fund Conventions. Fourth, the bill reduced the liability limit for offshore facilities to $ 50 million from $ 75 million, and raised a tanker's liability from $ 30 million to $ 40 million.

The first good news spill bill promoters had in a long time came on May 9, 1984, when the Secretary of Transportation, Elizabeth Dole, announced that the Reagan Administration was reversing its position and would now support the creation of a comprehensive oil spill compensation and liability regime.

The Administration's reversal was at least partially based on the completion of new "Protocols" or amendments to the Civil Liability Convention and Fund Convention that increased CLC coverage to $ 78 million and, with the Fund, to a total of $ 175 million, which would be hiked to $ 260 million after three of the leading oil receiving nations (i.e., the United States, Japan, Italy, France, or the Netherlands) equalling at least 500 million metric tons, adopted the Protocols.

Seizing upon the new-found Administration endorsement, we offered the text of H.R. 3278 as a floor amendment to H.R. 5640, the proposed Superfund Expansion and Protection Act. The amendment was accepted by a voice vote on August 10, 1984, and the entire bill was subsequently passed by the House. The Senate, however, took no action on oil spill legislation, either alone or in the context of Superfund, and it died with the Adjournment of the 98th Congress.

So, once again, we dusted off the bill at the start of the 99th Congress, which proved to be one of the most active —and most confusing — for oil spill legislation. The bill as reported by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee¹⁵ deviated from previous bills in several significant ways:

* it refunded to the General Treasury monies (at that time more than $ 20 million) in the FWPCA § 311 Fund;

* it imposed limits on liability that were in line with those included in the 1984 international Protocols ($ 60 million for tankers, $ 300 per ton for other vessels, $ 150 per ton for inland oil barges, and $ 50 million for facilities); and

* it established a government corporation in the Department of Transportation to manage the fund.

On August 1, 1985, the House Energy and Commerce Committee reported H.R. 2817, the Superfund Amendments of 1985. I requested and was granted a sequential referral of the bill and on October 1, 1985, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee added the text of H.R. 1232 to the bill which then passed the House in December 1985 and was tacked onto H.R. 2005, the Social Security Minor and Technical Changes Act of 1985. Throughout a lengthy conference, the Senate maintained its opposition to the oil spill title. By May 1986, it was clear that the best deal we could strike was that in return for dropping the oil spill provisions the Senate would agree to quickly move a separate bill.

Stymied at this front, later that summer, on July 24, 1986, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee added a somewhat modified version of H.R. 1232 to its fiscal year 1987 "reconciliation" recommendations to the House Budget Committee. Most importantly, in an effort at compromise with the Senate, the bill now preserved, without restriction, the rights of states to maintain their own oil pollution compensation funds. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, H.R. 5300, was passed by the House on September 24, 1986, but the oil spill provisions were stricken in Conference.

Oddly enough, the Conference retained — and the bill as it became law provided — the financing provisions for the oil spill fund, a 1.3 cent per barrel tax on oil¹⁶ that would not "trigger" until implementing legislation was enacted by a deadline of September 1, 1987.

Concurrent with action on the budget reconcilation package, the Senate on September 28, 1986, passed an oil spill bill, as had been agreed in the Superfund Conference. S. 2799, introduced by Senator George Mitchell (D-Maine), provided a $ 500 million per incident cap, allowed states a "direct draw" of $ 250,000 on the fund for immediate cleanup costs, did not preempt any aspect of state laws, and placed no limit on the liability of vessels or OCS facilities.

The House and Senate bills were obviously miles apart philosophically and substantively. Fruitless negotiations to resolve these differences continued until the last minutes of the 99th Congress, which adjourned on October 18, 1986. Though another Congress had now ended without success in achieving an accommodation on the programmatic aspects of the legislation, spill bill advocates took heart from having one foot in the door — the financing provisions for the compensation fund were, at least temporarily, on the books.

The dawning of the 100th Congress brought yet another oil spill bill, H.R. 1632,¹⁷ that blended many aspects of previous House and Senate bills. It again preserved state funds and taxing authorities (while preempting state liability laws), implemented the international Protocols, and made the Fund available for a $ 100,000 "direct draw" by the states. Liability limits were set at $ 60 million for [19 ELR 10337] tankers, $ 300 per gross ton for other vessels, and $ 75 million for facilities. The House Public Works Committee held a hearing on the bill on June 24, 1987, but no further action was taken in the House.

Pursuing all possible roads to success, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee again added the provisions of its oil spill bill to its budget reconciliation recommendations. Though approved by the House as part of H.R. 3545, the fiscal year 1988 reconciliation bill, the oil spill section was once again dropped in Conference. A glimmer of hope for oil spill legislation was kept alive by the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 that extended the deadline for enacting "triggering" oil spill legislation until December 31, 1990.

Developments in the 101st Congress

Today, in the midst of the 101st Congress, the eighth to consider oil spill compensation legislation, we find ourselves framing our discussions not in terms of "Oil spills can happen" but rather, "Look at what happened in Alaska. In Narragansett Bay. In the Delaware River. And in the Houston Ship Channel."

On June 21, 1989, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee marked up an oil spill compensation bill for what I sincerely hope is the last time. This bill, H.R. 1465, sets up a billion-dollar-per-incident oil industry-financed fund to pay for oil spill cleanups and to compensate those who suffer losses as a result of a spill. As in previous bills, the fund kicks in as a backup if claims exceed an innocent spiller's liability, or if the source of the spill is unknown, and to pay for immediate cleanup costs incurred by federal and state governments.

The bill provides that if a spill is a result of gross negligence, the spiller is responsible for all cleanup, removal, and damage costs. If, however, the spill is caused by one of the enumerated "defenses" to unlimited liability, the bill establishes limits for vessels and facilities beyond which claims would be paid from the fund. The bill also implements the Protocols to the Fund and CLC Conventions for spills created by seagoing tankers, when and if the Protocols are ratified by the Senate.

While 11 amendments were offered during the markup, those dealing with the issue of preemption of state laws once again prompted the most debate. The Committee was faced with two choices: first, a preemption of only those state laws in conflict with the international protocols when adopted; or second, the choice I offered, the preemption of state liability laws in tandem with a prohibition on states assessing taxes on oil to pay damage claims covered by the federal fund. States could however, continue to use an oil-tax-derived fund for spill cleanup. State funds generated from any source other than a tax on oil are not affected by the bill's provisions and can be used for any purpose. By a bipartisan vote of 26 to 16, the Committee adopted my amendment.

After the markup, I met with other House Democratic leaders and we decided to take an omnibus oil spill compensation, liability, response, and prevention bill to the full House for a vote in late September. I think this is a wise decision and, coupled with administrative support for the bill, may provide just the spark necessary to finally move this legislation that has foundered far too long.

Over the tortured 14-year history of oil spill compensation legislation, we have increased liability limits, increased the size of the fund, tried to reach an acceptable accord on the idea of preemption, and worked for a reasonable international system of liability and compensation. Yet, in many respects H.R. 1465 looks a lot like the bills of previous years, because the premise stated in our very first Committee report from the 94th Congress remains the same: "The bill has one basic purpose. That purpose is to insure an unlimited, readily accessible compensation fund, to which claimants, damaged by oil pollution, may have recourse."

As this goes to press, optimism prevails and speedy consideration by the House in late summer is assured. However, it would be foolish to believe that the bill that passes the House will face smooth sailing in the Senate. For my part, as Chairman of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, I have no higher priority on the Committee agenda this Congress. I intend to use every method and resource I can muster to push the bill to enactment. With the massive spill in Prince William Sound as backdrop, I don't know how I could responsibly do otherwise.

1. FWPCA § 311, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321, ELR STAT. FWPCA 039. FWPCA is popularly known as the Clean Water Act.

2. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653.

3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524.

4. H.R. REP. NO. 1489, 94th Cong., pt. 1.

5. ELR STAT. TREATIES 40306.

6. H.R. REP. No. 340, 95th Cong., pt. 1.

7. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1812-1824.

8. H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., pt. 1.

9. H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., pt. 2.

10. H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., pt. 3.

11. Id.

12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.

13. H.R. REP. No. 120, 97th Cong., pt. 1.

14. H.R. REP. NO. 340, 98th Cong., pt. 1.

15. H.R. REP. NO. 247, 99th Cong., pt. 1.

16. Pub. L. No. 99-509.

17. H.R. REP. NO. 163, 100th Cong., pt. 1.