2 ELR 20368 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1972 | All rights reserved


In the Matter of Louis K. Lefkowitz v. Fuchs Brothers Sales Corp.

No. 41480/71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. January 27, 1972)

Importer of men's shoes made of alligator, caiman or crocodile skins enjoined under New York state law (Agriculture and Markets Law § 385-a) from further offering such shoes for sale. Although importer does not stock or warehouse such shoes in New York, its New York operation serves as the moving force in bringing the manufacturer and the retailer together, from which importer derives a profit. Hence, its operation constitutes offering such shoes for sale despite no direct handling.

Counsel for Plaintiff
Louis K. Lefkowitz, Attorney General
80 Centre Street
New York, N.Y. 10013

Counsel for Defendant
Schlanger, Blumenthal & Lynne
7 East 48th Street
New York, N.Y. 10017

[2 ELR 20368]

Greenfield, J.

The Attorney General moves, pursuant to Section 63, Subdivision 12, of the Executive Law, for an injunction restraining defendants from engaging in the State of New York, in the illegal sale of men's shoes made of alligator, caiman or crocodile skins. Section 385-a of the Agriculture and Markets Law prohibited the sale or offer for sale of certain animal skins after September 1, 1970, on the ground that this served to protect endangered species.

There is no dispute on the facts. Respondent is an importer of men's shoes, having an office in New York City, as well as in other cities, and employing salesmen throughout the fifty states, who have authority to accept orders from retailers for shoes which are thereafter manufactured abroad to fulfill the orders. The uncontradictedtestimony of respondent shows that it does not stock or warehouse shoes in New York, but upon clearing through U.S. Customs at John F. Kennedy Airport the shoes are immediately shipped to their ultimate destination.

Petitioner bases its case upon bills of lading for more than 1,000 pairs of shoes in the prohibited skins arriving after the effective date of the statute, to respondent's order. Respondent has shown that the immediate destination of all the shoes was outside New York State, where their sale is not prohibited. The sole question is whether respondent's business activities in New York constitute "selling or offering for sale" in violation of law.

It is undisputed that respondent is in periodic receipt of orders for such shoes directed to its New York office from customers throughout the United States. Once these orders have been transmitted by respondent to its agents in Europe the directions as to the ultimate destination of those shoes, once having arrived at United States Customs, are given to the shipper by respondent in New York. Finally, a portion of the proceeds of sale are paid to and received by respondent in New York. It is obvious that respondent's New York operation serves as the moving force in bringing the manufacturer and the retailer together, for which respondent naturally derives a profit. The fact that the shoes are not touched by respondent's hands does not serve as an expedient to circumvent the clear strictures of the statute. Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent has in fact offered for sale within the State of New York a commodity prohibited by law and thereby enjoins the respondent from further transacting such business.

Settle order.


2 ELR 20368 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1972 | All rights reserved