Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA
Citation: 6 ELR 20688
No. No. 74-2131, 543 F.2d 270/9 ERC 1097/(D.C. Cir., 07/06/1976)
The court invalidates EPA regulations imposing strict vicarious liability on petroleum refiners for negligent acts of retailers that cause contamination of lead-free gasoline by leaded gasoline. Under § 211(c)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(B), ELR 41201, which allows the EPA Administrator to prohibit fuel additives that will impair the performance of automotive emission control devices, the Administrator promulgated regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254 (Jan. 10, 1973), that would have imposed an irrebuttable presumption of refiner fault for any contamination at the retailer stage. These regulations were previously invalidated by this court. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 4 ELR 20397 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Amoco I). EPA's redrafting of the regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(b)(2)(iv), allows a refiner to escape liability for contamination only if the retailer does not lease his facility from the refiner or for the limited exceptions of deliberate contamination by vandals or service station employees.
Retailer negligence cannot be imputed to the refiner in all cases. Thus, the regulations arbitrarily create refiner liability even where the refiner his imposed a strict contractual obligation on the retailer to avoid contamination and has made every human effort possible to achieve compliance with it. The EPA has no authority under the Clean Air Act to alter the settled law of vicarious liability between lessor and lessee. The mere fact of a lease does not furnish a legal basis for imposing blanket responsibility upon the lessor for tortious acts committed by the lessee. Absent congressional inten to create a new tort, common law rules of vicarious liability apply. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1953).
Generally, vicarious liability may be imposed on a non-negligent person because of a closely-integrated relationship between him and the negligent party. W. Prosser, Law of Torts 458 (4th ed. 1971). The person to whom the negligence is imputed must have sufficient control over the acts of the negligent party to be responsible for those acts. Traditionally, a landlord is not vicariously liable for accidents caused by a lessee unless he has retained control over the premises. Prosser, supra, § 63. While the court is not willing to raise the traditional rule as a bar against all refiner liability, EPA cannot impose liability on all refiners for all negligent combinations occurring regardless of the degree of control exercised by the refiner over the retailer-lessee. Not all oil company leases necessarily retain control over retailers. Absent a demonstrated link between the lease and the degree of actual refiner control over retailers, EPA cannot impose blanket vicarious liability on refiners for negligent acts of their lessees. This rule is not an attempt to define the relationship that will justify imposition of vicarious liability. Indeed, the record contains no support for EPA's conclusion that refiners retain sufficient control over retailers to prevent contamination. The court merely holds this conclusion to be arbitrary.
The court's prior decision in Amoco I merely states when a refiner may not be held liable. It does not address the sufficiency of EPA's showing of when the refiner may be held liable.
Counsel for Petitioner
James F. Davis
Howrey, Simon, Baker & Murchison
1730 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington DC 20006
Counsel for Respondent
Edmund B. Clark
Raymond N. Zagone
Edward J. Shawaker
Department of Justice
Washington DC 20530
Leslie A. Carothers
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington DC 20460
MacKinnon, J., joined by Robb, J.; Wright, J., dissents.
[OPINION OMITTED BY PUBLISHER IN ORIGINAL SOURCE]